Introduction
The Mujahideen fired from fixed, surveyed sites and from mobile firing bases. The mobile firing bases deployed in two phases. During the day, the firing survey party would move into the area, determine the weapons positions, map locations, headings, intended positions for the aiming stakes and firing data. At night, the firing party would arrive in a jeep, meet with the survey party, set up their weapons, conduct a quick firing raid and depart.
The Mujahideen also employed unmanned firing bases. Unmanned firing bases were used against targets, which were devoid of cover and concealment. The Mujahideen would survey these points in daylight and set up rockets on makeshift or disposable launchers. They would connect these rockets to time-delay firing devices. The Mujahideen would be well away from the area when the Soviet or Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) forces would launch a search for them.
Shelling attacks had mixed results. When launched against military airfields and garrisons, they occasionally destroyed military targets of value. Further, they prevented the DRA or Soviet forces from sleeping and depressed morale. When launched against cities, they frequently killed innocent civilians. This cost the Mujahideen potential supporters. As some civilians expressed it, "the government oppress us during the day and the Mujahideen oppress us at night."p> Mawlawi Shukur Yasini is the narrator of Vignette 1 of Chapter 3 - A Shelling Attack Turns Bad.
A New Years Present for the Soviets
The Soviets invaded Afghanistan on 27 December 1979. I decided that we should give them a combination anniversary and New Years present on 29 December 1983. The present would be a shelling attack on the 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade at Samarkhel. I assembled 150 Mujahideen with two 82mm mortars, two RPG-7s, one recoilless rifle, and five or six antitank mines. We had 250 mortar rounds for the attack. I placed my nephew Shapur in command. He formed four groups: a mortar group commanded by Awozubellah; a mortar group commanded by my son Abdul Basir; an observation post/fire adjustment group commanded by Shapur; and a light group. We started moving the ammunition and supplies on donkeys and mules two days before the attack. We had to move all of it across the Kabul River and stockpile it in the village of Gerdi Kats. From there we had to move it to Khwaja Baba Ghar Mountain overlooking Samarkhel.
We moved the ammunition and supplies the mountain area undetected during the two days. We set up mortars behind the mountain and set up observation posts on top. The light group had the recoilless rifle, RPGs and antitank mines. They crossed the river at Bela at night and went through Samarkhel to the west. Local Mujahideen met them, guided them to the objective and helped them plant the mines. They planted the mines in the road near the main gate of the compound near a mosque. Our plan was to start with a quick strike by the light group and then follow on with the mortar attack. The 66th Brigade was garrisoned in barracks and tents, so we hoped our mortar fire would be effective against them. It was a rainy night with lots of lightening. The light group launched the attack at 2200 by firing the recoilless rifle and RPGs at the main gate of the enemy compound. The enemy reacted with tanks and APCs, which came roaring out of the gate. Two of them were destroyed or damaged by the antitank mines. The light group withdrew. At the same time, the mortars went into action. They sent all 250 rounds of hot steel into the enemy compound as our New Year’s present to the 66th Brigade. The 66th Brigade responded with BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, artillery and mortars. Round after round of enemy fire slammed into the mountains, while the Mujahideen mortars continued to fire from the valley between the mountains. With the Soviet fire, the Mujahideen mortars and the lightening, the night was practically turned into day. It was a spectacular fireworks display.
I had stayed at Gerdab and had a cow killed and cooked. I planned to welcome my returning heroes with a feast. They were supposed to return at dawn and so all the arrangements were for the feast were ready as the eastern sky lightened. But, my men did not return at dawn. The heavy Soviet return fire pinned them down. At daybreak, Soviet helicopters and aircraft began flying over the area and firing everywhere. I despaired that anyone would survive. I promised Allah that I would donate a large sum of money to charity if even half of my men would return. At 0800, my bodyguard, Juma Khan, and I left Gerdab and climbed the mountain overlooking Gerdab. I was using my binoculars and spotted a shepherd running towards me. Everything was now calm. The aircraft had returned to the airfield and the artillery had quit firing. I climbed down to meet the shepherd. He brought me the good news that my Mujahideen had survived and returned to Gerdab. None of my Mujahideen were even hurt! We had a very good feast.
Due to the heavy Soviet shelling, many other Mujahideen left their areas. Our contacts in the Soviet camp later reported that helicopters evacuated wounded and dead from Samarkhel to Jalalabad airport. The helicopters made 12 trips. Our contacts told me that there were at least 200 killed and wounded. This attack increased Soviet activity and Soviet helicopters were out flying every day looking for Mujahideen.
Author’s Commentary
A lot of Mujahideen mortar fire was observed fire from forward slopes of mountains with the gunner making firing adjustments. The mortar crew in this attack would not have survived the Soviet return fire if they had tried firing from the forward slopes. Their reverse slope firing positions in the valley made it difficult for the Soviet artillery to reach the firing positions. The use of forward observers to adjust fire is a mark of sophistication among Mujahideen forces. However, the Soviet mortar battery commanders should have surveyed these likely firing sites and had them plotted long before the Mujahideen attack. Apparently, they did not. This is a step that fire support commanders should take whenever their forces stop. This was a permanent garrison, so such planning should have been done years before. The figure of 200 dead and wounded seems high, but it was a well-planned and executed attack.
DRA and Soviet intelligence efforts in the Kama area seem inadequate. Commanders, like the narrator, operated from the same area throughout the war and moved freely through populated areas, yet the DRA and Soviets seemed unable to react in time. The Soviets and DRA knew who the narrator was, what he looked like and where he was from, but they were never able to kill or capture him.
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