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Hi Folks, how are you today?
It is our intent to create a respectful environment for understanding and healing, a Discussion-Safety-Zone for Related Topics, while maintaining our Visitors' Zones-of-Privacy, and to interact on a non-judgmental basis. Today far too many communities fail to create these safety-zones!

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*** Cases which have previously settled sex offender issues, listed by topic ***
   SO Registry Challenges:
   Failure to Register Challenges:
   Therapy, 5th Amendment, Risk Assessment Challenges:
   Civil Commitment Challenges:
   Conditions of Parole, Probation, Supervised Release or Conditional Discharge:
   Miscellaneous & Other Important Cases:

--- Sex Offenders Residing in Homes with Children ---
See Also: Contesting Conditions of Parole, Probation, Supervised Release -OR- Conditional Discharge below:
Failure to do background checks before placement of child in home: Generally these will be cases of foster children, or when other family members seek to house a child in their home:
January 2005:Maine: MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT: In re Janna Lynn M. et al.
The parents of Janna Lynn M., Alexander M., and Zachary M. appeal from a preliminary child protection order entered in the District Court (Houlton, Griffiths, J.) granting custody of the children to the Department of Human Services (DHS). They primarily claim a violation of their due process rights because of the refusal of the court to hold a jeopardy hearing. We dismiss the appeal as moot.

This proceeding began on August 15, 2000, when DHS filed a petition for a child protection order and a request for an order of preliminary child protection concerning Janna Lynn and Alexander. The petition stated that the children were neglected because of the parents' unkempt home and car and their failure to keep the children clean. The petition also alleged that the parents failed to protect the children from the threat of sexual abuse by Raymond L., the mother's brother, an untreated sex-offender, who was living with the family. That same day the District Court granted the preliminary protection order and DHS took temporary custody of the children. On August 24, the parents consented to the temporary order and waived the summary preliminary hearing.
The Department of Children’s and Family Services (DCFS) seeks writ review of an order of the juvenile court returning five-year-old H.S. to the care of her maternal grandmother, Sencere P. DCFS contends the order violated Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.4, which requires a criminal records check of all adults living in the home of any relative caretaker who is not a licensed foster care provider before a dependent child may be placed in the home.

SUMMARY: Maternal grandmother moved with H.S., on an emergency basis, to the home of maternal grandmother’s parents. A criminal records check revealed two of the residents of maternal grandmother’s new home had felony convictions that precluded placement of H.S. in the home. ... ... On May 17, 2004, an ASFA investigator reported the Taper Avenue home was unacceptable because, inter alia, a CLETS check revealed adults living there had criminal arrests or convictions including a conviction of rape for George T. and convictions of hit and run and robbery for Eddie H. ...

