Since war is an instrument of a nation's policy, it therefore, becomes obvious to start from there. It is the responsibility of the government, or the policy makers, to ennunciate the nation's policy to the military headquarters.
This will enable them to work out the conditions and anticipate the situations which could lead to war, and if so, the conditions and situations under which the war would have to be fought.

Policy is, therefore, the realm of the policy makers and is outside the preview of the armed forces. The latter are only required to understand the implications of the policy decisions and plan for the contingencies.
They can and must convey to the nation's policy makers the implications of the policy decisions.
They can and must convey to the nation's policy makers their advice on the use of the armed forces. Their view may or may not affect the policy maker's views depending on their own constraints.

However, it devolves on the policy makers that they do not spring a surprise on their own armed forces. to that extent, policy decisions must be taken very deliberately and in a minimum time frame of 10-20 years, whereby a detailed plan is required to be worked out, to implement the policy decision, with the need to employ force being the last resort. This would give the armed forces enough time to be prepared.

War, as indicated earlier, is an activity involving nations, and is a continuation of nation;s policy, by violent means.
It aims at protecting a nation's interests and creating conditions for further promoting these interests, by imposing her will on the opposing nation.
On analysis, it will be found that interests of nations are, invariably, spelt out in economic terms. One, as such, cannot but help come out with the truism that war is, invariably, caused by factors, which can be traced to economic factors.

In the case of developed economies, having diverted their resources towards this non productive activity, and having developed their production lines, they have no other option but to go into large scale export weapon systems. It, therefore, is in their economic interests, to create conditions conducive to creating the increased demand for their weapon systems.
As a matter of fact, when one sees the sequence of events, over the past 50 years, it strikes one straight away that practically all the international clashes were instigated by one or the other industrially developed country. This, obviously, creates demand for their weapon systems.
One, therefore, finds that it is in the interests of the weapon producing countries, to create tensions and such other conditions, where the receiving nations find themselves at loggerheads with each other, thereby increasing the demand for the weapon systems.
Such conditions, apart from creating demand for their products, also help, divert scarce resources, from productive activity of the rival or unfriendly countries.
It is indeed strange that the small western nations, which came into prominence three or four centuries ago, have devoted greater attention to war and have produced a number of thinkers, philosophers and soldiers who have studied, in detail, the various aspects of war, while India with all its claims to civilization never understood it.

Let not Bismark's quotation be amended by the Indians to read as follows:-
"Even fools learn from their own mistakes. But we Indians are bloody fools, for we do not even learn from our own blunders".

China realized it right from the beginning, that she would have to clash with India, and has already developed her infrastructure and prepared for the conflict which she knew was inevitable. She also selected the point of the actual clash, the border between India and Tibet.
India, on the other hand, was in the hands of visionary amateurs. They were advised by military leadership, who not only never grasped the concepts of policy/grand strategy, but were also never really meant to get involved at the level of policy making. The result was that India blundered into a trap blind-folded.
Two divisions, out of a seven divisions army got badly mauled. By itself, not a very major military disaster. After all, Great Britain had recovered from a much severe blow in the beginning of the Second World War. The Indian policy makers and their military advisers, however, never realised as to what hit them.
The Indian Army has still not recovered from the complexes developed since 1962. So frightened are the Indian Armed Forces of the Chinese that they, ostrich like, refuse to consider China as a major threat and cover up their inadequacies, by their bellicose drumming up of the Pakistani threat.

