GLOBAL 98 War Game - Urban Warfare Cell

Introducion

During the first week (13 – 17 July 1998) of the annual GLOBAL War Game at the Naval War College (NWC) the Wargaming Division, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL), Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) conducted an “off-line” Urban Warfare Cell. Participants included representatives from all four Services and the United Kingdom. It is significant that most participants had extensive experience in fires, urban combat, fire support, or naval netcentric fires.

Purpose and Objectives

The purpose of the Urban Warfare Cell was to inject an urban warfare dimension into the Network Centric Warfare focus of GLOBAL 98. Specific objectives were:

To examine alternative urban warfare concepts of operation to those developed in previous Urban Warrior War Games.
To examine Network Centric Warfare issues in the context of urban warfare.

Definition of Network Centric Warfare

Network Centric Warfare refers to the instantaneous distribution of massive amounts of data, resulting in a common operational picture shared by separate units and the potential to make decisive decisions at any level of command.

Intent

This report is intended to provide a stand-alone overview of the essential context and issues addressed in the Urban Warfare Cell. The focus of effort was concept and capability exploration, not training the participants. Thus, this report does not provide a “blow-by-blow” description of the cell play, but rather, concise “bottom line” results.

The Nature of Urban Warfare

The two year Marine Corps Urban Warfare Wargaming Program has generated a spectrum of insights regarding the nature of urban warfare which impact directly and immediately on the development of operational concepts and capabilities assessments. These provided the context for the efforts of the GLOBAL 98 Urban Warfare Cell. In short, urban warfare is chaotic, confused, and ugly. More specifically:

The urban battlefield is highly compartmented. One’s ability to see, sense, communicate and move is restricted on all sides by man-made structures. These man-made structures dominate the urban fabric. The commander may have to control key physical objectives in a city in order to destroy or eject the enemy. This myriad of small compartments absorbs formations in a “sponge effect” and forces the battle to be fought at close range by small, generally dismounted, and more dispersed units. Casualty rates have the potential to be very high. The commander’s span of control is limited by the compartmentation and by the sheer volume of information needed to control one’s own forces, confront the enemy, and operate effectively in the city. Vehicular mobility is limited and may be eliminated in certain situations by barriers, debris, and mines. Air mobility is seriously hampered by the lack of landing zones and could, potentially, be eliminated entirely by the enemy threat. Offensive momentum is maintained by attacking on a narrow front in echelon. When lead forces stall, those following either bypass or overwhelm the resistance. Electromagnetic interference caused by the large concentration of metal present, as well as urban terrain obstructions, can be expected to seriously degrade a range of technological capabilities. Some examples include compasses, GPS, and radios. Battle damage, fires, and smoke alters the landscape and obscures or obliterates landmarks. Units fighting in the city are often blind, out of touch, and lost. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), provided by overhead assets, is valuable, but limited by the urban terrain. (MOUT Homepage Note: IMINT can be very valuable in providing updates to outdated third-world maps, on concentrations of large crowds, and on urban structure damage and rubble. Overhead IMINT is not only provided by national and theater assets - but also by such organic means such as unmanned aerial vehicles and traditional aerial reconnaissance. These organic collection assets can provide real time information to a commander or leader on “what’s on the next block”.) It can tell the commander little or nothing about building interiors or the subterranean infrastructure. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) can yield valuable data on the enemy. (MOUT Homepage Note: SIGINT must also be capable of operating under the same urban related constraints that regular communications devices do and also have the capability to collect on and jam nontraditional communications such as cellular phones and the Internet – to name but a few examples). However, in the urban environment there is no substitute for Human Intelligence (HUMINT) to collect critical information peculiar to the urban environment. Ultimately, the long-term success of the urban fight may depend on the civilian population and their ability and willingness to support or resist friendly (Blue) efforts. Even after the battle, there are serious challenges. Operating the city and supporting the population requires many skills not typically found in regular military forces.

The opposing force (Red) will use the cover and density of urban terrain to avoid targeting by standoff weapons, forcing Blue to close and engage at short range, reducing the effectiveness of many of our weapons systems. The enemy will use obstacles, mines, and booby traps to obstruct and delay Blue maneuver. He will use counter attacks, fire sacks and ambushes to inflict casualties. He will attempt to deny air mobility, confining Blue to ground movement and maneuver. He will use peripheral incidents (“The CNN effect”) as distracters. Finally, the potential impact of chemical and biological weapons stand to magnify by orders of magnitude in an urban environment.