--- Sex Offender Registration Cases ---
Sex Offender Registration & Dangerousness Hearing: In essence Plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to a hearing on dangerousness before being listed in the state registry, and the state's failure to provide that violated due process and ex post facto clauses:
October 2001:Connecticut: 2nd Circuit Federal Court of Appeals : Doe -v- Dep't of Public Safety, 271 F.3d 38(Which was appealed to the US Supreme Court)
March 2003:Connecticut: US Supreme Court: CONNECTICUT DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY V. DOE
Held: The Second Circuit’s judgment must be reversed because due process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State’s statutory scheme. Mere injury to reputation, even if defamatory, does not constitute the deprivation of a liberty interest. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693. But even assuming, arguendo, that respondent has been deprived of a liberty interest, due process does not entitle him to a hearing to establish a fact–that he is not currently dangerous–that is not material under the statute. Cf., e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433. As the DPS Website explains, the law’s requirements turn on an offender’s conviction alone–a fact that a convicted offender has already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest. Unless respondent can show that the substantive rule of law is defective (by conflicting with the Constitution), any hearing on current dangerousness is a bootless exercise. Respondent expressly disavows any reliance on the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections, and maintains that his challenge is strictly a procedural one. .... ....
Sex Offender Registration & Ex Post Facto Clause: In essence Plaintiffs claim that, the requirement to register sex offenders convicted before enactment of registry laws violated the ex post facto clauses:
April 2001:Alaska: 9th Circuit Federal Court of Appeals : Doe -v- Otte 259 F3d 979(Which was appealed to the US Supreme Court)
March 2003:Alaska: US Supreme Court: SMITH V. DOE (The US Supreme Court after issuing its decision, then REMANDED this case back to the 9th Circuit Federal Court of Appeals to determine one issues they bypassed on the way up)
The Alaska law, which is our concern in this case, contains two components: a registration requirement and a notification system. Both are retroactive. 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 41, §12(a). The Act requires any “sex offender or child kidnapper who is physically present in the state” to register, either with the Department of Corrections (if the individual is incarcerated) or with the local law enforcement authorities (if the individual is at liberty). Alaska Stat. §§12.63.010(a), (b) (2000). Prompt registration is mandated. ... The information is forwarded to the Alaska Department of Public Safety, which maintains a central registry of sex offenders. §18.65.087(a). Some of the data, such as fingerprints, driver’s license number, anticipated change of address, and whether the offender has had medical treatment afterwards, is kept confidential. §§12.63.010(b), 18.65.087(b). The following information is made available to the public: “the sex offender’s or child kidnapper’s name, aliases, address, photograph, physical description, description[,] license [and] identification numbers of motor vehicles, place of employment, date of birth, crime for which convicted, date of conviction, place and court of conviction, length and conditions of sentence, and a statement as to whether the offender or kidnapper is in compliance with [the update] requirements … or cannot be located.” §18.65.087(b). The Act does not specify the means by which the registry information must be made public. Alaska has chosen to make most of the nonconfidential information available on the Internet.

This is the first time we have considered a claim that a sex offender registration and notification law constitutes retroactive punishment forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clause. The framework for our inquiry, however, is well established. We must “ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings.” Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997). If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry. If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the statutory scheme is “ ‘so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention’ to deem it ‘civil.’ ” Ibid. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248—249 (1980)). Because we “ordinarily defer to the legislature’s stated intent,” Hendricks, supra, at 361, “ ‘only the clearest proof ’ will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty,” Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997) ... ...

Our examination of the Act’s effects leads to the determination that respondents cannot show, much less by the clearest proof, that the effects of the law negate Alaska’s intention to establish a civil regulatory scheme. The Act is nonpunitive, and its retroactive application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
March 2004:Alaska: ON REMAND to 9th Cir Federal Court of Appeals: Doe -v- Tandeske
...... Our resolution of the Does' ex post facto claim made it unnecessary for us to decide at that time whether the Act violated plaintiffs' procedural and substantive due process rights. Id. at 982. However, the subsequent reversal of Doe v. Otte by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe now requires us to address those claims. The facts and the discussion of the relevant statutory provisions are set forth in Doe v. Otte, and accordingly, we proceed directly to our analysis. The Does assert that Alaska's sex offender registration law violates their right to procedural due process because the Act deprives them of protected liberty interests without notice or the right to be heard.

The Court has described the "fundamental" rights pro-tected by substantive due process as "those personal activities and decisions that this Court has identified as so deeply rooted in our history and traditions, or so fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered liberty, that they are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 727 (1997). Under Glucksberg, we are forced to conclude that persons who have been convicted of serious sex offenses do not have a fundamental right to be free from the registration and notification requirements set forth in the Alaska statute. While fundamental liberty interests require that any state infringement of these rights be "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest," state actions that implicate anything less than a fundamental right require only that the government demonstrate "a reasonable relation to a legiti-mate state interest to justify the action." Glucksberg, 521 U. S. at 722 (emphasis added).

As the Court has already determined in Smith, the statute's provisions serve "a legitimate nonpunitive purpose of 'public safety, which is advanced by alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in their community. ' " Smith, 538 U. S. at 102-03. Moreover, the Court held, the "broad categories" of offenses differentiated in the Act and the "corresponding length of the reporting requirement, are reasonably related to the danger of recidivism, and this is con-sistent with the regulatory objective." Id. at 102. Thus, although the Does possess liberty interests that are indeed important, Smith precludes our granting them relief.
The above two cases are the only Registration cases
that have been taken to the US Supreme Court
both were denied relief!

