Introduction
Major S. V. Mos’kin served in the Limited Soviet Contingent in Afghanistan (OKSVA) from September 1980 through November 1982 as a platoon leader.
Organizing a Security Outpost in the Suburbs of Kabul
At the end of May 1982, enemy diversionary/reconnaissance groups conducted actions against Soviet Army base camps. In particular, they fired directly on the 40th Army Headquarters. The leadership of the guerilla forces announced that they would destroy the headquarters in the near future. Therefore, the high command decided to upgrade the defense and security of the army headquarters.
As a result, Major Avramenko, my battalion commander, decided to establish a new security post, which would be manned by my motorized rifle platoon, which had three BTR-70s and 28 men. (Editor’s Note: The 2nd Platoon, 2nd Company, 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion, 180th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division. The 1st and 2nd Battalions were mounted on BTRs while the 3rd Battalion was mounted on BMPs – endnote). My platoon was reinforced with two AGS-17s and three PK machine guns with night sights. We also received some night vision devices for night observation. An engineer excavator came to the site and within 72 hours, dug the primary and reserve fighting positions for my BTRs and men and then connected all the positions with deep fighting trenches. We dug secret forward redoubts on the flanks of the security outposts for our machine gun crews.
We also built an observation post for a long-range field of vision over our area. We established visual communications between the secret dugouts and the observation post to assist in coordinating fires. We built two barbed wire fences all around the security perimeter. Between the two rows of barbed wire fence, we put in an antipersonnel minefield (pressure and tension-release mines). On the far side of the wire, we laid in trip flares. A landline was installed to give us telephone communications with the battalion commander, a neighboring tank platoon and the duty officer at army headquarters. I organized my post to have two-thirds of my men manning their posts at night and one third during the day. Every soldier had his combat crew assignment and instructions in case of an alert.
In September 1982, we intercepted an attempt by an enemy reconnaissance/diversionary group to penetrate the army headquarters. The Mujahideen preceded this provocation by shelling our positions with mortars and launch bombs. On the day before the attempt, they did a reconnaissance of our obstacles by driving a large flock of sheep into our minefield. On the next night, the Mujahideen attempted to penetrate to the army headquarters using a dry river bed and irrigation canal. We killed two of these who wandered into our mines. We recovered weapons and documents from their bodies.
Frunze Commentary
Following repeated, unsuccessful Mujahideen attempts on the army headquarters, future attempts by their reconnaissance/diversionary groups were thwarted by thorough, well-thought out measures to protect the army headquarters including the establishment of a new security outpost on the enemy approach route.
Editor’s Commentary
Due to the preeminence of the offense in Soviet military training, the Soviets rarely trained for the defense. There seems to be a hunker-down-and-wait mentality in their defenses, whereas one would expect to see patrols, moving ambushes, mechanical ambushes, and aggressive reconnaissance. This is particularly true at night. The Afghan police conduct the only night patrols done in this vignette. After a unit has gone to ground so thoroughly, it is hard to imagine putting it into aggressive action without some serious readjustments and retraining. The unit seems to have a bunker mentality.
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