The Battle for Grozny

New Year's Eve Day - 1994

The Russian and Rebel Situation: 11 to 31 December, 1994:

For the Russian Army, the Chechen invasion is total confusion from the word 'go'. The Russian Army of November 1994 is not the Soviet juggernaut of the Cold War, nor is it staffed with the hardened units of Afghani battlefields. Tens of thousands of veterans have been RIFFed and many units are critically undermanned.

The units sent into Chechnya are ad hoc, thrown together in early December. Their ranks are filled with young draftees, for the most part unmotivated and undertrained. The command structure is burdened with too many layers and ponderous, the supply system non-functional, intelligence on the opposition weak.

Yet the Kremlin is confident. Their three columns will brush aside the Rebels, seize their capital and restore order. Any remaining 'bandits' will fade into the mountains. From there, it will become an Interior Ministry problem.

Two of the three invasion columns are attacked even before they crossed their 'start lines'. Some units take fire the minute they leave their 'secure' assembly areas, others are subject to constant nighttime sniper harassment and bold daytime guerilla RPG attacks.

In Northern Chechnya, the Rebels launch several company and battalion-sized counterattacks. Some have armor support, all draw Russian blood.

For the first three weeks of December the Russians live on the brink of exposure. Moral is horrible and incidents of drunkenness abound. When Chechen grandmothers block one road and ask them "why?", the Russian draftees and officers can't honestly answer that question.

On the other hand, the Rebels are on familiar home ground, operating for the most part amongst a friendly population, and are well supplied with food, weapons and ammunition.

Though they have no airforce and the invaders outnumber them by at least four-to-one, the Rebel moral is riding high on a string of victories.

From the first skirmishes along the Russian approach routes to the beginning of the siege of Grozny, the Chechens have given far better than they got.

SOVIET LEGACY: The Russian and Rebel Perspective on MOUT Tactics:

Understanding what went wrong for the Federal forces during the battle for Grozny requires a review of both the offensive and defensive MOUT tactics taught by the Soviet Army.

Considering that the WWII Soviet 'Red Army' had two years of successful experience in Military Operations in Urban Terrain from Stalingrad to Berlin, as well as post-war lessons at Budapest (1956) and Prague (1968), one would think that they where the 'experts'.

At the height of the Cold War, Soviet doctrine stated that built-up areas (BUA) would be bypassed when possible, simply to maintain the momentum of the advance. Towns and villages would be isolated and dealt with by second echelons.

If a built-up area was vital to the Soviet commander's plan and first echelons are required to capture it, emphasis would be on the destruction of the enemy defending the area. If this wasn't possible, the city would be seized from the march, often with the aid of airborne/air assault troops. It was imperative to strike before the enemy could fortify his positions.

This method seems to avoid the waste of time, manpower, and equipment required to capture such objectives. Operations in BUA's lead to fragmentation of effort. These combined-arms operations, separate from the main effort, are difficult to control and require more (tactical) freedom of action than Soviet doctrine deems normal. The delegation of control inherent in urban operations called for a higher standard of training than many junior Soviet commanders have yet attained.

If a rapid seizure from the march wasn't possible, the city would be blockaded and and a covering force left to watch the defenders starve.

Recognizing the limitations of the old style and the changing nature of MOUT warfare, the 'new' theories of the 1980's emphasized assaulting rather than ignoring cities. Still not wanting to get bogged down in urban areas, they emphasized surprise and a rapid drive on key terrain within the heart of the city.

Anticipating that enemy (ie: NATO) positions would be less deliberately fortified, the Soviet units would form Storm Groups only when faced with hard-to-crack fortifications.

The Soviets planned to use armor in their city fighting, as part of the assault force or in close support of infantry. When committed to fighting within the urban environment, tanks would provide immediate fire support, engage targets in upper stories and seal off objectives from enemy reinforcement or escape. The company attacks would be on a narrow frontage - 200m on the city's outskirts, narrowing to one main street towards the city's center.

To assist in their high speed dash to the objectives, the Soviets would use Air Assault units to seize key buildings along the ground force's avenues of advance, acting as forward observers and restricting the defenders movement in his own rear areas. The paratroops would also serve as the mission's eyes and ears, picking out rebel movements far in advance of the mechanized elements.

Furthermore, the Soviets acknowledged that only weapons of mass destruction put more stress on the individual soldier than a MOUT battlefield.

Once the fighting started, the commander's ability to keep his unit combat-effective decreases dramatically. Command and control at higher (Battalion +) levels would become difficult and the battle would take on a nature all it's own.

To prepare for this, they staged more company and platoon level exercises, combined with greater training emphasis on both individual and small unit (squad/platoon) initiative and tactical proficiency.