As a matter of fact, when we study war and its history, we find practically all major scientific discoveries had war-like connotations before they were modified for civilian use. Whether it was the wheel or the discovery of fire, their first use was in wars or conflicts.
To be able to develop a proper war machine it was necessary to be able to produce the item concerned in adequate quantities. Production of, say, 100 war chariots, 7000 years ago, in Egypt, must have been a major industrial effort, far surpassing the production of, say 10,000 tanks by the United States of America in 1991.
Gunpowder and nuclear energy, are two other examples of scientific discoveries, with war-like implications, later converted to civilian uses.
It must, however, be reiterated that, unless there is a proper industrial base to fully use the potential of a discovery, the nation's war machine will always be at a handicap."
Gunpowder is an excellent case study in this aspect. Even though gunpowder was discovered in China, before the birth of Christ, it had to be rediscovered in the West and fully utilised. The lack of a proper metallurgical industry in China and for that matter in the rest of Asia, left it to the Europeans to develop cannons, guns and even muskets.
}India had her first glimpse of cannon, when she was on the receiving end of the cannonades from Babar's artillery in 1526, at the First Battle of Panipat. Even subsequently, till the British came, manufacture of cannon was a highly classified industry with very few who could manufacture them.

It would also be worthwhile to mention here that, a victory is only a means to an end and not the end itself.
It is, therefore, imperative that the final agreement should not only achieve the aims for which the war had to be resorted to, but also to ensure that war does not have to be fought again to achieve the same aims or results.
To be able to achieve the nation's aims, it, therefore, becomes imperative that, the armed forces are in a position to deliver.
With the parameters stipulated earlier, it becomes essential to have standing professional and preferably volunteer armies. (This includes the Navy and the Air Force).
To ensure that a nation has an effective war machine, and in the modern context, with the capability for instant response, it is a must! There is a need for the following ingredients:

An organisation to lay down clear-cut policy imperatives and the methodology to achieve the aims.

A single head of the three services.
Well-trained and equipped three services.
Adequate reserves of trained manpower and equipment.

The next step in the chain of command would be an organisation which would act as a link between the policy makers and the actual implementers of the policy, in this case - the three services, i.e., the Army, Navy and the Air Force.
As mentioned earlier, it is better to have a single individual, who transcends the inter-service rivalries and is above.
A partisan approach to any given problem.
To that extent, the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, as practiced in the United States of America, is a much better proposition than the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee in India.
The role of the Chief of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee would be, to advise the apex body on military implications of the policy goals laid down, and the methodology worked out for achieving these goals. To that extent, he would have to be a member of the apex council.
Once the policy has been laid down, he will have the responsibility of working out the methodology, in detail, as to how that policy is to be implemented, within the broad parameters laid down by the apex body.
In other words, he would work out the grand strategic stipulations. In this, he would be helped by his civilian counterpart (The Cabinet Secretary, in the case of India) along with the chief bureaucratic executives or the secretaries of the concerned ministries. Along with them he would also work out the guidelines/limitations for the implementation of the policy.
Thereafter, as the head of the three services, he would be required to work out, in detail, the contingency plans along with any alternatives, to ensure the achievement of the policy.
In between the Cabinet Committee for Parliamentary Affairs and the Chiefs of Staff Committee is the Committee for Defence Planning.
It is the apex council for integrated defence planning, as well as, national development. It is also the conduit between the Cabinet Committee for Parliamentary Affairs and the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
The Cabinet Secretary is the Chairman with the Prime Minister's Secretary, Defence Secretary, and the Foreign, Finance, Defence Production Secretaries, as well as, the Secretary of the Planning Commission as permanent members. This is what Rajesh Rajora has to say about the functioning of these committees:
Two way communications is usually absent in the above three committees. Most of the time they are at loggerheads. The bureaucratic body has occupied a place of extraordinary importance. No proposal, whether it is the brainchild of the service chiefs or the Minister (sic) can see the light of day unless it is duly processed by the bureaucracy. The speed with which it is processed is also dependent on them, often determined by their own perceptions of its importance and urgency. This has given rise to the expression "bureaucratic control" - a situation which the services resent.

Finally, it would be pertinent to reiterate that, maintaining an effective war machine is an expensive proposition. Unless the defence services contribute towards their maintenance, the nation is going to find it a heavy burden. Most of the Western developed nations have a strong and a well-developed armament industry. They use the export of weapon system to generate funds, including foreign exchange to help finance the nation's economy, as well as, finance the maintenance of their armed forces, at the same time help, maintain a satisfactory balance of trade.

