Excerpt From The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan

The Frunze Military Academy

Lessons Learned in Afghanistan

Edited By Lester W. Grau - FMSO and NDU

Vignette 1 from Chapter 1

An Airborne Battalion Searches Sherkhankhel Village

By Major S. N. Petrov

Introduction

Major S. N. Petrov served in the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA) from 1981 to 1983 as the commander of an airborne company. The Soviet Union’s Frunze Military Academy compiled the information contained in this book for their command and general staff combat arms officers in order to capture the lessons of Soviet tactical leaders learned in Afghanistan and to explain the change in tactics that followed.

An Airborne Battalion Searches Sherkhankhel Village

In the spring of 1982, guerrilla forces began combat activities in Parvan Province. Guerrillas hit our convoys, outposts and separate groups of soldiers. They regularly shelled the Bagram airport and the base camp of our airborne regiment. Intelligence reports indicated that a well-armed group of approximately 40 Mujahideen were operating out of Sherkankhel Village.

The airborne regimental commander received orders to destroy this guerilla force. Preparations for combat were rapidly completed. Sufficient ammunition for three days was issued to every paratrooper and two combat loads of ammunition were loaded onto the combat vehicles. The regimental commander personally inspected the battalion’s readiness.

The 3rd Airborne Battalion commander planned to move his battalion secretly to the Sherkhankhel region and seal it off with two companies of paratroopers while a third company would search the village. One airborne company would remain in reserve. An artillery battalion and four Mi-24 helicopters would provide support with the initiation of combat.

In the predawn hours of 20 March, the battalion moved out from Bagram to Sherkhankhel. A reconnaissance patrol moved 300 meters in front of the column. The approach march moved on a wide, straight road. Along the left side of the road stretched a thick, high, long adobe wall while on the right side lay a concrete lined canal. The canal was five meters wide and two-and-a-half meters deep. Suddenly, through an embrasure cut in the adobe wall, and practically at point-blank range, the enemy opened fire on the reconnaissance patrol. The survivors scrambled for safety into the canal. A machine gun opened fire from a house 150 meters further north from the ambush site. The battalion column halted and the battalion commander called in artillery and helicopter support.

The battalion finally began to maneuver its reserve company in an effort to encircle the enemy, but only after the Mujahideen ceased fire. But even this attempt was stopped by a veritable hurricane of enemy fire. The Mujahideen used the system of karez to successfully break contact and withdraw. A karez is a system of underground tunnels used for the collection of ground water and for carrying water for surface irrigation. There was no thought of conducting a pursuit or continuing the action. The 3rd Airborne Battalion lost eight men killed and six wounded. Two of the dead were officers. The battalion did not search the village since the Mujahideen were already gone. Instead, the battalion returned to its base camp.

Frunze Commentary

In spite of our measures to prepare for combat secretly, the enemy was able to determine the intention of Soviet tactical elements. Exploiting the arrogance of the battalion commander, the enemy hit him with an ambush. The battalion’s sub-units, which were prepared to conduct a sweep, conducted an approach march along a single march route, which was so constricted as to prevent maneuver by the sub-units. The battalion commander merely put a reconnaissance patrol to his front and did not consider using flanking patrols.

Editor’s Commentary

Operations security is difficult, particularly when fighting on someone else’s turf and working with an indigenous force which may not be 100 percent on your side. Yet operations security is absolutely imperative for preserving your force and winning battles. In this vignette, the regimental commander thoroughly inspected his force prior to its moving out. This sounds like a good idea, however it was the dreaded stroevoy smotr (ceremonial inspection) which was an unwelcome part of peacetime, garrison soldiering in the Soviet Army. The entire regiment would lay out all its equipment on the parade ground. All equipment would be laid out on tarps in front of vehicles. Every piece of equipment would formally checked and accounted for, the correct spacing on uniform items would be checked with a template, and displays would be aligned with a piece of string. The process could take three days. Although inspections are god ideas, these massive formal inspections were almost always conducted before a planned action. Any Mujahideen in the vicinity were tipped off that an action was pending and could sound the warning. The Soviet pattern often compromised operational security. In this vignette, the Mujahideen definitely were warned and punished the careless Soviet force. The stroevoy smotr may have been a part of the Soviet problem.

The MOUT Homepage Hot Links:

Visitor since 23 February 1998

This page hosted by Get your own Free Home Page