Sex Offender Registration Challenges: In essence these Plaintiffs claimed sex offender registry violated rights found in the constitutions, all cases failed. We are listing them because there may be reasons some folks want to read them:
September 1997:Connecticut: 2nd Cir Fed Court of Appeals : Roe -v- Office of Adult Probation,

September 1997: Washington: 9th Cir Fed Court of Appeals: RUSSELL/STEARNS v GREGOIRE No. 9635398

August 1997: New York: 2nd Cir Fed Court of Appeals: DOE v PATAKI (Corrected Opinion)

April 1996: New Jersey: 3rd Cir Fed Court of Appeals: ARTWAY v ATTY GEN NJ

June 1998:Utah: 10th Cir Fed Court of Appeals: JON FEMEDEER v Haun

October 1999: Tennessee: 6th Cir Fed Court of Appeals: Cutshall v Sundquist, Gov Tennessee

Unusual Sex Offender Registration Challenges: These cases presented issues based upon their unusual circumstances and have been granted partial relief. Their STATE law or STATE Constitution, as written, prevents the state from violating rights under special circumstances, these cases had some of those circumstances:
August 1999: Ohio: Ohio Supreme Court Ohio: State v. Bellman, 86 Ohio St.3d 208 (1999): Bellman cannot be required to register as 'Sexual Predator'

November 2001: Hawaii: 1st Cir Fed Court of Appeals: Hawaii v Eto Bani
This is the only case still good today, as the Hawaian law violates its State Constitution.
Failure to Register Challenges: It is not our intent to list all cases, just some raising unusual grounds or court decisions on new issues:
September 2000: North Carolina: Supreme Court: North Carolina v. Ricky Neal Young: N.C.G.S. § 14-208.11, which requires sex offenders to register their address, is unconstitutional as applied to an adjudicated incompetent defendant because it fails to afford sufficient notice under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the defendant here was provided with sufficient actual notice to satisfy due process requirements for any reasonable and prudent man, defendant has been legally determined to be incapable of managing his own affairs and is not a reasonable and prudent man.

January 2004: Florida: 5th Dist Court of Appeals: Giddens -v- State of Florida: Low IQ and functionally illiterate is a valid defense, Giddens was not guilty. see also Proving Knowledge of Sexual Offender Registration

September 2002: Michigan: Court of Appeals: Michigan -v- Lockett: Notifying Probation Office of change of address is insufficent, must also notify local police. Lockett was guilty.

December 2000: Michigan: Court of Appeals: Michigan -v- Santos: "Willful" failure to register is defined.

October 2000: Missouri: Supreme Court of Missouri: J.S. -v- Robert Beaird: J.S. worked as an over-the-road truck driver was charged with failure to register, "within ten days of coming into any county, register with the chief law enforcement official of the county in which such person resides." The critical question is whether J.S. falls into that group of sexual offenders "coming into" Jackson County. Thus, under the rule of lenity, the statute should be construed so that J.S., who has resided in Jackson County since the law came into effect, is not required to register because he never moved out of the county.

April 2004: North Carolina: Court of Appeals: North Carolina -v- Bryant: Bryant, formerly of South Carolina, was charged and convicted of failure to register after moving to North Carolina. Bryant argued that, the statutory scheme, which imposes a duty to register violates the right to due process of out-of-state residents who move to North Carolina by allowing them to be convicted of the offense without notice of the duty to register. Bryant was innocent, and convictions were reversed.

