Chechen Commander on Modern Separatism

Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye
in Russian
No 2 22-28 Jan 99 p 2

Interview with Brigadier General Zelimkhan Abdulmuslimovich Yandarbiyev, former president of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, by Maksim Shevchenko in Staryye Atagi, date and occasion not specified, under rubric "Other Shores": "A War Like Any Other War: Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev on Why They Wanted To Kill General Romanov and Why They Executed Russian Mercenaries"

The last Chechen war will stir the consciousness of countrymen for a long while yet--not everything has been said completely, not all viewpoints have been submitted to the court of public opinion. This is why Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye is publishing an extensive interview with Chechen military leader Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev. Some of the information he cites generates great doubt, but nevertheless (or perhaps even at the same time) the opinions expressed outline in the fullest way the ideological position of the Chechen command element and reveal their typical techniques for preparing for combat operations. The Chechen problem remains open; moreover, the "Ichkeria Jihad" is gaining a tendency to spread onto the territories of neighboring republics and oblasts. The published interview permits picturing more distinctly the premises and nature of modern separatism.

From Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Dossier

Zelimkhan Abdulmuslimovich Yandarbiyev was born in Kazakhstan in 1952. After returning to Checheno-Ingushetia, he worked as a handyman, mason, and assistant drill operator. He completed the Philological Faculty of Checheno-Ingush State University in 1981. He is a member of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] Union of Writers. In the fall of 1991 he was one of the leaders and ideologues of the "Chechen revolution." In April 1993 he supported the edicts of President Dudayev on dissolution of the Supreme Soviet and introduction of direct presidential rule. He was appointed acting vice president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria on 17 April 1993 by a Dudayev edict. In connection with Dudayev's death, the State Defense Council of ChRI [Chechen Republic of Ichkeria] declared him president on 22 April 1996. On 27 May 1996 in Moscow he signed the Agreement on Cessation of Military Operations. He formed the ChRI government on 28 September 1996. After elections he transferred presidential powers to Maskhadov on 12 February 1997. He later refused to cooperate with the Maskhadov administration and went over to the opposition. He was decorated with the "Hero of the Nation" Order, and brigadier general rank was conferred on him by edict of President Maskhadov in late February 1997.

[NVO] Please tell us how events developed after your capture of prisoners during the unsuccessful November assault on Groznyy by the opposition. Did you realize then that war was inevitable?

[Yandarbiyev] As we assumed, the fact was confirmed that the so-called opposition was being directly led by mercenary Russian military and the FSB [Federal Security Service] and that Russian officers and men were taking part in the opposition's actions--attacks on posts, assaults on Chernorechye--and were killed. This fact became obvious to the entire world on 26 November 1994--we showed regular Russian military personnel who had been taken prisoner and who had assaulted Groznyy in the guise of Chechens.

Deceived Chechens and turncoats, including traitors, were with them, of course, but this demonstrated that Russia would not be reconciled with the situation of independence of the Chechen state that had formed. This indicated that war was imminent.

[NVO] Did General Dudayev try to enter into any kind of contacts with the Kremlin?

[Yandarbiyev] He tried, and very actively. All of us were trying to influence the situation at least in some way. They say hope is the last to die, but we still were hoping we would manage to avoid war. That is why Dzhokhar returned all captured military personnel to Russia when petitioners for them arrived from Yabloko and from Democratic Russia. He allowed the bureaucrats to contact Moscow and try for talks. Several delegations were even sent. The elderly and others tried to influence the Kremlin. And later, although this was proposed to us in a very unpleasant form, Dzhokhar sent people to Kizlyar for talks. He himself met with Grachev. The work went on day and night.

[NVO] What did the meeting with Grachev provide?

[Yandarbiyev] Dzhokhar said he explained to Grachev what such a development of the situation could lead to. He said Grachev seemingly understood and promised to report to Yeltsin and exert influence so a force option was not employed. But according to other information, those who wanted this war influenced Yeltsin, and in the Security Council the president of Russia called Grachev a coward.

[NVO] In your opinion, who favored war?

[Yandarbiyev] Lobov, Yegorov, Shakhray--this entire team of Yeltsin's. Step by step, they moved toward 11 December, when Yeltsin announced the commitment of troops.

[NVO] Did you have a unified defense plan and did a centralized command exist?

[Yandarbiyev] Dzhokhar immediately set up a State Defense Committee and declared martial law. He did everything that should be done in such a situation. Of course, the organization of resistance was centralized, but it stands to reason that there also were independent actions by the population. Therefore the troops advanced very slowly--they must have sensed that resistance would strengthen.