The fog of war will always thrive in the urban environment. Fortunately, the enemy will suffer from many of the same disadvantages.

Concept and Methodology

The Urban Warfare Cell functioned as an advanced planning cell, whose primary tasks were to develop the concept of operations to liberate an occupied capital city and to brief the CJTF Commander on the same. Given the compressed schedule for the actual Urban Warfare Cell operational play, participants were provided a concept of operations developed by war game participants of the Marine Corps’ Urban Warrior War Game Series as a baseline for further examination.

Additionally, the cell undertook a focused and detailed look at the impact of urban warfighting on Netcentric Warfare in a separate seminar dedicated to that end.

Scenario

The overall context for the game was a Southwest Asian scenario involving the entire theater in major combat. In that portion of the campaign addressed by the Urban Warfare Cell. A hostile nation had fomented rebellion in a nearby country, overthrown the legitimate government, and then occupied it. The Urban Warfare Cell was concerned with liberating he capital city and returning control of the city over to the rightful authorities. The actual liberation of the city occurred 48 days after commencement of hostilities. U.S. and Allied forces available to conduct Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) included advance elements of a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) embarked on amphibious ships, elements of a U.S. Army mechanized infantry division, one or more allied/coalition brigades, and Special Operations Forces (SOF). U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and other national assets supported the operation.

These forces were directed to seize four key objectives to both unhinge the enemy and regain control of the city by seizing vital facilities. The main objective was the Ministry of Defense (MoD), which was the military headquarters and seat of government. Another was the government-owned radio and TV complex as both a means and symbol of control. The power plant and the desalinization plant were the other two objectives, which had to be quickly occupied and protected from sabotage. The intent was to decapitate Red’s command and control, and split his forces into smaller groups, setting him up for defeat in detail.

Red forces included a corps headquarters, a corps logistics support command, and two infantry brigades.

The city was a mid-size urban area (population 600,000 – 1,000,000) with a small harbor and an airfield. The size of the urban area itself was about 12 X 8 kilometers. To focus players on the urban battle, other forces were responsible for isolating the city and insuring that the necessary forces could reach the city when required. Even though the Cell preferred to conduct siege operations as opposed to urban warfighting, they were directed by the National Command Authority (NCA) to liberate the city as soon as possible and turn it over to the legitimate government so forces would be free for follow-on operations.

Findings

Three concepts of operations (CONOPS) were considered. Each provided interesting insights and approaches to the battle, though none addressed the terminal phase of the operation due to lack of time. In all cases Red had one brigade (# battalions) of highly motivated professional infantry and one brigade (3 battalions) of mediocre local infantry. Not having enough forces to defend everywhere, Red opted for a light screen and a mobile defense. He used the subways and civilian vehicles for mobility. He used barriers, mines and fires to channel blue into fire sacks, to delay the assault, and to conduct flanking counterattacks. He made a considerable effort to conceal his elite forces and equipment from observation and targeting. Where visibility was unavoidable, such as at check points or beach defenses, he used the local Red forces.

The baseline CONOPS only provided a force ratio of about three to one because the original intent was to attack the capital first, eliminating the enemy headquarters and logistics base before liberating the rest of the country. Other U.S./Allied ground forces were employed in isolating the city. The commander’s intent was to use deception, feints, and attack on multiple axes to draw the enemy away from the center of town and MoD and fix them in support of the main attack against the MoD from an unexpected direction. After key objectives were taken and the Red headquarters and logistics base destroyed, the mop-up process would proceed, relying heavily on allied forces from the region to identify Red forces hiding among the civilian population. At this point at least half of Red’s forces should have been neutralized or destroyed. Casualties would have been heavy and the deception plan could have encouraged the civilians to flee away from the initial feints and attacks into the route of the main attack.

The second CONOPS took advantage of a decision by the CJTF Commander to put Special Operations Forces (SOF) teams in country early. These units were used to place sensors, gather HUMINT, and establish contact with insurgents. When intelligence revealed distrust between enemy troops from the hostile nation and local enemy forces, a Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) campaign was commenced to exploit this friction. The intensity of the PSYOPS campaign steadily increased. In the days before the main attack, efforts were made to keep the enemy awake and on constant alert to induce extreme fatigue by the time Blue attacked. Assuming Red’s effectiveness would be seriously reduced and the local forces would be neutralized, Blue opted for a simultaneous takedown of all objectives. After the key objectives were seized, Blue intended to isolate the remaining enemy forces and attempt to convince the local Red forces to return to control of the legitimate government. These local forces would then be used to regain control of the city. If this failed, them Blue forces would have to engage in dangerous mop-up operations in the city. The PSYOPS campaign would also be used to persuade civilians to stay under cover during the attacks. A strong civic action program would be in place to address civilian needs as the city was liberated.