June 2004: California: Court of Appeals, 1st Appellate District, Division Three: The People -v- Donald Barker: see also Justices Question Use of ‘I Forgot’ Defense in Case of Sex Offender Who Failed to Register on Time.
Required to Register Challenges: It is not our intent to list all cases, just some raising unusual grounds or court decisions on new issues:
December 2004: California: Court of Appeals: 4th Dist. Div 3, 12-14-2004: People v. Noriega (2004): Does Penal Code fn. 1 section 290's sex offender registration requirement constitute cruel and unusual punishment when applied to a conviction for misdemeanor {Slip Opn. Page 2} indecent exposure? (§ 314, subd. (1).) The California Supreme Court recently addressed this issue with regard to a similar misdemeanor provision, possession of child pornography, pursuant to section 311.11. ( In re Alva (2004) 33 Cal.4th 254 ( Alva ).) In Alva, the court concluded, "[M]andatory sex offender registration, as provided by section 290, is not 'punishment' for purposes of either the Eighth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] or article I, section 17 of the California Constitution." ( Id. at p. 292.) We are bound by this decision. ( Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 , 455.) Thus, the trial court erred by refusing to impose the mandatory sex offender registration requirement triggered by defendant's conviction for misdemeanor indecent exposure. We reverse the trial court's order and remand the matter for further proceedings. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

--- Therapy and Risk Assessment Cases ---
Therapy & 5th Amend Rights: .. This is the main case on therapy which is quoted throughout the nation......
June 2002:US Supreme Court: McKUNE, WARDEN, et al. v. LILE

Respondent was convicted of rape and related crimes. A few years before his scheduled release, prison officials ordered respondent to participate in a Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP). As part of the program, participating inmates are required to complete and sign an "Admission of Responsibility" form, in which they accept responsibility for the crimes for which they have been sentenced, and complete a sexual history form detailing all prior sexual activities, regardless of whether the activities constitute uncharged criminal offenses. The information obtained from SATP participants is not privileged, and might be used against them in future criminal proceedings.

There is no evidence, however, that incriminating information has ever been disclosed under the SATP. Officials informed respondent that if he refused to participate in the SATP, his prison privileges would be reduced, resulting in the automatic curtailment of his visitation rights, earnings, work opportunities, ability to send money to family, canteen expenditures, access to a personal television, and other privileges. He also would be transferred to a potentially more dangerous maximum-security unit. Respondent refused to participate in the SATP on the ground that the required disclosures of his criminal history would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.

He brought this action for injunctive relief under 42 U. S. C. §1983. The District Court granted him summary judgment. Affirming, the Tenth Circuit held that the compelled self-incrimination prohibited by the Fifth Amendment can be established by penalties that do not constitute deprivations of protected liberty interests under the Due Process Clause; ruled that the automatic reduction in respondent's prison privileges and housing accommodations was such a penalty because of its substantial impact on him; declared that respondent's information would be sufficiently incriminating because an admission of culpability regarding his crime of conviction would create a risk of a perjury prosecution; and concluded that, although the SATP served Kansas' important interests in rehabilitating sex offenders and promoting public safety, those interests could be served without violating the Constitution by treating inmate admissions as privileged or by granting inmates use immunity.

You can read the brief filed by the 18 Amicus States by CLICKING News release of the reasons they filed Montana News Release.
Therapy & 5th Amend Rights: .. Court cases which have considered whether 5th Amend rights apply in a therapy environment...
Decided 07-01-86: ALLEN v. ILLINOIS, 478 U.S. 364 (1986)
Summary: ... The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." This Court has long held that the privilege against self-incrimination "not only permits a person to refuse to testify against himself at a criminal trial in which he is a defendant, but also `privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.'" Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973)); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924). In this case the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that a person whom the State attempts to commit under the Act is protected from use of his compelled answers in any subsequent criminal case in which he is the defendant. What we have here, then, is not a claim that petitioner's statements to the psychiatrists might be used to incriminate him in some future criminal proceeding, but instead his claim that because the sexually-dangerous-person proceeding is itself "criminal," he was entitled to refuse to answer any questions at all.

The question whether a particular proceeding is criminal for the purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause is first of all a question of statutory construction. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 236 -237 (1972). Here, Illinois has expressly provided that proceedings under the Act "shall be civil in nature," . 105-3.01, indicating that when it files a petition against a person under the Act it intends to proceed in a nonpunitive, noncriminal manner, "without regard to the procedural protections and restrictions available in criminal prosecutions." [478 U.S. 364, 369] Ward, supra, at 249. As petitioner correctly points out, however, the civil label is not always dispositive. Where a defendant has provided "the clearest proof" that "the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention" that the proceeding be civil, it must be considered criminal and the privilege against self-incrimination must be applied. 448 U.S., at 248 -249. We think that petitioner has failed to provide such proof in this case.

