The Battle for Grozny

Russian Army Lessons Learned

Marine Corps Infantry Officer Course

Introduction

This article appears - without source - on the Marine Corps University's (MCU), Infantry Officers Course (IOC) Newsletter Web-site.

Russian Army Lessons Learned from the Battle of Grozny

1. There is a need to culturally orient your forces so that you do not end up being your own worst enemy - simply out of cultural ignorance. Many times, Russian soldiers made serious cultural errors in dealing with the Chechen civilians. Once insulted or mistreated, the Chechen civilians often became active fighters against the Russians. Russian sources admit they underestimated the affect of religion in regards to the conflict.

2. There is a need of sorting out the combatants from the non-combatants. The days of uniforms and organized units are over. The Russians were forced to resort to searching the pockets of civilians for military equipment and to sniffing them for the smell of gunpowder and gun oil. This is a crude method of force protection and intelligence collection. Trained military working dogs were used, but were not a effective. Nevertheless, dogs were probably the best way to determine if a person had been using explosives or firing a weapon recently.

3. The psychological impact of high intensity urban combat is so intense that you should maintain a large reserve that will allow you to rotate units in and out of combat. If you do this, you can preserve a unit for a fairly long time. If you don't, once it gets used up, it can't be rebuilt.

4. Training and discipline are paramount. You can accomplish nothing without them. You may need to do the training in the combat zone. Discipline must be demanded. Once it begins to slip, the results are disastrous.

5. The Russians were surprised and embarrassed at the degree to which the Chechens exploited the use of cell phones, Motorola radios, improvised television stations, light video cameras, and the Internet to win the information war. The Russians admitted that they lost control of the information coming out of Grozny early in the operation and never regained it.

6. The proliferation of rocket propelled grenade (RPGs) launchers surprised the Russians, as well as the diversity of uses to which the RPGs were put. RPGs were shot at everything that moved. They were fired at high angles over low buildings and from around buildings with little or no attempt made to aim. They were sometimes fired in very disciplined volleys and were the weapon of choice for the Chechens, along with the sniper rifle. Not only were the Russians faced with well-trained, well equipped Chechen military snipers, there were also large numbers of designated marksmen who were very good shots using standard military rifles. These were very hard to deal with and usually required massive fire power to overcome.

7. As expected, the Russians reiterated the need for large numbers of trained infantrymen. They said that some tasks, such as conducting logpack operations, could only be conducted by the infantry, as the logistical unit soldiers were hopelessly inept and were easy prey for the Chechens.

8. The Russians found that boundaries between units were tactical weak points. However, it wasn't just horizontal boundaries they had to worry about. In some cases, the Chechens held the third floor and above, while the Russians held the first two floors, and sometimes the roof. If a unit holding the second floor evacuated parts of it without telling the unit on the ground floor, the Chechens would move troops in and attack the ground floor unit through the ceiling. Often this resulted in fratricide as the ground floor unit responded with uncontrolled fire through all of the ceiling area including sections still occupied by Russian troops. Entire battles were fought through floors, ceilings, and walls without visual contact.

9. Ambushes were common. Sometimes they actually had three tiers. Chechens would be underground, on the ground floor, and on the roof. Each group had a different task in the conduct of the ambush.

10. The most common response by the Chechens to the increasingly powerful Russian indirect and aerial firepower was hugging the Russian unit. If the hugging tactics caused the Russians to cease artillery and air fires, it became a man-to-man fight and the Chechens were well equipped and prepared to win it. If the fires did not cease, the Russian units suffered just as much as the Chechen fighters, sometimes even more so, and the morale effect was much worse on the Russians.

11. Both the physical and the mental health of Russian troops began to decline immediately upon initiation of high intensity combat. In less than a month, almost 20 percent of Russian soldiers were suffering from viral hepatitis (serious, debilitating, and slow recovery). Most had chronic diarrhea and upper respiratory infections that easily turned to pneumonia. This was blamed on the breakdown of logistical support that resulted in soldiers drinking contaminated water. Unit sanitary discipline broke down almost completely.

12. According to a survey of over 1300 troops, about 72 percent had some sort of psychological disorder. Almost 75 percent had an exaggerated startle response. About 28 percent had what was described as neurotic reactions, and almost 10 percent had acute emotional reactions. The Russians recommended two psycho-physiologists, one psycho-pharmacologist, one psychiatrist, and one medical psychologist at each (U.S. equivalent) corps-sized unit. Although their experience in Afghanistan prepared them somewhat for the physical health problems, they were not prepared for this level of mental health treatment. Many permanent combat stress casualties resulted from soldiers not being provided proper immediate treatment.

13. Chechens were not afraid of tanks and BMPs (infantry fighting vehicles). They assigned groups of RPG gunners to fire volleys at the lead and trail vehicles. Once they were destroyed, the others were picked off one-by-one. The Russian forces lost 20 of 26 tanks, 102 of 120 BMPs, and 6 of 6 ZSU-23s (anti-air artillery) in the first three days of fighting. Chechens chose firing positions high enough or low enough to stay out of the fields of fire of tank and BMP weapons. Russian infantry conscripts simply refused to leave (dismount) from the "perceived" safety of an infantry fighting vehicle and often died in their BMP without ever firing a shot. Russian "elite" infantry did much better, but did not coordinate well with armored vehicles initially.

14. Chechens were brutish, especially with prisoners of war. Some reports say the Russians were not better - but most say the Chechens were the worse. Whoever was at fault, the battle degenerated quickly to on of "no quarter asked - none given." Russian wounded and dead were hung upside down in windows of defended Chechen positions. The Russians had to shoot at the bodies to engage the Chechens. Russian prisoners were decapitated and at night their heads were placed on stakes along roads leading into the city. The same roads that Russian replacements and reinforcements had to travel. Both Russian and Chechen dead were routinely booby-trapped.

15. The ferocity and brutality of the Chechens did not surprise the Russians. They expected them to be "criminals and animal brutes" but they were surprised by the Chechen use of booby traps and mines. Chechens mined and booby-trapped everything, showing excellent insight into the actions and reactions of the average Russian soldier. Mine and booby-trap awareness was hard to maintain.

16. The Russians were satisfied with the combat performance of most of their infantry weapons. However, they considered the T-72 tank as "dead meat." The T-72 was too vulnerable, too awkward, not agile, had limited visibility, and poor weapons coverage at short range. As a result, the Russians removed them from the battle. Smaller numbers of older tanks and additional self-propelled artillery, air-defense-artillery, and BMPs replaced them. (MOUT Homepage Note: the direct fire capabilities of artillery and air-defense-artillery in an urban combat situation were not lost on the Russians). Precision guided weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were very useful. Also identified was the need for non-lethal weapons - riot control and tranquilizer gasses - not weapons such as sticky foam. The Russian equivalent of the M202 flash flame projector and the Mk 19 grenade launcher were very useful weapons. Ultimately, a strong combined arms team and flexible command and control meant more than the individual weapons used by each side.

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