A modified CONOPS from the foregoing had significantly different starting conditions. The CJTF Commander opted to liberate the country before attacking the capital city. This brought a much larger force to bear on the city, expose the enemy to another week or two of shaping operations, and finally put the enemy in an almost hopeless position. The main attack was simultaneous on all objectives with overwhelming force, after which the city would be cleared a sector at a time.

Development of the three CONOPS described above both supported much of the urban warfare baseline developed over the past two years as well as providing some additional insights. Several merit remarking:

All three called for one or more deep and narrow ground based penetrations of the urban environment to reach key objectives quickly, and were to have been conducted even if vertical assault options were available. Skepticism was evident, however, as to whether penetration could occur as far and as rapidly as provided in the CONOPS – clearly an issue meriting further examination.

The need for detailed and extensive intelligence preparation of the urban battlefield cannot be overemphasized.

Cultural intelligence is critical, both as it relates to the cultural realities of the particular area and to understanding the nonmilitary :players” crucial to both making the city work and assisting in addressing the problems of the civilian population.

Civil Affairs operations, coupled with an effective PSYOPS campaign are crucial to success in dealing with the civilian population. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) may not be able to enter the battle zone with adequate relief for days or weeks. Thus, lack of effective plans in these areas could well have significant, if not decisive, military consequences.

The definition of “control”, and thus in this case success, remains an elusive and contentious issue. For example, many Urban Warfare Cell participants disagreed with the choice of physical objectives as a key feature of the CONOPS, arguing that the focus should be on destroying or expelling the enemy. This question merits further examination and there is unlikely to be definitive resolution. Urban wargaming efforts to date have suggested the greater importance of physical objectives both in controlling the basic functioning of an urban area, and in defeating enemy forces to include the key maneuver precept of fracturing his cohesion. This is contrasted with the dynamics of more open terrain, and is shaped by the density and hardness of the urban environment, the significantly altered dynamics in operating therein, and a nonlinear concept of “control” which focuses on critical nodes of influence or leverage.

Network Centric Warfare and Urban Operations

The specific applications of the Netcentric Warfare concept to the urban environment was addressed specifically and in detail in a half-day seminar focused on a range of issues in the context of two vignettes.

Summary of Urban Warfare Cell Issues

Urban Warfare Cell participants developed their comments and issues on Urban Warfare and the Network Centric Warfare and vetted them for several hours. The following is a compilation of those points:

Network Centric Warfare

Network Centric Warfare will not change the basic nature of Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT).
Network Centric Warfare, as proposed, will be defeated by the chaos of urban warfare.
Urban terrain may prevent full utilization of Network Centric Warfare.
Technology to allow friendly position location may be the most critical contribution of Network Centric Warfare to MOUT>
Network Centric Warfare may allow wide spread independent tactical engagements, but it also threatens “Command Manipulation” at all levels.
Force protection of the Network Centric Warfare network is vital.
Can we still fight if the net is disrupted?
How do we make Network Centric Warfare joint? How do we share Network Centric Warfare with Allies?
What constitutes a “common operational picture?”
How is self-synchronization achieved?
Who exercises speed of command?
Data fusion must include auto tracking of ALL theater assets. Network Centric Warfare must not only tell the commander about the enemy but also about the full status of his own forces including readiness and logistics.

MOUT Issues

What if urbanization does not continue or even reverses? Will a work-at-home revolution obviate the need for people to live in cities?
There is still significant doubt that MOUT is inevitable; is there a compelling reason to fight in the cities?
Urban warfare will require extensive training. Do our troops have the time or facilities to do this? Training time is already in short supply. Some people propose using specially designated units that train exclusively for MOUT. Existing urban training facilities are small and do not allow for the training of large units. Urban terrain or the threat can seriously restrict or even prevent helicopter operations. If so, our standing operating procedures relying on helicopters for urgent resupply and medical evacuation will not work. Urban terrain favors the defender; thus, heavy casualties can be expected in offensive urban operations. Training can reduce casualties somewhat. New tactics, techniques, and procedures to reduce casualties still need to be developed.
MOUT issues include: the need for real-time information dissemination; models for demolition effects on various buildings/materials; “tagging/tracking”; and Identification Friend or Foe (IFF).