March 1998:Minnesota Court of Appeals: Randy Morrow -vs- Comm'r of Corrections

April 1999:Minnesota Court of Appeals: Randy Morrow -vs- Comm'r of Corrections

January 2005:9th Cir Court of Appeals: USA -v- Antelope, CR-00-00039-DWM
Lawrence Antelope is a convicted sex offender who shows promise of rehabilitation. The terms of his supervised release offer him treatment—but at a price he is not willing to pay. Antelope has repeatedly refused to incriminate himself as part of his sex offender treatment. He declines to detail his sexual history in the absence of any assurance of immunity because of the risk that he may reveal past crimes and that his admissions could then be used to prosecute him. In response, the government has twice revoked his conditional liberty and sent him to prison. The case he now brings requires us to decide whether the government’s actions violated his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. Because the Constitution does not countenance the sort of government coercion imposed on Antelope, and because his claim is ripe for adjudication, we reverse the judgment of the district court.

We decide also Antelope’s challenge to the release term prohibiting him from possessing “any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stimulating materials,” which we vacate and remand, as well as his challenge to the term prohibiting him from access to “any ‘on-line computer service,’ ” which we affirm.

Accordingly, the decision of the district court revoking Antelope’s supervised release because he invoked his Fifth Amendment rights in connection with the SABER program (Sexual Abusive Behavior Evaluation and Recovery) is REVERSED, the imposition of the release term prohibiting access to “any pornographic materials” is VACATED and REMANDED, and the release term prohibiting “access to any ‘on-line computer service’ ” is AFFIRMED.
Therapy required before parole: ........
December 1997:Hawaii: 9th Circuit Federal Court of Appeals: Neal -v- Shimoda
Therapy & Ex Post Facto Clause: ........
December 2000:Colorado: 10th Circuit Federal Court of Appeals: Chambers -v- Colorado
Risk Assessment Tools: .. Court cases which have evaluated the merits and failures of various risk assessment tools, as to there admissibility in a court action...
Nov 2001:Arizona Court of Appeals: State -vs- Judges (CA-SA 01-0464)
Dec 2002: Illinois Court of Appeals: Dale Taylor (2-01-0494)
Oct 2002: Iowa Court of Appeals: In re Harold Johnson (____)

--- Civil Commitment ---
6-27-97 Kansas: US Sup Ct KANSAS v. HENDRICKS
... The Act's definition of "mental abnormality" satisfies "substantive" due process requirements. This Court has consistently upheld involuntary commitment statutes that detain people who are unable to control their behavior and thereby pose a danger to the public health and safety, provided the confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards.

The Kansas Act requires a precommitment finding of dangerousness either to one's self or to others, and links that finding to a determination that the person suffers from a "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder." Generally, this Court has sustained a commitment statute if it couples proof of dangerousness with proof of some additional factor, such as a "mental illness" or "mental abnormality," see, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 314 -315, for these additional requirements serve to limit confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control.

Contrary to Hendricks' argument, this Court has never required States to adopt any particular nomenclature in drafting civil commitment statutes and leaves to the States the task of defining terms of a medical nature that have legal significance.

NOTE: States have simply enacted into their penal laws that, each sex offense means that the person has a "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder," this effectively circumvents the essence of this decision, because this decision also permits every state to define terms of medical nature that have legal significance.
Summary: ... Court's holding that a statute, "found to be civil in nature, cannot be deemed punitive" or criminal "as applied" for purposes of the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses. Cert was granted to decide whether "an otherwise valid civil statute can be divested of its civil nature." The majority declines to answer this question. Instead, it assumes that the statute at issue is civil--rather than "otherwise ... civil," or civil "on its face." Young v. Weston, 122 F. 3d 38 (CA9 1997). And then it merely holds that a statute that is civil cannot be deemed the opposite of civil--"punitive," as the majority puts it--as applied to a single individual.

