Lines of Communications (LOC) Security
The first priority of Mujahideen commanders was to disrupt the movement of convoys travelling on the main roads of Afghanistan. Motorized rifle sub-units were usually responsible for route security. Normally, a motorized rifle battalion would be responsible for a 40- to 150-kilometer stretch of road, whereas a company would cover from two- to 10-kilometers. In February 1986, my 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion, reinforced with a tank company and two artillery batteries, was responsible for the security of a 102-kilometer stretch of road along the Puli-Charkhi to Jalalabad highway as well as the security of the Naghlu power dam site. I could field 11 tanks, 42 BMPs, twelve self-propelled howitzers, 27 82mm mortars, nine twin-barreled anti-aircraft guns, and 23 AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers. I decided to split the area into three sections. My 7th MRC had a 32-kilometer section, my 8th MRC had a 40-kilometer section and my 9th MRC had a 30-kilomter section. I determined the length of each section after considering the terrain, key sites, enemy activity and the line of strength of my sub-units. I considered several solutions before I selected the one which seemed to best concentrate combat power in critical sectors.
My LOC security was based on a series of security outposts running the length of the road. A motorized rifle platoon, one or two AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers, one or two heavy "Utes" or DShK machine guns, one or two 82mm mortars and a tank usually occupied an outpost. These could be combined into a security detachment (a motorized rifle company or battalion reinforced with artillery, tanks, and engineers).
The security outposts functioned around the clock. During the day, one man per squad was on watch while a two-man patrol worked the area. At night, every security outpost would send out one or two security points. These four-man points were located 500 to 900 meters from the security outpost and had wire and visual communications with the outpost. The outpost could cover the point with fire.
Each security outpost had a full perimeter defense in order to defeat a Mujahideen attack from any direction. Each platoon had a primary and alternate sector of fire. Artillery fire planning was carefully done. Artillery sub-units were usually collocated in the security outposts with the motorized rifle sub-units. The artillery was positioned in order to effectively support all the security outposts. Artillery fires were planned on all likely axes on which the Mujahideen could move. Targets were registered and numbered. The targets, and their coordinates were maintained by the security outposts, artillery gun crews and by the battalion headquarters. Fires could be adjusted from pre-planned targets by the security outpost commander or, if he could not communicate directly with the artillery sub-unit, through the battalion commander. Normally, it took not more than two to four minutes to bring artillery fire onto a group of Mujahideen.
We selected the position for the outposts carefully and fortified them thoroughly. We piled up earth and stones to make complete trench-works, bunkers; and ammunition, food and water points. We ran two rows of barbed wire around each outpost and put antipersonnel mines between the fences. We put trip flares and sensors at remote and concealed approaches to the outposts. The entrance and exit to the security outposts were closed and mined at night. Rules of conduct were posted at the perimeter of the security zone and outside the security outposts. The signs were in the Afghan, Russian and English languages. Editor’s Note: There is no single Afghan language. Pushtu and Dari are the official languages, while Tadjik, Uzbek, Kirghiz, Baluchi, Turkmen, and Arabic are also spoken - endnote.
Every security outpost had five combat loads of ammunition and ten days worth of food, water, and fuel. (Editor’s Note: The combat load is a logistic planning term, which differs from the U.S. "basic load". Five combat loads is a significant amount - probably enough for six good fights - endnote). Night-vision devices, "Blik" binoculars, night scopes, parachute flares, and tracer ammunition were available for night-time employment.
Each security outpost maintained the following documents and maps:
1. The combat mission of the outpost and the sequence of mission fulfillment.
2. The commander’s map marked with positions, fire plans and known enemy situation.
3. A diagram of the strongpoint.
4. Orders from the battalion commander.
5. Combat orders of the security outpost commander.
6. An observation schedule.
7. A patrol schedule.
8. A duty weapon schedule and sectors of fire.
9. Signal tables.
10. Observer’s journals, combat journals and journals of enemy activity.
Editor’s Note: Duty weapons were manned, crew-served weapons in temporary positions. Only these weapons would engage enemy reconnaissance or probing elements while the rest of the force moved to battle positions. The duty weapons would then move to battle positions. Enemy return fire would be on the temporary position and enemy knowledge of the locations of defending Soviet crew-served weapons would be faulty – endnote.
The battalion produces the security plan which shows the number and composition of each security outpost, the quantity of vehicles, weapons and ammunition at each security outpost, the security belt at each outpost, the defensive plan for key sites, the coordination measures between elements, the defensive fire plan, the signal plan for communications between garrisons, convoys, dispatch posts and the fire support elements. In addition, the battalion had a shift schedule for its sub-units and also the battalion commander’s order for organization of the security zone. Sub-units had their TO&E plus additional radios, telephones and cable communications gear for command and control.
Radio is the primary means of communications in LOC security. All armored vehicles, TO&E and attached sub-units, as well as passing convoys, monitor a common channel. The battalion reconnaissance platoon is located close to the battalion command post. Its function is to cut off and destroy any groups of Mujahideen in the battalion AOR. They usually do this by setting up ambushes on sites where Mujahideen could approach the highway. Their ambush site is coordinated with the regiment’s ambush plan and usually lasts one night. There have been times, however, when the ambush party has stayed on site for three days.
Editor’s Commentary
The Soviet concept of LOC security appears to have been to establish a series of fortified positions, man them and then sit back and wait. This is a very passive, reactive posture. There is no aggressive patrolling or reconnaissance. Again, the Soviets used their reconnaissance force as a primary combat force and not for gathering intelligence. There seems to be no attempt to shift forces, occupy temporary sites and take actions to deceive or "wrong-foot" the enemy. The Mujahideen could easily collect against this scheme and take appropriate actions to avoid or overcome it.
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