Excerpt From The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan

The Frunze Military Academy

Lessons Learned in Afghanistan

Edited By Lester W. Grau - FMSO and NDU

Vignette 37 from Chapter 5

Convoy Escort and Combat in the Village of Daulatabad

By LTC A. A. Agzamov

Introduction

LTC A. A. Agzamov served in the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA) from 1981 through 1083 as the commander of a reconnaissance group of a reconnaissance company. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Star”.

Convoy Escort and Combat in the Village of Daulatabad

At the end of 1981, the enemy mounted attacks against convoys along the Termez, Shebegan, Andkhoy, and Maimana route. I was particularly difficult in the region of Daulatabad. Intelligence reports indicated that a guerrilla force of 25-30 men armed with rifles operated in this area. Acting secretly, the enemy would attack a single vehicle or column. Their goal was to paralyze resupply into the area.

On 2 December 1981, the 2nd Reconnaissance Company, which was garrisoned in Maimana, was ordered to escort a 120-vehicle convoy loaded with supplies from Andkhoy to Maimana. The distance was 110 kilometers. The company reinforcements included a sapper squad, a flame-thrower squad armed with RPO flame-throwers, a ZSU-23-4 self-propelled air defense gun, and a BTS-4 towing vehicle. The BTS-4 is a turretless T-55 tank equipped for towing tracked vehicles.

We had two days to prepare for the mission. During this time we studied data which we received from the high command and resolved issues of rear support and maintenance support. We paid particular attention to readying the vehicles for the march and to preparing our weapons for combat. The troops drew rations and ammunition.

The convoy commander, N. Beksultanov, was the deputy commander of a SPETSNAZ detachment. He decided to conduct the march from Maimana to Andkhoy on a single route and precede this with a forward security patrol. At 0500 hours on 4 December, the column moved out and 11 hours later closed into the assembly area some three kilometers northeast of Andkhoy. The truck convoy, already loaded with supplies, joined us. We then had to arrange the march column, distribute our combat power throughout the convoy, agree on control measures, and arrange for our night rest stop. We planned to leave on the morning of 5 December, move for five or six hours covering 80 kilometers with one rest stop. Following an overnight rest, we would close into Maimana the following day. The company had a platoon serve as the forward patrol.

The column moved out at 0500 on the morning of 5 December. By 0900, the forward patrol reached the village of Daulatabad. They reported back that the village was deserted. This report put us on our guard, and the company commander ordered us to increase our observation. When the lead vehicles of the convoy began to exit Daulatabad village, the enemy opened fire with a grenade launcher and destroyed a BMP-2KSH and a fuel tanker. The BMP-2KSH is the command version of the BMP-2 series. A fire broke out and the vehicles immediately behind the conflagration were stuck in the narrow streets.

The enemy opened up with small arms fire. Two more BMPs were knocked out and, as a result, the convoy was split into three sections. We returned fire, but it was not controlled or directed. The convoy commander lost control over his sub-units, as his communications were gone. Individual vehicles independently tried to break out of the kill zones. The forward air controller (FAC) called in helicopter gunships and directed their fires. The helicopters began gun runs on the enemy in the village. In the meantime, the trail platoon received the mission to sweep the western part of the village. The dismounted troopers moved under the cover of BMP and helicopter fire to carry out their mission. The enemy withdrew when faced with this decisive action.

In the course of this three-hour battle, four of our soldiers were killed (all drivers), six were wounded, three BMPs were destroyed and five trucks were burned up.

Frunze Commentary

This example shows poor decision-making, inadequate preparation for battle and inadequate troop control during the course of the battle. None of the commanders involved had been briefed on the probable sites of enemy contact and the likely enemy courses of action.

Editor’s Commentary

In this vignette, the reconnaissance element reports that all the people in a village, which is a traditional trouble spot, have left. This leads to increased observation, but the commander does not dismount a force and have them probe the village for ambushes. This appears to demonstrate a basic lack of field craft on the part of the commander.

Again, the company commander muddles through a three-hour battle with a lightly armed platoon and only manages to extricate himself when airpower is brought to bear. There seems to be a strong reluctance to dismount and close with the enemy. There is an over-reliance on firepower.

Finally, Afghan government forces and Afghan civilian drivers are never part of the equation. Losses are strictly in terms of Soviet men, material, and trucks from the convoy. Either the Afghans never suffered casualties, or they were considered of no account. If it is of the latter, it demonstrates a mindset that is counterproductive when trying to assist another government in winning a guerrilla war.

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