If a detainee comes forward with " `the clearest proof' that `the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention' that the proceeding be civil, it must be considered criminal." Allen, 478 U. S., at 369 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U. S. 242, 248-249 (1980)) (emphasis added). See also Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93, 100, 105 (1997). Accordingly, we have consistently looked to the conditions of confinement as evidence of both the legislative purpose behind the statute and its actual effect. See Hendricks, 521 U. S., at 361, 367-369; Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 269-271 (1984); Allen, 478 U. S., at 369, 373-374. As we have acknowledged in those cases, the question whether a statute is in fact punitive cannot always be answered solely by reference to the text of the statute.
Decided 01-22-02 KANSAS v. CRANE
Summary: ... Here in Crane, the US Supreme Court revisited the broadly interpreted Hendricks decision and tightened the requirements somewhat. Civil commitment of dangerous sex offender beyond original prison term requires proof defendant has serious difficulty in controlling behavior but does not require proof of total or complete lack of self control. This decision modifies the broad Hendricks decision.
Decided 05-18-92 FOUCHA v. LOUISIANA, 504 U.S. 71 (1992)
Summary: ... Under Louisiana law, a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity may be committed to a psychiatric hospital. If a hospital review committee thereafter recommends that the acquittee be released, the trial court must hold a hearing to determine whether he is dangerous to himself or others. If he is found to be dangerous, he may be returned to the hospital whether or not he is then mentally ill. The State Court of Appeal refused supervisory writs, and the State Supreme Court affirmed, holding, among other things, that Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983), did not require Foucha's release, and that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated by the statutory provision permitting confinement of an insanity acquittee based on dangerousness alone.

Decided 01-08-03 (8th Cir) Linehan -vs- Milczark (Minnesota Case)
Summary: .......
Decided 05-20-99 (9th Cir) YOUNG v WESTON 9835377
Decided 09-16-99 (9th Cir) YOUNG v WESTON 9835377 (Revised)
Summary: ... Young claimed that, his conditions of confinement were so punitive as to render the facially valid civil statute a punitive statute and thereby violate the ex post facto clause. Further, given that the state refused to hold any hearing as to his claims, that his due process rights were violated. The upper court agreed and remanded for further proceedings to determine if the conditions of confinement were in fact punitive. This issue was not precluded by the Hendricks case.
Decided 07-22-02 (So.Carolina Supreme Court) In the Matter of Clair Luckabaugh, Respondent.
Decided 07-22-02 (So.Carolina Supreme Court) In the Matter of Paul Newman Allen, Appellant.
Summary: ...................
Decided 07-11-02 (New Jersey Supreme Court) In the Matter of the Commitment of W.Z. (A-17-01)
Summary: ... W.Z. has an extensive criminal and juvenile record, including three sexual offenses against women, the first of which occurred in 1982 when W.Z. was sixteen years old and the others occurring in 1989 and 1994. W.Z. acknowledges that based on his record, he has been convicted of a “sexually violent offense,” one of the requirements for commitment under the SVPA. The proceedings to commit W.Z. under the SVPA were initiated by the State in December 1999 when W.Z. was nearing the end of his sentence for the 1994 criminal sexual contact conviction. He was committed temporarily to the NRU based on two clinical certifications by physicians. Additional psychological testimony was presented at the final hearing in April 2000.

The psychologists who testified at the hearing agreed that W.Z. does not have a sexual compulsion but found him to suffer from various disorders that gave him a propensity to act antisocially and violently. The expert who testified on behalf of W.Z. concluded that W.Z. possessed a “great likelihood” of future violent behavior and anticipated that twenty percent of W.Z.’s future violent behavior would involve acts of sexual violence. All but one of the five actuarial risk-assessment tools used by the experts placed W.Z. within a high range of risk of repeating his sexually criminal conduct. The fifth placed him in the moderate range.. The trial court found that the record contained clear and convincing evidence that W.Z. was unable to control his dangerous sexual behavior and that he was likely to commit additional sexual offenses in the reasonably foreseeable future. Accordingly, the court ordered W.Z. committed to the NRU.

