Europe and President Bush
Two other temptations must also be resisted.
On the European side is the temptation to speed the emergence
of the Union as an international actor by constantly claiming
autonomy or independence from the US. Lingering anti-American
undertones, of course, will invariably surface for, as in any
long unbalanced relationship, the junior partner will tend to
make declaratory statements that generate misperceptions.
Europeans should not succumb to this
temptation, for the move from dependency to equal partnership
is not measured by rhetoric. Instead, Europeans must assume a
fairer share of the transatlantic burden, putting in place a
truly common European foreign policy, and think and act as a
regional power with a global outreach. If the Euro succeeds as
a global currency, which I believe it will, and if Europe’s
rapid reaction force becomes a reality soon, as I also think
it will, the EU will have secured the preconditions for a more
equal partnership – literally by putting its money (and
soldiers) where its mouth is.
On the American side, the temptation is to
overplay its “sole superpower” role by acting unilaterally.
But this is loneliness disguised as leadership and is not in
America’s interest. National interests can no longer be
effectively pursued unilaterally; US global interests are
served best by multilateral action and bodies.
Even if, in military terms, America remains
the sole superpower, military might is of limited use in the
daily conduct of foreign policy. America would benefit not
less than Europe from an effective system of global governance
in the achievement of its goals – be it freer trade, a viable
non-proliferation regime, containment and prevention of
regional conflicts, or better regulated financial markets. To
this end, the US has a vital stake in the EU’s coming of age
as an international actor. It should therefore do away with
the traditional ambivalence of demanding a more mature and
active Europe on one hand, all the time feeling uncomfortable
with it on the other.
True, America officially welcomed the
launching of a common European security and defense policy.
But recurring signs of US nervousness about the nature of this
process exist. Americans often ask whether it is all about
better European capabilities – which would be fine for NATO –
or about European integration (i.e. instrumental to a
political project). My response is that it is about both, and
that Washington should support both. A sober assessment of
this process leads me to assert that a more capable and united
Europe will usher in a more effective Atlantic Alliance and
not, as some believe, in American disengagement from European
commitments.
What the EU aims at is not a duplication of
NATO structures or an alternative to the Atlantic Alliance.
The EU is preparing to deal – jointly with US forces or with
purely European forces when NATO as a whole decides not to
engage – with crises in and around Europe. More than defense –
which will remain NATO-centered – Europe is building up its
security role as a regional stabilizer: a role that EU
enlargement to include candidate countries in Central and
Eastern Europe will strengthen.
For, contrary to what is often said in
America’s Congress, Europe already bears the lion’s share of
the peacekeeping burden (let alone reconstruction aid) in the
Balkans. It goes without saying that there should be “no
taxation without representation.” If Europe’s foreign and
defense policies succeed, NATO should become more European.
Washington, however, should not worry about this: if Europeans
see the Alliance as a more European organization they are more
likely to commit themselves (in budgetary terms, too) to its
success.
A similar logic of partnership applies to
enlargement. The concept of Europe is not immutable, and
rightly so. On the basis of a broad notion of security and
stability, EU enlargement is every bit as important as
deepening the EU. Here a common transatlantic approach to both
EU and NATO enlargement would enhance stabilization and
integration in post-Cold War Europe – to everyone’s benefit.
A new and functional division of labor
between Europeans and Americans is thus conceivable, provided
it retains the framework of common political commitments and
shared responsibilities. What should not be pursued is a
rigid, vertical and artificial division of labor, whereby the
US plays the lone global leader (with Europe simply following)
while the EU concentrates exclusively on enlarging its “house”
(with the US disengaging from Continental security). This
would be unhealthy and make the transatlantic compound
unsustainable.
The antidote is a genuine sharing of choices
and decisions. If divisive decisions must be taken, healthy
partnership requires that they be discussed openly and
honestly. A case in point is the issue of National Missile
Defense. No matter what policy the Bush administration adopts,
European reservations and doubts should be taken into account.
If Europeans want to have some influence
here, they must play a unitary role by, say, encouraging
America to update the ABM Treaty in agreement with Moscow.
That would help strategic stability, prevent antagonizing
Russia (which remains a fundamental factor in European
security) and avoid deteriorating the security climate in
Asia. The same is true of dealing with so-called “rogue
States”: here again, a better combination of US and European
strategies could produce a more effective approach, based on a
blend of engagement and resolve.
A new division of labor, and a new sharing of
responsibilities, depends as much on economics as on security.
A stable Euro makes stronger cooperation possible and
desirable: not only to prevent global financial instability
but to avoid the risk of conflicting currency blocs arising.
Provided that the Bush Administration pragmatically pushes for
more trade liberalization, we will be able to deepen
transatlantic market integration, which will act as a boost
for our economies. Scope will also then exist for revitalizing
the WTO, for which a strong European-American commitment is a
necessary precondition, though not the entire solution.
Here a serious reassessment of our
negotiating tactics and old habits is needed. The WTO, but
also the IMF and World Bank, must understand the evolving
needs of those societies most vulnerable to the impact of
globalization. We need to reach out to the rest of the world
in a more open and persuasive way. The G-8 process, which
Italy chairs this year, will test such resolve - on which
rests the legitimacy of the entire process.
A renewed Euro-American partnership based on
our own respective styles and instruments in foreign policy
will benefit both sides. The EU is rightly searching for its
identity as a collective actor. As Europe changes, so too does
America – in terms of its demographic and social composition,
economic and political structures, geopolitical orientation
and national psychology. Granted, transatlantic diversity
might cause occasional squabbles. However, mutual interaction
and equal partnership remain the only response – especially if
they are reflected into long overdue reforms of multilateral
institutions and increased global governance.
Operating within multilateral frameworks,
however tiresome, has more often than not served US national
interests as well as those of Europe. This will not change. A
stronger EU is America’s natural partner, occasional
competitor, but certainly not a rival. It is the duty of
governments on both sides of the Atlantic to persuade their
publics of this.
by Giuliano Amato
January 2001
ROME -- What does the future hold for
transatlantic relations? That question arises with every new
American administration. Because worries about a “widening
Atlantic” gap have existed since the early 1970s, it is
tempting to proceed as if transatlantic relations will remain
on roughly the same wavelength as before. The truth is,
however, that the US and the EU are rapidly evolving along
their own paths: both sides of the Atlantic thus face the
challenge of managing an ever more complex relationship.
© Project Syndicate 2001
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