Introduction
Major I. A. Egiazarov served in the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA) from 1982 through 1984 as the commander of a SPETSNAZ group. The term SPETSNAZ means -Troops of Special Designation. For his book, Lester Grau used the term SPETSNAZ for Soviet forces trained for long- range reconnaissance, commando and special forces type combat. A SPETSNAZ detachment is equivalent to a battalion command, although its personnel strength was less than 100. They are sometimes called SPETSNAZ companies. SPETSNAZ groups were equivalent to company commands, but had a personnel strength of 15-16 men or less. Some were four-man groups. They were sometimes called SPETSNAZ platoons.
Repelling a Raid on a Security Post
During the second half of June 1982, the high command decided to strengthen and expand Afghan government power around the city of Rukha in the Panjsher valley. They decided to do this during the course of an operation in the Panjsher valley, which involved Afghan government troops and a SPETSNAZ detachment. The Afghan Army had a series of security outposts on the dominant heights surrounding Rukha. These posts were poorly fortified, there were not enough soldiers and heavy weapons to hold them and the Afghan soldier’s morale was low. The high command decided to reinforce the existing force and to add additional outposts by assigning men from a SPETSNAZ detachment to man them (the 31st SPETSNAZ Group of the 177th SPETSNAZ Detachment).
Thus on the 13th of June, I received orders to take my 31st SPETSNAZ Group and occupy the heights opposite the rest of the force across the Panjsher River. I was a lieutenant at the time. My commander wanted me to establish an observation post and look for Mujahideen activity in the area of the hamlet of Marishtan. This would also deny the enemy the opportunity to conduct his own reconnaissance and launch a surprise attack on our battalion.
There were 15 men in my 31st SPETSNAZ Reconnaissance Group. Besides small arms, we had two AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers, one DShK heavy machine gun and one 82mm "tray" mortar. An artillery battery that belonged to the SPETSNAZ detachment supported us. We expected enemy action in the region on 15 or 16 July, and that action might include an assault on the security outposts.
We occupied our assigned peak on 15 July and began fortifying the position. This was our order of work. First, prepare firing positions and establish an integrated, comprehensive firing plan. Second, fortify the positions with local materials to blend in with the natural terrain and build covered shelters for the troops. Third, build tiered observation posts out of stone and clay. Fourth, mine the approaches to the post. Fifth, on a nearby terrace, build a hidden tanglefoot obstacle. Sixth, organize an uninterrupted schedule of observation and security. Three men were always on guard during the day and seven men were always on guard at night. The detachment resupplied us with ammunition and food every three days.
About 1830 hours on 18 July, we were eating dinner and observation was lax - probably my lookouts had also decided to eat without my authorization. During this time of relaxed vigilance, the enemy sneaked onto our high terrace, climbed to within 10 meters of our defensive position and simultaneously opened fire with three DShK heavy machine guns from "Black Hill" and "Fang Mountain". My men, with the exception of two lookouts, dove behind the walls and in the dugouts for shelter. The guerrillas had resolutely seized the initiative and pushed their attack forward, throwing grenades as they came. The Mujahideen having climbed onto our high terrace ran toward our defenses, but were caught in our tanglefoot. This broke their attack and we were able to destroy them with fire from our dugouts. The enemy left four corpses on the terrace. The rest withdrew under the cover of DShK fire. We had o casualties.
Editor’s Commentary
Even, and sometimes especially, in elite forces, the commander must stay on top of his personnel and ensure that they maintain vigilance and perform other routine soldier’s duties. Soldier’s carelessness almost led to the destruction of this observation post
This vignette indicates that an artillery battery may have been part of a SPETSNAZ detachment. In this particular vignette, the detachment was operating within MRL range since part of the artillery plan was for MRLs.
The Soviet tanglefoot obstacle appears to be a most effective obstacle. Western armies have not adopted it - perhaps these armies ought to consider doing so. The Soviet tanglefoot obstacle is different than that used in western armies. It is a large, compressed, banded spring made of high-quality wire. It is similar to an uncontrolled "Slinky" toy. When unbanded during set up, it uncoils wildly in every direction. It will stop dismounted soldiers, animals, vehicles, and even tanks. It is almost impossible to extricate anything from this obstacle without heavy-duty wire cutters, pliers and lots of time. These obastcles are called MZP - concealed obastcles.
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