Note: This is one of those very questionable cases. Notice that the experts anticipated that, 20% of W.Z.'s future violent behavior would be sexual. That portion of the testimony kept the case within the SVPA act and permitted the state to civilly commit W.Z..
Decided 07-01-02 (Wisconsin Sup Ct) In re the Commitment of Tory L. Rachel
Decided 07-01-02 (Wisconsin Sup Ct) In re the Commitment of John Lee Laxton
Decided 07-03-02 (Wisconsin Sup Ct) In re the Commitment of Lenny P. Keding
Summary: ...................
Decided 09-27-02 News Article: Justice halts ruling on sex predators
Decided 09-27-02 (Arizona Supreme Court) In re Detention of Wilbur W.
Decided 09-11-02 (Arizona Court of Appeals) In re Detention of Wilbur
Summary: ... Newspaper article describes issue. Supreme Court order stays the effect of the Court of Appeals opinion regarding specific jury instructions. Unusual case and warrants review.
Decided 02-15-01 (Arizona Court of Appeals) In the Matter of Leon G.
Decided 07-12-01 (Arizona Supreme Court) In the Matter of Leon G.
Summary: ... Arizona's Civil Commitment law can be both "constitutional" AND "unconstitutional," (a very interesting explanation) said the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court says a finding of "volition" is required before commitment, vacating the Court of Appeals decision. Both decisions have wonderful explanations of many issues revolving around these laws. In particular is, the justices claiming these laws do an "end-run" around the criminal laws, and why send these folks to prison if they are supposed to have the treatment which they will eventually get when civilly committed?
Decided 10-17-02 (Florida) Westerhide -vs- Florida (SC-00-2124)
Summary: ...

Decided 04-25-02 (California Supreme Ct.) People -vs- Ghilotti (SC-009512A)
Summary: ...

--- Contesting Conditions of Parole, Probation, Supervised Release
-OR- Conditional Discharge ---
Contesting Conditions of Parole: Requirement to Register as Sex Offender and Therapy
Decided 12-21-2004 Coleman -v- Texas 5th Cir (REVERSED & REMANDED)
Coleman was convicted of burglary of a habitation in 1986 and sentenced to thirty years incarceration. He was paroled in 1991. While on parole, the state indicted Coleman for aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by contact. He pleaded guilty to and was convicted of only misdemeanor assault. The state revoked his parole following the assault conviction and he was reincarcerated.

On January 17, 2001, Coleman was released on mandatory supervision on the condition that he reside in a halfway house until employed.1 On February 27, 2001, the parole panel imposed two additional conditions on his release, requiring him to register as a sex offender and attend sex offender therapy. Coleman was not given advance notice or a hearing to contest the imposition of these conditions.

The Texas Department of Criminal Justice is authorized by Texas law to impose reasonable conditions on parole to serve the interests of protecting the community and rehabilitating the parolee.39 When those conditions impact a liberty interest of the parolee, they may be imposed only with justification. The Department may condition Coleman’s parole on sex offender registration and therapy only if he is determined to constitute a threat to society by reason of his lack of sexual control.

Absent a conviction of a sex offense, the Department must afford him an appropriate hearing and find that he possesses this offensive characteristic before imposing such conditions. This court was told at oral argument that evidence of Coleman’s lack of sexual control exists. None appears in the record, however, and no contention is made that Coleman has been afforded a hearing meeting the requirements of due process.

We therefore hold that the sex offender conditions placed on Coleman’s parole are invalid, and we remand the cause to the district court for disposition consistent with this opinion.
Contesting Conditions of Conditional Discharge:
Decided 12-14-2004 Wilfong -v- Kentucky No: 2002-CA-000535-MR Court of Appeals
This is unique in the sense that, only Kentucky has what is known as "Conditional Discharge" which a person is sentenced to at the same time as the original sentence is set. The court sentencing the person to prison (which may be followed by a period of parole, decided by the Parole Board), and a period of additional time called "Conditional Discharge" following the completion of any imposed parole.