A nation is strong only if it is economically strong. Economic strength is possible only when there is stability. This requires military strength.
Military strength, on the other hand requires economic strength. The two are very closely interlinked. The two must be complementary, one paying for the other.
The western economies have achieved this balance and are in a position to call the shots in the international foray. The best examples are the United States of America and France. They are the biggest producers of armaments and the biggest exporters of weapons systems.

In the last 20 years, India has never spent more than 4 percent of its gross domestic product. As a matter of fact the expenditure has varied between 2.85% and 3.62% of the gross domestic product.
On the other hand, after 1962, in the next two years, when the expenditure on defence was raised from 2 per cent to 4.5 per cent of the gross domestic product, the growth rate went up from the Hindu rate of growth of less than 3 per cent to a growth rate of 6.5 per cent (Government of India Economic Survey for 1988-89).
As the expenditure on defence was reduced, having reached the desired strength of armed forces, the growth rate dropped.
It would be pertinent to highlight that Pakistan's growth rate has been persistently higher than India and so has been her expenditure on defence, in terms of percentage of her gross domestic product.
An obvious conclusion that one makes is that in any economy, the growth rate appears to be directly linked with the expenditure on defence.
The United States of America, France, all have been spending on an average more than 4 per cent of their gross domestic product, on defence and each one has had a growth rate of well above 5-6 percent in real terms, leave alone at current prices.
Empirically, it appears that, between 4.5 per cent to 5 per cent of the gross domestic product would be the optimum rate for investment in defence. It would ensure a growth rate of about 6 per cent or more and at the same time not attract much attention of the world powers.

So far, the trend in this country has been to set up public sector undertakings in the backward regions, to give a fillip to the local region, towards development and general well-being of the people of that region.
However, from experience in India it has been observed that such a policy has the following drawbacks.

The region may not be suitable for such an industry, economically, in that it is invariably neither a source of raw material, nor is it a market for that industry's produce.
Invariably the requisite infrastructure in the form of power or electricity, or even for that matter adequate trained matter adequate trained manpower has to be created from scratch. It has generally been observed that the complete manpower, especially trained manpower comes from outside. The locals just get unskilled jobs. Of course, there is some trickle down effect. The cost, in economic terms is, however, too high.
The price of the produce from such industries is unreasonably high.
On the other hand, it has been experienced that by positioning armed forces units, or installations in such regions similar results occur. The local population gets increased work, albeit at the unskilled level. Suitable infrastructure develops in the form of new retail outlets, schools, and even medical facilities.
In addition, the region is opened up by improved transportation facilities.
We have had experience of towns like Jammu, Rajouri, even Simla (after Independence) Ambala Cantonment and Jhansi being economic gainers by having army units positioned there.
Today, after more than 50 years of their stay, these towns have developed enough to reach, what in economic terms is called, the "take-off stage".
Similarly, townships like Binnaguri, Lekhapani, and Misamari have come up as a result of defence units located there and the region has developed from near jungle into modern areas with all amenities available. All this, without additional burden, which an industry, located in such a region, would become.
In addition, the country, in this case India, would make a considerable profit by selling all the land in existing cantonments and moving the armed forces into such backward areas.
The defence forces would be quite happy if they get adequate accommodation and adequate schooling and education facilities, for their children and other amenities.
The defence services also help the nation economically, by converting the revenue account expenditure into savings.
With over 42 lakhs employed in the defence services and defence linked related industries, in India, their provident fund, group insurance savings, contribute very handsomely towards the total national savings effort.
In addition, if the government could set up a pension fund instead of budgeting for the pension in the revenue account and transfer an equivalent of 10 per cent of the individual's pay plus dearness allowance, as most private firms do.

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