Attack on the Ministry of Defense
In November 1982, some 60 Mujahideen from the Islamic Party of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (HIH) and Mohseni’s Harakat-e Islami launched a night attack on the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) Ministry of Defense located in the Darulaman Palace. The security in the area was very tight and the area between the Darulaman Palace and the Tajbeg Palace (headquarters of the Soviet 40th Army) was heavily patrolled. We decided to limit the attack to a short-range Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) attack. The HIH group was armed with AK-47 Kalashnikov rifles, while the Mohseni group had British Sten guns (a 9mm World War II submachine gun. It has a 32 round magazine and a rate of fire of 540 rounds per minute) and other weapons. The Mohseni had the RPG-7 we used in the attack. Both sides provided ammunition for the RPG.
We assembled in the staging area at Char Qala in the late afternoon. Char Qala is about three kilometers north of the target. From there, we moved south in-groups to the intermediate villages of Qala-e Pakhchak, Qala-e Bahadur Khan and Qala-e Bakhtiar. Our attack position was a water mill outside the Juvenile Penitentiary close to the Darulaman Palace. As we moved, we dropped off security elements. Most of the men in the group were assigned to provide security during movement to and from the target area. Security elements were positioned at key locations, which facilitated our infiltration and withdrawal. Once our forward security elements secured the firing area, the RPG-7 gunner Saadat (from the Mohseni faction) took his position. He was about 250 meters from the target. He fired two rockets at the building. The enemy response was immediate. Guards from around the palace filled the night with heavy small-arms fire. We did not return their fire. Instead, we immediately began retracing our steps and pulled out along the route held by our security detail. We then scattered into hiding places and safe houses in the villages of Chardehi. Some years later, a prison inmate who was on the DRA side during the night attack told a Mujahideen contact that about 20 people were killed or injured in our attack.
Author’s Commentary
The Mujahideen urban warfare tactics were low-level and fairly unsophisticated. Their actions were usually limited to a single strike followed by an immediate withdrawal to avoid decisive engagement with a better- armed and supported regular force. Survival dictated the tactics, but the impact on the war effort was political and psychological rather than military. The work and risk that the urban guerillas accepted was great and the results were often minimal or not immediately evident.
Mujahideen success in the urban areas was due primarily to the support of the local population and the lack of DRA/Soviet influence/control outside the areas that they physically controlled. The cities were under nighttime curfew, but the patrols enforcing the curfew could hardly move safely off the main city roads. The Mujahideen had great freedom of action outside the main thoroughfares and in the suburbs. However, they could not fully exploit this advantage due to insufficient training, poor organizational structure, a lack of modern weapons and equipment, an ineffective command and control system and a lack of tactical cohesiveness among the various Mujahideen combatant groups. Lack of communications equipment, particularly in the early days of the war, severely hampered the Mujahideen.
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