[NVO] Let us turn back a bit. You met with Dagestan State Council Chairman Magomedali Magomedov in Makhachkala on 26 December...

[Yandarbiyev] Yes, I did. Dzhokhar spoke with him by telephone and demanded that he withdraw Russian troops from Dagestan and open the border for movement in order to lift the blockade set up around us. When the conversation began, they cut off the telephone and communications was interrupted. He said to me: "Go there." It was evening and I responded that I would now run and change--I was in military uniform. He insisted I travel directly that way, with weapon. I told him fine, that if you, Dzhokhar, insist, I'll go, but in that case I simply would have to accept battle at the border and with that put an end to any talks. Therefore let me go in civilian clothes. We had a delegation of elders from Dagestan at that time. In short, I went--I left the security at the border, crossed it, spent the night, and was in Makhachkala in the morning. This was the 26th or 27th. Magomedov received me after about 20 minutes. He was afraid to receive me alone--Nukhu Aliyev and Dagestan Council of Ministers Chairman Mirzabekov were with him.

The war already had begun and 47 Russian officers and men had just been captured in Khasavyurtovskiy Rayon, and it seems some had been killed. I demanded that Magomedov withdraw Russian troops from Dagestan immediately, open the border with Azerbaijan and take a number of steps which would demonstrate his neighborly and fraternal attitude toward us in this situation.

But he kept reiterating one thing all the while as if wound up: "We are Russia, we are Russia, we are part of Russia." Then he said: "I read and know all your works and plans for liberating the Caucasus. For God's sake, leave Dagestan in peace. Dagestan made its choice long ago." I responded: "Dagestan did not make its choice. It probably was you who made your choice, but Dagestan has a long time yet to make its choice. This should not be confused." In short, we parted, each with his own opinion and his own interests. He asked that we not touch the territory of Dagestan. I responded: "If you consider Dagestan Russian territory, then we will fight on all enemy territory, including Dagestan. Ingushetia, Ossetia, Dagestan-- everyone who considers themselves Russian territory has to know we also will fight on their territory." And that is what happened. Those were the attempts at peace talks. After that the assault began...

[NVO] How true is it that not everyone supported Dzhokhar Dudayev at first? I know some elderly people expressed themselves in the sense that allegedly this is Dudayev coming to an understanding with Yeltsin and they forbade their sons to intervene.

[Yandarbiyev] Perhaps there also were such private opinions, but this was a purely subjective phenomenon. Objectively the entire population was against Russia. This does not mean they supported Dudayev. It was the beginning of the aggression that removed the problem of internal nonacceptance of Dudayev in a portion of the population. He who was a traitor of course was against him--they would say he wanted to occupy a leadership post and pocket so-called subsidies from Moscow. Others, even those who hated Dudayev and me, saw that the enemy was bringing war and was not carrying cakes and candies. And so a militia quickly began assembling, people were mobilizing themselves for protection.

[NVO] How serious were your forces by the beginning of the war?

[Yandarbiyev] If we're speaking about regular subunits, this was one battalion of Basayev's and a Spetsnaz regiment of Gelayev's, which numbered 500 persons all told. There also was a regiment of new recruits, but there were few of them. The others were not military, but power subunits: DGB [State Security Department] up to 100 persons, militia 100-200 persons. Detachments were organized in the form of a militia by rayons and by villages. Militiamen were given an assignment. They took up positions and assaulted the Russian troops.

[NVO] That is to say, the Army in fact organized spontaneously?

[Yandarbiyev] No, not spontaneously--the situation did the organizing. We distributed the weapons we had.

[NVO] This basically consisted of those weapons which the troops who left Groznyy in 1992 left for you?

[Yandarbiyev] That which they left and that which we acquired afterwards. We put to use everything we had. Whoever could do so, acquired weapons independently. That is how a people's militia formed that basically carried the burdens of war on its shoulders.

[NVO] Was there purposeful training of people for war?

[Yandarbiyev] Yes, the people were trained because we always were convinced--and Dzhokhar emphasized this--that Russia would not simply leave us alone that way. We knew we would have to prove our competence as an independent state in war. Dzhokhar said: "No matter what we do, Russia will try to destroy us." That is what happened.

