As the forward deployed expeditionary element of United States military power the United States Marine Corps (USMC) must be prepared to react quickly and effectively in the most unconventional of theaters. Given this unique warfighting mission, the Marine Corps has had much experience throughout its history operating in urban environments. Examples include the battles for Seoul and Hue in the Korean and Vietnam wars respectively. In the 1990’s, Marines have been deployed in several major peacekeeping operations, all of which have required a concentration of force in major urban centers. Operations in Panama, Liberia, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo have proven that Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) are complex and challenging. Preparing for the demands of urban operations requires extensive training and continual innovations in MOUT strategy, operations; tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs); and technology.

In the future, the urban environment will present Marines with situations requiring the conduct of many different categories of military activities concurrently. Missions such as humanitarian assistance operations, peace operations, and full-scale, high-intensity combat may occur simultaneously within three city blocks. The Marine Corps' Commandant has labeled this concept the “3-block war.” Integrating and coordinating these varying missions, each of which has its own operational characteristics, will challenge Marines to use their skill and determination in imaginative ways. The presence of large numbers of noncombatants and the potential difficulty in distinguishing noncombatants from hostile forces will further complicate the task of operating in the urban environment.

Overview:

In light of the probability of future operations in urban environments, in 1997 the Marine Corps provided a preliminary assessment of urban warfare lessons learned in support of the Close Support End-to-End Assessment (CSEEA) Joint Wargame. Three scenarios across the spectrum of conflict from mid- to low-intensity were chosen to represent urban operations for this J-8 sponsored wargame.

The lessons are drawn from: (1) Russian military operations in urban areas of Chechnya (with focus on the fighting in Grozny) between 1994 and 1996, (2) Israeli experiences operating in urbanized southern Lebanon during Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982, (3) and British military experiences in Northern Ireland from 1969 to 1996, with special emphasis on the period 1969 to 1976 when the British Army had the lead in security operations.

Lessons Learned:

Analysis of the Russian, Israeli, and British military operations in urban terrain yielded the following overall strategic, operational, tactical, and technical lessons:

Strategic Lessons:

 Military action cannot solve deep-seated political problems, but can buy time for politicians to search for political solutions.

 It is difficult to get well-defined policy objectives to which the military can work steadily and logically.

 Contrary to expectations, urban operations are neither short-lived nor low cost.

 Lines of command and control are often unclear and/or conflicting in urban operations, especially when police and military units are intermingled.

 Problems with disjointed command structures can be exacerbated by too much senior leadership at the operational level.

 Operations can also suffer when there is a lack of continuity in the senior command structure.

 Local paramilitary forces are likely to receive outside assistance.

 Concern for civilian causalities and property damage decline as casualties among security forces rise.

 When security operations begin to achieve results, the enemy may start attacking targets in the security forces’ homeland and/or their personnel stationed abroad.

 Paramilitary operations more often aim at achieving political advantage rather than military results.

 A distinct advantage accrues to the side with less concern for the safety of the civilian population.

Operational Lessons:

 It is important to have a well-developed military doctrine for urban operations, but that is not enough in and of itself.

 Situation-oriented training in urban warfare and tactics greatly improves military effectiveness and reduces losses.

 Clear rules of engagement are essential in urban combat situations.

 Even clear rules of engagement, however, are sometimes difficult to enforce, especially in the face of mounting losses among the security forces.

 The tempo of operations in an urban environment is so intense that personnel tend to “burn out” quickly.

 Overwhelming firepower can make up for organizational and tactical deficiencies in the short-run if one is willing to disregard collateral damage.

 Urban combat is extremely manpower intensive and produces significant attrition of men and materiel among the attackers.

 Psychological operations are a key element of any military operation in an urban environment.

 Urban operations are very infantry intensive affairs which produce large numbers of causalities.

 Urban operations usually stress the logistics system because of unusual requirements and abnormally high consumption rates in some class of supply.

 The spatial qualities and perspective of urban and conventional warfare differ. Urban combat is more “vertical” in that operations routinely reach up into tall buildings and down into sewers and basements.

 Special forces are useful tools in urban settings, but are often misused because conventional force commanders do not understand how to use their special skills effectively.

 The large-scale movement of urban non-combatants can significantly hinder military operations.

 Non-combatants cannot be counted upon to behave sensibly.

 Strategic bombing and close air support can be used to shape the battlefield, even in an urban setting.

 Standard military unit configurations are often inappropriate for urban combat.

 Failure to understand the importance of civil affairs and psychological operations can cost commanders dearly.

 Amphibious operations can have an important role in urban warfare, especially in achieving tactical surprise.

Tactical Lessons:

 Rigorous communications security is essential, even against relatively primitive enemies.

 Night operations are especially difficult to carry out in an urban environment.

 Forces operating in cities need special equipment not found in standard tables of organization and equipment.

 Tanks and armored personnel carriers cannot operate in cities without extensive dismounted infantry support.

 Trained snipers are very cost effective, but likely to be in short supply.

 If patrolling is central to the strategy of the security forces, it will be different from conventional combat patrolling and must be well coordinated.

 Fratricide is a serious problem in cities because it is harder to identify friend from foe.

 Major civilian structures in cities (e.g., hospitals, churches, banks, embassies) are cited in such a way as to be tactically useful locations, command key intersections, and/or are built of especially solid construction. Therefore, such facilities are especially useful to urban defenders.