Non-Lethal Issues

MOUT gives three choices: kill non-combatants with the combatants, separate the non-combatants from the combatants, or incapacitate them all and then separate.
Non-lethal weapons are relatively new and poorly understood. They are potentially significant force multipliers during MOUT. The application and implication of Non-lethal munitions need to be explored in more detail.
How would non-lethal weapons fit into the Network Centric Warfare or the Ring of Fire concepts?
What is the best use of non-lethal munitions to deal with an enemy using non-combatants as human shields?
What is the best use of non-lethal Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), what would they deliver?
Can non-lethal munitions be used to stop vehicles or small boats?
How would non-lethal munitions and robotics be used together?
What Non-lethal capabilities do we really need during MOUT?

Weapons Issues

Weapons with “tunable” (”dial-a-yield”) effects, and the ability to be used at very short ranges would provide a significant advantage.
Most urban combat is at very close range, limiting the opportunities to use indirect fires. However, if Network Centric Warfare allows better targeting of the enemy at a safe distance, and the Rules of Engagement (ROE) permit, then indirect fires make a significant contribution.
Many of our weapons are designed to operate in open, relatively clean battlefields. Some of our weapons will not arm at the short ranges of the urban battlefield. Additionally, there are few, if any, weapon test ranges that can realistically duplicate urban terrain.

Communications Issues

The basic technological challenge during MOUT is communications. The compartmentation of the urban environment will seriously restrict communications and therefore situational awareness.
Routine reports (SITREPS, POSREPS, SPOTREPS, and supply requests) should be automated and digitized.

Command and Control (C2) Issues

There were four friendly and two hostile brigades fighting within twelve kilometers of each other. How do you integrate air space management in that small of an area?
Network Centric Warfare may be able to flatten the chain of command in open terrain but not during MOUT. Very small units at a tactical level typically fight urban military operations. Momentum is maintained by fighting on a narrow front with several units in echelon behind the lead unit. When the lead unit is engaged or stalled, following units move up to support and/or bypass the lead units to keep the attack moving. Command and control during MOUT involves a lot of details that would quickly saturate a senior commander in a flattened command structure.

Logistics Issues

Logistical support of MOUT will be difficult. Consumption rates may be radically different. There will be a much higher consumption of fire ordinance, grenades, and demolitions.
Combat Service Support forecasting is inadequate. Good models for forecasting personnel casualties and expenditure of consumables do not exist.

Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations

What is the policy/doctrine of handling the aftereffects of the use of chemical and/or biological weapons by the enemy in the urban environment? What are the procedures for handling large numbers of contaminated non- combatants?
There needs to be better training, understanding, and preparation in order to conduct Civil Affairs or PSYOPS and in the hand off to NGO’s, local authorities, and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs).
Civil Affairs can be a great force multiplier. A very large and robust Civil Affairs force is absolutely required during urban combat.
If a large non-combatant population remains in and around the city, their attitude towards the friendly and enemy forces is crucial to the success of the mission. A large hostile civilian population could prevent mission success. Good cultural intelligence, a well-coordinated PSYOPS campaign, and strong Civil Affairs operations are absolutely necessary. The Commander-in-Chief must be prepared to support a large humanitarian relief program.

Intelligence

Good HUMINT is absolutely necessary in conducting MOUT.
Real time overhead imagery is constantly needed. Battle damage and engineering efforts will constantly open and close streets forcing routes of advance and supply to be continuously adjusted.
SOF strategic reconnaissance units can provide HUMINT and formulate and execute a PSYOPS campaign to support MOUT.
Reconnaissance teams have limited endurance in the urban environment and must be rotated frequently.
There was inadequate time allotted during the war game to consider all the options presented by SOF.

Conclusion

The Urban Warfare Cell at GLOBAL 98 proved to be a superb opportunity to examine the effects of Network Centric Warfare in urban operations. The cell proved to be an extremely valuable vehicle for identifying critical issues for further examination when urban operations are associated with the concept of Network Centric Warfare. It is widely agreed that the cell advanced the delineation of critical issues related to Network Centric Warfare and laid the groundwork for future exploration of this topic. An implied follow-on action is to continue to study issues and ideas through a series of war games and workshops.

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