There was a very typical episode. One elderly man from Alkhankala recently reminded me that when the war began he and several other old men came to me and asked: "Well, war has begun, but do we have weapons to repel aggression? Give us weapons!" And at that time I answered him: "Take empty bottles, fill them with gasoline and set fire to tanks!" This old man recalls that he was so astonished and angered by my answer that he simply turned and silently departed with his companions. He considered such an attitude of the vice president to be extremely irresponsible. But now in our days I asked him whether or not I was right, and he responded that I was, that the method was valid... I was demonstrating that we had to defend ourselves with everything we had. Dzhokhar also assembled the people and said we had no modern equipment or modern weapons, but we had the will for independence and the courage, which awakened in 1991.

[NVO] Did you have a specific plan for the defense of Groznyy?

[Yandarbiyev] The plan was drawn up by Dzhokhar's staff under Maskhadov's direction. There was a city defense staff. Positions were distributed on approaches to the city, but everything in conformity with our capabilities.

[NVO] What actions did you expect from the Russian army?

[Yandarbiyev] After 26 November, when Grachev announced that if he committed troops, tanks would not enter the city, I assumed there would be no tank assault. But the Russian command still began with a tank assault. Of course, air support and artillery support stand to reason... But again, tanks entered the city very swiftly from several directions. Our first screening forces on approaches and on the outskirts were crushed, and they penetrated. Evidently the fact that Chechens still were hoping Russia would not take it to a major war had an effect. They penetrated to the center; they most likely made a mistake. And they immediately began to suffer losses in the first assault, already near the presidential palace. When the assault began Dzhokhar shifted to the alternate CP; the military staff and I myself as vice president remained in the presidential palace. During the assault we were in Maskhadov's office. Maskhadov ordered Basayev and Gelayev to pull up to the center, to the presidential palace.

[NVO] Did you have reliable radio communications?

[Yandarbiyev] There were military field radios and there was a large room crammed with radio equipment which permitted contacting everyone. In addition, we also had Japanese "Motorolas" in insufficient numbers, but the primary commanders had them. Communications was no problem for us. At the very least we were keeping the city and its closest limits under constant control.

Then the assault began... Shamil Basayev was heading to the palace from the south--he was in the vicinity of Chernorechye. There were others on the opposite side, in the north... Then they began to advance and report by radio how much equipment they destroyed. Figures came constantly: "One, two, another two, five more..." Sometimes even, when they heard each other, they would call to one another over the air. One would say: "We destroyed two!" And the other would answer: "What is two? I myself now will destroy two!" And so they went.

[NVO] And the tank columns simply stood in place?

[Yandarbiyev] No, they weren't standing, they were advancing and destroying everything they came across. The fate of those tanks which penetrated to the railway station square was as follows. They penetrated and halted. They somehow lingered. Some even crawled out of the hatches and began looking around, and some leaped off the vehicle. Then suddenly ours opened fire! An entire cemetery formed there... But then they tried to get out. One tanker who was there went with me later until the end of July and related that he changed two tanks--they knocked out the first one right away, then he was transferred to a second, and the second one also ended up being knocked out.

[NVO] Are modern tanks so easy to set afire?

[Yandarbiyev] It's surprising. Evidently it is difficult to imagine, but Allah helped us, otherwise it simply is impossible to explain! The fact is that very many of them were knocked out. And tanks which in other situations are strong and terrifying, which are impossible to breach, were set afire. There was something wondrous in this. And it also inspired confidence that even with the weapons we had...

[NVO] By the way, what kind of weapons were these?

[Yandarbiyev] Mukha grenade launchers, Shmel flamethrowers, but basically RPG-7's.

[NVO] Did you try to contact the Russian command element during the fighting?

[Yandarbiyev] Yes, Maskhadov and his staff were constantly trying to do this in order to bring them to reason. We also were arranging propaganda support--we were appealing to the Russian troops so they did not destroy themselves and so they realized this was useless.

[NVO] You did not try to ask for an armistice at least to bury the dead?

[Yandarbiyev] It is generally known that the Chechens did not leave their fallen. There were cases where one would die and another two or three persons would die for the sake of dragging his body out. We have such traditions. We cannot leave the dead both out of a feeling of kinship and a religious feeling. And losses were heavy... And the Russians... Even Kovalev can bear witness to the fact that on the second or third day we tried to arrange an armistice for them to remove corpses. The Russian command did not accept our proposal. They took it as a show of weakness. But the corpses of Russian officers and men were scattered about throughout the city, and cats and dogs were eating them. A terrible spectacle. It generally was some kind of nightmare around the presidential palace. It was strange to think that corpses lay on the streets for a day, another day, a week, a month.

[NVO] Even a month?

