Introduction
Commander Akhtarjhan was a Jamiat-e Islami (JIA) commander in the Arghandab District northwest of Kandahar. The JIA was the Islamic Society of Rabbani. Commander Akhtarjhan was an elementary school student when he joined the Jihad at the age of twelve. At the end of the war he was 25 years old and a commander. He joined the Jihad since he had two brothers in the Jihad - both were killed. He took their place as family tradition dictated. He served under Mulla Naqib, the most powerful Jamiat commander in the area.
Raid on the 15th Division’s Garrison
The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) 15th Division was garrisoned in Kandahar city. We had contacts within the division. In the fall of 1987, our contacts invited us to come and seize the weapons from the division’s military police company. We gathered about 100 Mujahideen for the operation. I commanded a group of 15 within the larger group. We crossed the Argandab River from our base camp at Chaharqulba to Baba Walisaheb and, from there, we went to the suburb of Chawnay. Local guerrillas secured our passage through Chawnay. We finally reached the division’s main garrison. We waited until the moon set around midnight. The military police company building was at the end of the main compound. We crept to the building and saw that our contacts had placed a ladder against he wall for us. Some 50 of our group took up positions outside the compound while our raiding group of 50 climbed the ladder up onto the roof of the building. Then we climbed down from the roof inside the compound walls.
Some of our contacts were on sentry duty, so we had no troubles. Our contacts met us and led us into the barracks building. We assembled in a large empty room. Our contacts then took us to different rooms where the soldiers were sleeping - five or six soldiers per room. Their weapons were stored in the rooms. We took their weapons. Next to the barracks was a larger arms room. After disarming the sleeping soldiers, we raided the arms room and took hundreds of weapons. We then started carrying all the weapons onto the roof and passing them down to our fellows outside the compound walls. While we were doing this, the company political officer got out of bed and saw us. He started to make a noise, so we killed him with some of the bayonets. We finished getting the weapons and left for our base camp. Our contacts deserted the DRA and came with us. We had some Arabs who were with us for Jihad credit. They had a video camera and all they wanted to do was take videos. They were of no value to us.
Author’s Commentary
The Mujahideen penetration of the DRA was essential for successful raids like this. Entering a sleeping compound is always a high-risk proposition since someone is always awake, or wakes up, besides the sentries. A secure approach and withdrawal route is essential to urban guerrillas. Having local guerrillas secure the route allowed the force to bring enough people to carry the weapons without worrying about being ambushed on the way out.
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