If this 'fast assault' fails, the Soviets were to fall back on the 'traditional' MOUT approaches.

The Russian Perspective: Soviet Infantry Urban Assault SOP'S

1. When approaching built-up areas, choose firing positions close to buildings.

2. Upon target acquisition, take cover and fire (During Attack From The March, one did not take cover!)

3. Try to deceive the enemy as to your position; move only if cover permits.

4. Within buildings, don't continually fire from the same doors and windows. Keep moving, and use firing ports cut in the walls.

5. Shoot from the hip when firing on the move. Bringing the rifle up to the eye will reduce your ability to see and react.

6. Bound from cover to cover. Do not move unless you have cover to go to.

7. Choose covered positions that allow right-handed fire and throwing. (Soviet children were not allowed to become left-handed).

8. When firing the AK-74 on automatic, use a supported position.

9. Shoot around a right-handed wall left-handed. With grenades and left-handed walls, stand with back to wall and throw backwards, overarm.

10. Keep all weapons ready to fire at all times - AK's to automatic, Tanks loaded with HE, BMP's with gun and missile loaded. Always deliver a high volume of fire.

The Rebel Perspective: Soviet Defensive SOP'S:

Considering the most of the rebels had been in the Soviet Army at one time or another, they would have had the same training as well. One must remember that the Soviet Army trained against an 'enemy' using Soviet tactics, not those of the most-likely enemy.

MOUT Defensive SOPS:

1. Positions must be prepared for 360x defense, with weapons on all levels (up to the attic) - not just the ground floor [70's doctrine stressed basement and first floors]. AAA assets are placed up high, or in open areas that allow 360x fire.

2. The defense must be flexible and mobile. This also means that "offensive actions are as important as the defense of the strong point itself".

3. Good use must be made of cellars, with some prepared as positions for tanks, self-propelled guns or howitzers.

4. There should be intensive engineer preparation, including barricades and AT/AP minefields (both to protect the strongpoint and channel the enemy) as well as fortified positions and prepared covered routes for resupply or withdraw (like tunnels and rabbit-holes).

5. One or two strongpoints must be made to act as a focus of the defense (Starting with buildings on squares or at intersections). Strongpoints are organized for 360x defense, defenders should be mentally and physically prepared to be cut off. Food and ammunition supplies are stockpiled.

Furthermore, just prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Army Studies Office exposed the use of honeycomb defenses, allowing 360x defense. These would be based on company 'trefoils', with three platoon 'radials'. The primary benefit appeared to be that such a formation would allow the use of 90% of the weapons systems - rather than the 60% of the old formations.

Tanks assigned sector anti-tank defense should hide in buildings (basement or ground level) or prepared positions supporting defense strongpoints. A tank company should be kept as a mobile antitank reserve.

The Russian Plan for Grozny, 31 December 1994

The following paragraph appears to be the original blueprint for the assault:

"In planning the attack on a BUA, Soviet officers (down to Company level) study large-scale maps and photos of the area. Information is also gleaned from the local populace and reconnaissance patrols. The direction and width of streets and underground passages, the locations of all major administrative buildings, communication centers, utility buildings, train stations and other objectives whose seizure would assist in the capture of the city are studied in detail".

The Russian command truly expected that the rebel resistance would be weak and easily brushed aside, which is difficult to fathom since they began the campaign three weeks prior with the same misconception.

31 Dec. What Happened In Realtime: The New Year's Eve Strike:

Izvestia will report that Grachev and Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets order the attack while drunk, offering the first squad into the palace the Hero Of Russia medal - the Kremlin's highest military award - if Grozny is taken by Grachev's birthday, 1 January.

The desultory air and artillery strikes of the past week built to a crescendo during the day, a prelude to the mechanized Russian assault of 2,000 troops [ rough description of an Motorized Rifle Regiment, indentified in the German press as elements of the 'Moscow' Division] with the railway station their ultimate objective. The Chechens anticipate the assault and bus in more fighters throughout the day, though Dudayev can rely on only 5,000 men.

Under a heavy cloud of black smoke from the burning oil refineries, the Russians make their move.

By 13:00 hrs Russian armor is moving up the city's avenues, with heavy firing from both sides. The rebels initially appear to panic, then become enraged. They fall back (an apparently deliberate move) echoing shouts of "Allah Ahkbar!" to keep each other aware of their locations a primitive but effective way to avoid fratricide.

On top of bad moral and an exhausting advance on the city, none of the Russian troops have maps of the objective, nor have they received any MOUT training prior to the assault. Reported incidents of 'friendly fire' are rampant. Somehow, the lessons of Stalingrad, Bupadpest, Prague and Afghanistan are forgotten: the covering infantry become separated from the tanks, or more likely wait too long to dismount, according to one Russian PW's commentary. In such a situation, it would have been quite easy for the rebels to spray the tops of the BMP's with bullets, allowing the RPGists to casually pick their targets.