[Yandarbiyev] Yes, even when we were leaving the city they were still scattered about everywhere. But on the other hand, information began coming to us just a week later that the Russian command had begun to destroy the corpses. They were dumbfounded by the heavy losses, and transporting the corpses to Russia meant demonstrating the operation's failure. Therefore they began destroying corpses. For example, subunits were disposed around the DK [not further expanded, possibly House of Culture] imeni Krupskaya. There the corpses were fastened up in artillery boxes and right there they were buried by a bulldozer. Such sequences became part of Nevzorov's film. This is the truth! I don't know, does he have documentary scenes? I think they are documentary...

[NVO] You mean the episode where the tank is burying the bodies of dead soldiers?

[Yandarbiyev] Some of our people saw this mess. A terrible picture!

[NVO] When and how did prisoners begin coming to you?

[Yandarbiyev] Right away, from the first hours. When the New Year's assault began and tanks penetrated, they brought two--a captain and someone else... Later they still began coming. Later they began to lead them to the presidential palace, where up to 50 persons accumulated. Later every subunit itself took its own prisoners.

[NVO] Did you or Dudayev talk with the prisoners?

[Yandarbiyev] I did and Dzhokhar did. It was interesting for me, but these were people who were in shock and could not adequately react to the situation. Later, when the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers appeared, they saw that at least someone was concerned for them and began to feel better. People had ended up in a situation which they could not even imagine in their dreams!

[NVO] What was the assault on the presidential palace like?

[Yandarbiyev] It was chaos; evidently those assaulting wanted to end everything as quickly as possible. They were figuring on attacking with everything there was, solving the problem as quickly as possible, and teaching the Chechens a lesson once and for all. The onslaught was very strong. At the same time, this gave us an opportunity to adapt to the situation mentally. Once you knock out a tank, knock out two of them, then you see you are knocking them out very quickly, you see so many killed enemies scattered about... You begin to realize you are capable of coping with the situation. This was a psychologically fortifying moment for the lads and for people who never had held a weapon in their hands.

They attacked with everything they had, and each day the pressure only grew. The city was being destroyed right before your eyes. This could be seen excellently on going up to the fifth floor, where my security occupied a position. My brother and nephew were there; my brother died there on 16 January... Well, when you went up there you saw everything blazing round about--bombing, artillery and mortar attacks were being delivered continuously.

[NVO] Did you have heavy losses?

[Yandarbiyev] In the first days we had especially heavy losses. Having combat weapons is one thing, but you have to become accustomed to a situation of intensive fighting and intensive use of weapons. By our calculations, around 3,000 soldiers died in this war. The others were the civilian population.

[NVO] What figure do you put on Russian Army losses, if only in the Groznyy fighting?

[Yandarbiyev] In the Groznyy fighting we did not count, we had no mechanism. Later, when we were estimating and checking with certain sources and intelligence coming over operational channels, Russian losses were up to 200,000 as of the beginning of 1996...

[NVO] 200,000?

[Yandarbiyev] Yes, killed. Why did they not basically show these losses? Because there were very many mercenaries from prisons there...

[NVO] Did you personally see mercenaries from prisons?

[Yandarbiyev] In photos, yes.

[NVO] But you personally conversed with such people?

[Yandarbiyev] No, I didn't. But the fact that they basically were in the blockposts is the truth. Evidently they were not counted, because when the Russian command would provide information about battle losses, they would count dozens of dead Chechens daily, but for them it turned out to be one or two persons wounded. But the situation was the direct opposite.

[NVO] How did you treat prisoners? Were there those whom you deliberately did not take prisoner?

[Yandarbiyev] Well, not taking prisoners did not happen with us. Perhaps there were such orders on the Russian side? Our people themselves spared prisoners--everyone knows this. They especially spared the lads. But when mercenaries were caught--and I know this, and this did not shock me, I even considered it proper--they would be shot. They came here not because they had nothing to eat--they came here to destroy.

[NVO] Did they in fact cut off heads?

[Yandarbiyev] There were instances with they cut off heads. And how could they not when Russian mercenaries cut off ears? Simply [the ears] of civilians to show off later--you can't tell whose ears they are- -a fighter, a woman or a child. And the people became embittered, and it happened that they even cut off heads. This fit in this war, because the war was monstrous and it was impossible to adhere to moral standards. When goodness knows what is happening around you, people who have become desperate could even undertake that. But responsibility for all brutalities rests with the Russian side--the Chechens demonstrated utter humaneness.

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