Remote-control Attack on a Convoy in the Suburbs
There were some 40 guerillas in my force. We lived inside Kabul and in the suburbs. Most of the men were ethnic Pashtun, but there were seven Dari speakers from outside Kabul as well. The Pashtu speakers often mingled with the Kochi nomads who would pitch their tents and graze their herds on the outskirts of Kabul. The Dari speakers posed as dairy product buyers when Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) forces checked the area.
In October 1982, I was a combatant, not a commander. Our commander was Qarar. He led us on a convoy attack against the Kot-e Sangi - Darulaman road near Qala-e Alimardan. It was a combined action involving Islamic Party of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (HIH) forces under Commander Didar, Commander Firoz and Commander Qarar, as well as fighters from the Mohseni faction. The combined force numbered 76 men. We expected a convoy from Darulaman to Kabul the next day. We all moved to the area at night and surrounded the area. Our mining teams emplaced seven remote-controlled (shartaki) mines. Then they camouflaged them. After positioning two observation posts and designating a detonation team, the Mujahideen withdrew. A Mujahideen known as Sher Bach-e Khala (a Hazara) and I spent the night in a clover field some 200 meters from the road.
The next morning, Commander Qarar came down the road on his bicycle. He told us that the Soviet convoy was moving from Darulaman. We moved into our detonation position. Commander Qarar then moved to the other observation post. He told the observer to take off his turban and wave it when the first two vehicles had passed the mined stretch of the road. He would do this since we could not see the mined stretch from the detonation position. A moment later, the convoy reached the site and the observer took off his turban, waved it and moved to a safe spot. We operated the detonator and four of the seven mines exploded. The explosion destroyed or damaged one BMP (A Soviet tracked infantry fighting vehicle that normally carries a three-man crew and a squad of eight soldiers) and three trucks. The four-man Mujahideen group safely escaped the area.
Author’s Commentary
It is always a good idea for a detonation party to be able to see the target area. Mujahideen communications were often primitive and, in this case, depended on one visual signal. The attack, like most urban attacks, was a quick, single strike followed by an immediate withdrawal. Such harassing attacks seldom had any major impact other than on morale. It was a good idea to have a small detonation group, but a 76-man force to secure the area while it was mined seems too large. Kabul was under a night-time curfew and a large group could be detected by patrols along main roads.
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