Excerpt From The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan

The Frunze Military Academy

Lessons Learned in Afghanistan

Edited By Lester W. Grau - FMSO and NDU

Vignette 33 from Chapter 4

Securing a Base Camp

By LTC A. Yunakov

Introduction

This and the following vignette are not part of the Frunze book. They are extracts from P. Alexseev’s “Okhranenie” (Security), Voyenny Vestnik (Military Herald), April 1994, p. 42-46. Colonel Alexseev is on the faculty of the Frunze Department of the History of Military Art. He apparently used LTC Yunakov’s report that was in the Frunze Afghanistan archives. Although both examples lack the element of combat, they show how base camps and lines of communications (LOC) security were organized.

Securing a Base Camp

My battalion was part of a separate brigade based in Kandahar and Helmand provinces (Editor’s Note: Probably the 5th Motorized Rifle Battalion, 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade – endnote). The brigade had three motorized rifle battalions, an air assault battalion, a signal company, a radio-electronic warfare company, an artillery battalion, a helicopter squadron and a brigade headquarters. The battalion’s mission was three- fold: first, to provide security to a base camp near Lashkargah in Helmand Province, second, to escort convoys two or three times a week along and 80-kilometer stretch of road, and finally to fight guerrilla forces in the immediate vicinity. My battalion was reinforced with a battery of D-30 122mm howitzers and two tank platoons. A 12-kilometer perimeter encompassed our base camp. I had seven fighting positions spaced around the perimeter. Each position was occupied by one or two motorized rifle platoons. When providing convoy security, I usually dispatched one or two motorized rifle platoons with one or two 82mm mortars. When fighting guerrillas, I usually dispatched a motorized rifle company, with the artillery battery, reconnaissance platoon, and two mortar platoons.

The guerrillas began firing launch bombs at my base camp shortly after we created a security zone. These attacks were launched from the green zone along the Helmand River. In early 1987, we conducted an operation, in conjunction with the Afghan Army to clean out the guerrilla forces from Lashkargah and to establish observation posts in the green zone for a Sarandoy battalion. After the operation, we established another security outpost in the Qala-Bust fort in order to control the green zone adjacent to the observation posts. We garrisoned this outpost with another Sarandoy battalion. We maintained close coordination with Sarandoy through a liaison officer.

In order to protect my men from mortar and light machine gun fire, I paid a lot of attention to digging in and fortifying the positions. Every squad was completely dug in. Every firing position was linked to its platoon positions by communications trenches. Each fighting position has a dug in sleeping quarters (where possible), ammunition point, platoon command post, dining room, water point, wash room and latrine. In order to improve observation, I established forward security posts, which consisted of a BTR machine gunner, a driver, and a rifleman. These were placed in position at 1800 hours following the issuance of the combat order and challenge and password. They were checked every two hours and changed every four hours by the platoon leader or his assistant. During the night, these posts were only allowed to fire on semi-automatic as a warning or probe. If they fired a burst on full automatic, the entire force would occupy its fighting positions. Artillery fired scheduled harassing and interdicting fires and had fires planned throughout the area. We were also able to open fire without warning when a target appeared in my area of responsibility (AOR) at night. At daybreak, I pulled all my forward posts back and fired on any person, convoy or caravan that we discovered in the Registan Desert within four kilometers of my camp. None of my personnel were allowed to withdraw from a fighting position.

Every six months, the battalion commander ordered a rotation of sub-units. The rotation occurred during daylight. Sub-units coming off base camp defense were assigned to convoy security duties. In preparation for these duties, we trained the sub-units in procedures for clearing roads of mines, checking and clearing bridges, defeating enemy attacks and evacuating vehicles under fire.

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