 Direct-fire artillery and anti-aircraft artillery can be a valuable tool in urban combat, provided one does not care about collateral damage.

 Small unit leadership, especially at the junior non-commissioned officer level, is critical to tactical success in urban operations.

 Recovering damaged armored vehicles is more difficult in urban areas.

 Intelligence, especially from human sources, is critical to successful urban operations.

 Hit-and-run ambushes by small groups are the favorite tactic of urban paramilitary forces.

 Tracked vehicles are preferable to wheeled vehicles in situations where there is likely to be large amounts of rubble in the streets. Otherwise wheeled armored vehicles are preferable.

 Helicopters have extreme difficulties operating in an urban combat environment, but are quite useful in redeploying forces and supplies to just behind the forward edge of operations.

 The Soldier's load must be dramatically reduced because urban warfare requires greater individual agility and stamina.

 Soldiers sometimes either deliberately misuse or modify “non-lethal” technologies to make them more harmful than intended.

 Very accurate and up-to-date maps are essential for successful urban operations.

 The shock value of artillery fire diminishes over time.

Technical Lessons:

 Some military equipment will probably have to be modified in the field to counter enemy tactics and equipment.

 Small arms, though not decisive, play a disproportionately significant role in the outcome of urban battles.

 Individual flak jackets significantly reduce urban casualties.

 Smoke enhances survivability in urban situations, but carries significant operational penalties (e.g., impedes visual communications, taxes driving skills of vehicle operators, and slows the overall rate of advance).

 Mortars are highly regarded by both attackers and defenders in urban operations, but may be less effective than supposed.

 Machine-guns may be more valuable than assault rifles for urban combat.

 Air defense guns are valuable for suppressing ground targets.

 Heavy machine-guns still offer good defense against close air attack, especially helicopters.

 Commercial off-the-shelf technologies can be employed successfully for military purposes in cities.

 Rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) are omnipresent and very effective weapons in urban combat.

 Armored vehicles require more protection when operating in cities and that protection needs to be distributed differently than for conventional battlefield.

 Remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) can provide real-time intelligence, but analysts have considerable difficulty interpreting it correctly.

 The enemy often employs home-made weapons, even including chemical weapons, against security forces.

 Lightly protected armored vehicles are of limited value in urban terrain.

 Combat engineering equipment, especially armored bulldozers, are critical assets in urban combat.

 Cluster munitions are very effective in cities, provided one is not concerned about collateral damage.

 Although available, artillery-fired precision-guided munitions (PGMs) were seldom used in urban operations.

 Air-delivered precision-guided munitions were much more commonly employed than artillery-fired PGMs when not hampered by bad weather.

 “Bunker busting” weapons are invaluable for urban warfare.

 “Non-lethal” technologies were seldom used for combat missions. Instead, “non-lethals” were more generally employed for crowd control and riot suppression.

 Extensive use of “non-lethal” weapons can become counterproductive because demonstrators can build up an immunity to their effects, especially the shock value of such weapons.

 Conventional military radios are likely to be unsuitable for urban operations and work poorly in built-up areas.

Conclusion:

In the future, U.S. forces are most likely to engage in low- to mid-intensity operations in developing or underdeveloped parts of the world. It is also likely that a large percentage of these operations will draw U.S. forces into MOUT. According to United Nations estimates, the urban population of developing countries worldwide increases by about 150,000 people each day, with the most pronounced growth occurring in Africa and Asia.

By the year 2025, three-fifths of the world's population--five billion people--will live in urban areas. In some developing nations, the pace of urban population growth will exceed the development of city services. Housing, water, and jobs will be in short supply, giving rise to poverty, disease and crime. Over-crowded conditions will create an environment of social and economic tension, which might eventually find an outlet in the form of violence.

The Russian, Israeli, and British examples of MOUT serve as examples of a military strategy possibly being adopted by weak conventional as well as non-conventional forces around the world. Realizing themselves to be inferior to larger, better equipped militaries in the areas of conventional battlefield tactics, heavy artillery, armor, and advanced command and control technology, weaker forces might attempt to compensate through asymmetrical means such as guerilla warfare--including guerilla warfare on urban terrain. By using the familiar terrain of their native cities to launch guerilla operations against intervening conventional armies, the Chechens, the PLO, and the paramilitaries of Northern Ireland exploited the Russian, Israeli, and British forces’ inability to adapt their tactics and technology to the urban environment. The conventional forces learned that fighting an unconventional war in an urban environment poses a set of difficulties and challenges completely alien to military combat in any other type of terrain. Though the Russians, the Israelis, and particularly the British demonstrated capabilities to adapt to the challenges that they faced in their respective MOUT, in each instance the lack of preparedness (at least initially in Northern Ireland) made the operation much more time consuming and costly than was originally anticipated.

The near certainty that the National Command Authorities will again deploy U.S. Marines to urban environments, combined with the mandate to reduce casualties and collateral damage, requires that the U.S. concept for future MOUT address and prepare for the unique challenges that will be faced. The Russian, Israeli, and British experiences illustrate that factors such as the granularity of urban terrain and the presence of noncombatants can combine to create friction which can potentially erode the effectiveness of basic operational capabilities. Therefore, meeting the challenge of future MOUT must continue to be a multi-step process requiring an examination of doctrine, organization, training and education, equipment, and support systems. It is essential that U.S. military planners study and understand the nature of the urban environment and its implications for operational- and tactical-level evolutions.

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