The initial Russian move is supposed to be air-mobile, with 'paratroops' inserted in the center of town and on top of key buildings along the line of march.

The armored forces will assault through the rebel positions and link up with the paratrooper's positions in sequence. At least that's what the armor and mechanized commanders think - in reality, they will find no 'stepping-stones' of friendly paratroopers.

Someone in the upper echelons had neglected to inform both the airborne troops and the helicopter units. C.G. Vitaly Pavlov swears that his people never received a combat mission request on 1 January.

The 131st 'Malikop' Brigade is at the heart of the attack. However, there is little radio coordination with adjacent units, no maps of the city's streets and a muddy plan - "Get in and drive!". The rebels have blocked side streets, creating a channeled killing zone.

During the fighting, scores of little dramas are played out:

'Yazid', a 26 yo member of Dudayev's bodyguards, says that Chechen orders are to allow the Russians to break through, then attack them from the rear. 'Yazid' notes that Russian response is panic and disorientation, as tank after tank explodes.

Lt. Alexander Labzenko, commander of one of the Malikop Bgd's ZSU-23-4's (self-propelled antiaircraft vehicle) tasked to provide flank suppression, notes that the Brigade takes fire immediately after crossing the Sunzha. The two lead tanks are knocked out, but the men press on. The Brigade never links up with the battalion they are to reinforce and as night falls, Labzenko's ZSU is knocked out.

Some Russian armor even makes it to the Palace area, but even the civilian reporters note that the tanks aren't accompanied by infantry. They fire at Dudayev's building, more in fustration that tactical necessity.

During the day, the 81st MRR's FAC, CPT Aleksandr Kiryanov, is KIA when the Regt. CO's BMP is hit with an RPG. Kiryanov had called in 38 air strikes since the war started, claiming at least 10 rebel KIA.

Motorized Rifle Battalion 09332's BMP-2's took the brunt of the slaughter at the railway station; 30 survivors spend the next ten days barricaded in two nearby apartment buildings. One tank unit of the Kantimir Division is surrounded near the same railway station and all of it's survivors made prisoners. A few blocks away, a group of cut-off paratroopers dig in and wait for help.

One of the platoons in 1LT Andrei Shevelev's Airborne Recon Company discovers a rebel ambush in the Sunzha Heights region. This is part of a larger rebel force gathering near Oktaybr'skiy. Shevelev's unit engages an estimated 100 rebels for six hours. In the end, the paratroopers count 80 Chechen KIA's, plus four rebel KAMAZ truks, two tanks and two BMP's destroyed.

CPT Sergei Kurnosenko, a tank battalion S3, is leading a company of tanks. During the course of the fighting, his tank destroys 3 rebel tanks and 24 troops. He is killed when an RPG strikes his tank.

One of the squads in OFC. A. Kirilin's communications platoon is pinned down at the railway station. He organizes a 360x defense of the building, and they repulse at least one rebel attack. Kirilin personally takes out one rebel firing point and his unit holds the position until relief comes.

PFC A. Yefremov's squad comes under heavy fire but wipes out three rebel firing points. His squad is one of those with the initial assault groups on the Council of Ministers Building, where they take out an RPG team and two more firing points.

After destroying three rebel firing points, tank commander Junior Sergeant V. Nalbandyan's platoon leader was killed. Nalbandyan takes over the platoon and safely withdraws them them to an assigned rally point.

Civilians wander throughout the fighting; an old man and some boys huddle around a fire built in an old barrel, within sight of Russian troops.

Innocent bystanders or rebel lookouts?:

At some point during the day, the paratroop command realizes that they were not coordinated into the assault. Columns of paratroopers head into the city to help their mechanized and armored comrades, "like blind kittens".

The rebels are even active outside of the city, attacking the Russian's second-echelons and artillery positions. Airborne Company Commander V. Zinchenko's men are attacked in the Andreyev Valley, as is S. Begletsov's SP Artillery Battalion. Begletsov, his men subjected to an artillery ambush deploys his unit for a counterbattery mission, then beat-off an attack by a platoon of rebels.

Chechen TV broadcasts live throughout the fighting, the tape running uncut and the commentator silent.

The Chechens use ancient tactics worthy of Afghans - disabling the vehicle with an RPG or Molotov, then shooting the panicked occupants as they bail out. One driver fires back with his Kalishnikov as Chechen guerillas close in, who finish him off with a grenade.

By late afternoon Chechen RPG gunners, fueled by religious fever, eagerly roaming about, still searching for targets.

