Introduction
Mujahideen shelling attacks on garrisons, outposts, airfields and cities were a daily event. The Mujahideen usually used mortars, rockets and recoilless rifles in these attacks. Sometimes they used mountain guns and howitzers. The objective was to harass their foes and destroy war material. Mujahideen gunners learned to construct multiple firing sites and to fire and then quickly displace before Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) or Soviet artillery or aviation could respond effectively. When possible, Mujahideen would keep water near their firing sites to dampen the ground behind the rocket or recoilless rifle. This would help curb the amount of tell tale dust raised by the backblast of the ordnance. The Soviets and DRA tried to curb these attacks with counterbattery fires, rapid reaction forces and ambushes. Due to their routine nature, the Mujahideen did not usually discuss these unless the interviewer probed. The Mujahideen considered these as usually rather dull events that did not bear retelling. The following attacks (Chapter 3), however, were hardly dull events.
Mawlawi Shukur Yasini is a prominent religious leader in Nangarhar Province. He is from the village of Gerdab in Kama District northeast of Jalalabad. During the war, he was a major commander of the Khalis group of the Islamic Party of Mawlawi Yunus Khalis (HIK). Later he joined the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan of Gailani (NIFA). During the war he took journalist Dan Rather to his base in Afghanistan. He also accompanied Congressman Charles Wilson of Texas into Afghanistan several times. During most of the war he was active in his own area, fighting the DRA in Jalalabad and the Soviet 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade at Samarkhel. He became a member of the Nangarhar governing council after the collapse of the communist regime - a position he held until the Taliban advance in September 1996.
On day, three Soviet soldiers from the 66th Brigade crossed the Kabul River for a picnic. They were drinking vodka and cooking shashlik around a campfire when Mawlawi Shukur captured them. One of the Soviets named Naomov, converted to Islam and fought with the Mujahideen for three years. Author Ali Jalali interviewed Naomov during his visit to Washington D.C. sponsored by the Freedom House. Naomov spoke Pushtu well by that time. Naomov recommended that "the Mujahideen quite fighting one another and unite against the enemy." Naomov settled in Canada.
A Shelling Attack Turns Bad
In the spring of 1981, the Soviets and DRA were very active in our area. As a result, we dismantled our permanent bases and changed them to mobile bases scattered throughout the area. I intended to launch a major show of force against the Soviets using my mobile bases. I had two mortars - a 60mm and an 82mm. The problem with the 60mm mortar is that it only has a range of 1,400 meters, so the gunner has to get close to the target to use it. I also had two DShK machine guns and five RPG-7s. I kept these heavy weapons at my base at Gerdab. My men had small arms which they kept with them.
On 17April 1981, I launched a shelling attack against the Soviet 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade in Samarkhel. I took only 42 men with me since we were not very well equipped and we were not ready for a major encounter with superior forces. Further, Kama District is right across the river from the 66th Brigade garrison and they kept the area under constant surveillance. I did not want to move a large group of men through the area and alert them. To avoid observation, we went north from Gerdab into the mountains and then west across the mountains into Mamakhel Village in the Kama area. We stayed for three nights in Mamakhel and spent the days in the mountains at Dargo China spring - some three kilometers away. From Mamakhel, we went to Kama Village where some people were still living - although many people had already emigrated to Pakistan.
At Kama, I put my nephew Shahpur in charge and told him to take my two mortars and 38 men and to go shell the 66th’s camp. (Author’s Note: the 66th and 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigades were forces created for counterinsurgency. They had three motorized rifle battalions, an air assault battalion, an artillery howitzer battalion, a multiple rocket launcher (MRL) battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, a tank battalion and support troops. The 70th was located in Kandahar. The 2nd battalion of the 66th was located in Asadabad. Each of its motorized rifle companies had four motorized platoons instead of the usual three). I kept four men with me. The shelling group left Kama at dusk. They positioned the 82mm mortar on the north side of the river at the house of Khan-e Mulla at Jamali Village - since it had the range. Then they crossed the river at Bela and approached the camp through the village of Samarkhel. They occupied positions close to the entrance of the enemy camp. They had the guerrilla mortar (60mm) and the RPGs with them. They opened fire with the RPGs and the 60mm mortar from close range at 2200 hours. The 82mm mortar joined in with long-range fires onto the sleeping camp. The shelling attack created chaos. The shelling group fired at intervals over a two-hour period and then broke contact and withdrew. I was in Kama throughout the attack. My men had orders to join me in the mountains at the Dargo China spring the next day. I went to the rendezvous point. I arrived and they were already there. Two of my men were missing, since they forgot the 60mm mortar and a video camera and had gone back to retrieve them. (Author’s Note: The video camera was an important accessory of this war. Mujahideen used video cameras to record their actions so that they could prove that they expended weapons, ammunition and supplies and achieved results. The videotapes justified the issue of more supplies to the faction).