This case questioned the constitutionality of such a sentencing scheme and the Kentucky Court of Appeals said, it is constitutional. This is likened to a second period of parole, and has "Conditional Discharge Conditions" that are exactly like conditions of parole or probation. However, if the person violates any of those, s/he must serve out, whatever period of parole was not served PLUS the conditional discharge period (3 years).

We placed this case here because it has a good discussion of "Conditions of Conditional Discharge" on pages 11-32:
1) Dating, intimate, or sexual relations with an adult;
2) Sexually arousing materials;
3) Presence at locations where children congregate;
4) Possession of items that attract children;
5) Participation in Sexual Treatment Program.

and includes sub issues of the Void for Vagueness and Overbreadth Doctrines.
Contesting Conditions of Supervised Release:
Decided 12-8-2004 USA -v- Rose Marie Wise 9th Cir (REVERSED & REMANDED)
9. The Defendant shall not be allowed to reside in the home, residence, or be in the company of any child under the age of 18 without prior approval of United States Probation. The Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS) shall approve the custody and contact with the defen-dant's minor son, Richard "Ricky" Nelson Wise, Jr.

8. The Defendant shall not possess any porno-graphic, sexually oriented or sexually stimulating materials, including visual, auditory, telephonic, or electronic media, and computer programs or services.
Prohibiting / Limiting, Computer Use As Condition of Parole / Probation / Supervised Release:
Decided 03-27-01 (D.C. Cir) USA v White
Decided 04-30-01 (2nd Cir) USA v Peterson
Decided 03-29-02 (2nd Cir) USA v Sofsky
Decided 01-08-03 (3rd Cir) USA v Robb Walker Freeman
Decided 01-21-03 (7th Cir) USA v Todd Scott
Decided 04-9-03 (7th Cir) USA v Delbert Holm
Decided 02-13-03 (11th Cir) USA v Karl P. Zinn (Excellent Explanations)
Decided MM-DD-YY (10th Cir) USA v Russell Lane Walser (Explanation of how computer is searched)
Decided 10-15-98 (9th Cir) USA v Fellows (Unusual Condition of Probation)

Permitting polygraphs & penile plethysmograph testing & and prohibiting computer use as Conditions of Parole / Probation / Supervised Release:
Decided 3-28-03 U.S.A. v Robert Morris Dotson, 4th. Circuit (2003)

--- Miscellaneous & Related Cases ---
Reasons for Accepting A Guilty Plea, Even When Possibly Innocent: ....Decided 11-24-70 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)
Punishment Civil/Criminal: ....Decided 06-27-80 UNITED STATES v. WARD, 448 U.S. 242 (1980)
Punishment Test: ....Decided 02-18-63 KENNEDY v. MENDOZA-MARTINEZ, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)
Bill of Attainder: ....Decided 06-07-65 UNITED STATES v. BROWN, 381 U.S. 437 (1965)
Status Crimes: ....Decided 06-16-68 POWELL v. TEXAS, 392 U.S. 514 (1968)
Prohibiting Therapy: ....Decided 01-09-74 MARSHALL v. UNITED STATES, 414 U.S. 417 (1974)
Ex Post Facto: ....Decided 06-06-94 MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE v. KURTH RANCH, ___ U.S. ___ (1994)
Ex Post Facto: .... Decided 05-01-20 CARMELL v. TEXAS
Ex Post Facto: ....Decided 08-1798 CALDER v. BULL, 3 U.S. 386 (1798)
Ex Post Facto: ....Decided 03-03-1890 IN RE MEDLEY, 134 U.S. 160 (1890)
Permissive Inference: ....Decided 04-27-88 HICKS v. FEIOCK, 485 U.S. 624 (1988)
Privacy of Registrant's Info Submitted: ....Decided 03-16-99 PAUL P v VERNIERO 3rd. Circuit (1999)
Filing Under a Pseudonym (i.e. John Doe): ....Decided 03-16-99 JON FEDEMEER -v- HAUN 10th. Circuit

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