The day ends as rebels begin to loot the Russian dead and crippled vehicles for weapons, ammunition and anything else of use... throughout the night, scattered Russian units are pinned down. Confused, low on ammunition, all they can do is wait for day-break and the arrival of close air support.

Chechen fighters boast of 50 tanks destroyed. Film footage shows a massacre: a square full of smoking BMP-2's, a isolated and shattered BTR, rebels firing from the cover of a pair of disabled reactive armor-fitted T-80's, a street full of burnt-out T-72 and BMP-2 hulks. Russian and western press counted nine AFV's knocked out in the Central Square alone.

An Izvestia report claims that the 131st Brigade losses for the day total 20 of it's 26 tanks, 100 out of 120 APC's, and 50% of it's 1,000 men KIA, WIA and MIA.

The Russian artillery barrages finally end around 02:30, 1 January 1995.

What Ivan Did Wrong:

Training exercises in the early 80's pointed out the following chronic MOUT mistakes amongst Soviet troops:

1. Poor target observation and shooting at the wrong target 2. Poor individual marksmenship, both dismounted and mounted. 3. Small-unit inability to react without orders. 4. Poor personal concealment and camouflage, both a failure to appreciate it's need and incompetent attempts. 5. Unable to throw grenades from cover. Throwing grenades on the run and firing whilst pinned down in hollows - exactly opposite of the right answer! 6. Slow individual reaction to surprise. 7. A massive lack of technical knowledge and leadership by junior NCO's. 8. Poor individual performance underground and in very enclosed spaces (ie: tunnels and sewers, room-clearing at hand-to-hand ranges).

It appears, after watching network footage of the fighting, that the Russian attackers - both soldiers and commanders - made these same mistakes, verbatim.

The commanders also made the following mistakes:

Underestimated the enemy's skill and willpower.
Failed to train the infantrymen on the most basic levels. Failed to ensure good communications, coordination and intelligence.
Failed to form assault teams tailored to the environment.
Failed to coordinate with other branches (VDV air assault) .

Why? To reach an arbitrary deadline set in the Kremlin, 1,000 miles to the north.

Someone in the higher echelons broke out the text book on city fighting and followed the template on 'attacking a city', without ever factoring in the reality that fast assaults only work when the attackers are well-trained and supplied with good intelligence on the objective.

What could the Russians have done differently?

A 'fast assault ' was never possible, since the rebels knew they were coming, and having sat through the same classes as their opponents, had taken the time to prepare a response by the book.
Given that the objective was the rapid assault and seizure of the Presidential Palace, and that the three main avenues were the most likely avenues of approach, it should have been obvious that the rebels would have built their defense around them.
The Russians should taken the time to build up supplies and refine their intelligence estimates, tailor specialized assault teams and then train their men.
When the infantry assault groups were ready to go in, the artillery barrage and air strikes should have been saved until the hours just prior to the assault. The stockpiled rounds could have been fired at the highest rate allowable, with the assault units following just behind this curtain. Such a 'Time On Target' would have been short and violent, dazed the defenders and reduced the defender's ability to take advantage of the ensuing rubble.
The type of round called for should be a mix of airbursts (clearing snipers from roofs) and concrete-piercing rounds (which penetrate a floor or so and take out snipers not on the roof).
The Russians could have also easily taken their armored advantage into the city with them. In addition to it's obvious firepower, the tank's physical bulk can provide cover would otherwise be none. Both BMP's and ZSU's have sufficient main gun elevation (+74x & +85x, respectively ) to suppress upper floors many stories up.
Those 2S1 and 2S3 SPG's not providing fire missions could have been attached to assault groups for direct fire support.
Combat Engineers could have broken through the rebel's street baricades.
It wasn't until mid-January that Combat Engineer Vehicles (either blade-equipped BREM's or IMR's) were seen with these units.

The Russians did learn from some of their mistakes. It took the Federal troops until January 26th to capture the Presidential Palace and there was serious street-fighting still going on by the end of February. By then, most of Grozny wound up being turned to rubble, with only 100,000 of the city's original 400,000 residents remaining. The rest are refugees.

The Russians took most of February and March to regroup while they laid siege to the remaining rebel strongholds (Shali, Argun, Gudermes and Shamaski) When they did move, the Chechen positions fell quickly.

Finally, the last major fortified rebel town fell on 8 June to an air-mobile assault. The Russians surprised the defenders of the mountain village of Vedano and claimed to have taken it without losing a single man.

Only one question applies to the rebel plan - they had rigged sections of the city with command-detonated mines, using the city's telephone system for control. Why wasn't it used? A Spetsnatz team eventually dismantled it around 12-14 January.

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