While I was at Kama, informers told me that the enemy would launch a search and destroy mission in Kama District in five days. I decided that they would now come sooner since we had shelled them. I decided that we had to leave the area. At sunrise, I instructed my men to go deeper into the mountains. I was tired and had a cold, so I decided to back home to Gerdab. However, as I set out, I saw two helicopters lifting off from the airport and flying low over Kama District. I hit the ground and hid. I was alone except for Haji Shahbaz. Other helicopters followed the first two. At first I thought that the helicopters were enroute to Kunar Province, but then they started landing troops from two helicopters at Mirji Gholi point on Derghi Ghar Mountain - about a kilometer away. They also landed troops north of Mamakhel on the plain and on Gedaro Ghunday hill. My men saw the helicopters landing and realized that they would be seen if they continued to climb into the mountains. So they turned around in the wide canyon and started back towards me. I was in a ditch between Mirji Gholi and Dargo China and was hidden by the early morning shadow from the mountain. As I raised my head, I could make out some 25 Soviet soldiers along with several people wearing Tsadar (an all purpose cloth that Afghans carry and wear - it serves as a bundle cloth, sleeping bag, camouflage covering, bundle wrap and shroud) moving to the southeast from the high ground of Mirji Gholi towards Gedaro Ghunday. I crawled about 50 meters in the ditch. The Soviets were facing the sun and I was in the shadow, so they could not see me. As I crawled, I got rid of the heavy things I had in my pockets - such as pliers and wads of money. I headed north towards the mountain ridge. At that point, Zafar and Noor, carrying the missing 60mm mortar and video camera, walked into the Soviet group setting up at Gedaro Ghunday. They were immediately captured. Noor was my cousin.
I climbed Derghi Ghar Mountain to try and see what was happening. I saw my men had split. Thirteen were now back in Dargo China. Tajahul commanded these 13 men - and the rest commanded by Shahpur were going back into the mountains. I saw that part of the Soviet force was heading towards my 13 men. The Soviets began firing flares at the group of 13 to mark their position. Helicopter gunships then attacked my men with machine gun fire. Other Soviets headed down from Derghi Ghar toward them. After the air attack, the Soviets were down in the valley picking up my pliers, first aid packets and the money I had discarded. The group examining my things looked different than the others and I thought that they were officers. I decided that when the helicopters made their next strafing run, I would use the noise of their gunfire to hide my fire. When the helicopters made their next gun rum, I fired on the group in the valley and hit one. This drew the Soviets attention and they opened up on me. Artillery started to fall all around. I ran from this position to another about 100 meters away. I had a "20-shooter" (Czechoslovak M26 light machine gun) and some of my men had "20-shooters." As I ran to change positions, I heard firing from "20-shooters" in my group. They were involved in a heavy fire fight.
I then heard noise from the north and I thought I that the Soviets were coming from that direction as well. But then I saw Shapur and one of my other men. They were coming for me. Shapur reported that tanks were moving through Kama and had sealed the exits. The enemy was arresting people throughout Kama. We decided to leave to the north. Earlier, Shapur had sent a message to my group of 13 telling them to move north. However, heavy artillery and direct fire pinned them down. They could not break contact and fought to the last man. As we left the area, one of my Mujahideen fired an RPG at a helicopter. The helicopter caught fire ad flew off and fell to the ground near Kama - where it exploded. I don’t know whether the RPG hit the helicopter or whether other ground fire got it.
We moved to the village of Ghara Mamakhel, some four hours into mountains, where I met two more of my men. By morning, 12 of my people arrived there. I learned the fate of my group of 13. The Soviets remained in Kama for two days. Then we returned to retrieve the bodies of my 13 men in a group, plus those of Zafar and Noor, and five more of my men. The Soviets had booby-trapped some of the bodies and had sprinkled chemicals on other bodies, which caused them to disintegrate. We couldn’t evacuate these bodies, so we built graves over them. Their bodies are still there under stones. I do not know what the Soviet casualties were, but I do know that I shot two, we downed a helicopter and the Soviets lost three armored vehicles to our mines during this action.
Throughout the war, I faced the Soviets like this during seven sweeps. I moved the families of the martyrs to refugee camps in Peshawar, Pakistan, since we couldn’t support them in the Kama area. I later learned that the Soviets were looking for me personally. They arrested someone who looked like me while he was harvesting clover. At that time, my beard was shorter. They took him to Jalalabad and paraded him around "We’ve caught the son of a b----" they said. Someone finally recognized him, and said that he wasn’t me and so he was released. Around the same time, the DRA governor of Kama District was in Merzakhel Village. The Soviets arrested him and put him into forced labor since they didn’t recognize him. They had him carrying water to their soldiers on the high ground. The Soviets were very careless of Afghan lives. They killed several villagers indiscriminately. They also killed one of my men who was unarmed. I am glad that we drove the Soviets out, but the subsequent actions of the Mujahideen tarnish their record of victory. I have written many poems of protest against their current activities.
Author’s Commentary
The Mujahideen were able to fire on the garrison over a two-hour period since they periodically shifted firing positions to avoid return fire. The Soviets did not push out any night patrols to find the firing positions, relying only on artillery fire - fire that did no good. Apparently, the garrison commander had not surveyed potential and actual Mujahideen firing positions to counter them.
The Mujahideen rendezvous point was located in one of three escape routes into the mountains from the Kama District. Further, it is adjacent to a likely blocking position, which the Soviets used during their periodic block and sweep operations. The Mujahideen were caught downhill from the Soviet blocking force and could not escape. As usual, the Mujahideen were severely hampered by the lack of portable, short-range radios which would have allowed them to coordinate their actions.
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