Excerpt From The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan

The Frunze Military Academy

Lessons Learned in Afghanistan

Edited By Lester W. Grau - FMSO and NDU

Vignette 38 from Chapter 5

Convoy Escort and Combat Near Maliykhel'

By Major A. I. Guboglo

Introduction

Major A. I. Guboglo served in the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA) from 1981 to 1983 as a motorized rifle platoon leader. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Star” and the medal “For Valor”.

Convoy Escort and Battle near Maliykhel’

During the winter of 1982, several guerrilla detachments worked near the village of Maliykhel’ on the Kabul- Ghazni highway. The guerrillas would launch attacks on Soviet military convoys.

On the 11th of December 1982, the commander of the 7th Motorized Rifle Company (7th MRC, 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion, 191st Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment) received orders to escort a truck convoy from Ghazni to Kabul and return. They were to insure the unimpeded movement of the convoy in both directions on the 170-kilometer stretch.

The road march to Kabul went as planned and the enemy did not try to attack the convoy. After loading the trucks, we were prepared for our return trip to Ghazni. My company commander decided to place two BTRs at the head and two BTRs at the tail of the column and then intersperse five BTRs within the truck column. He put a BTR between every eight trucks. He had the 1st Motorized Rifle Platoon (MRP) serve as a reconnaissance platoon and move ten kilometers in front of the convoy. The average road speed of the convoy would be 35-40 kilometers per hour. There would be one rest stop at the end of three hours driving.

In case the enemy would attack the column with small arms, the BTRs and helicopter gunships would place maximum firepower on the enemy while the convoy moved out of the kill zone. As a variant, should the terrain permit, the BTRs would roll right over the ambush sites of the attacking enemy.

At 0730 hours on 13 December, my company commander gave the order and the convoy moved out. After 30 minutes of travel, one of our heavy-transport trucks broke down. My company commander had another transport truck link up with this vehicle and tow it right behind his command BTR at the front of the column. At 1115 hours, the lead vehicles of the main body approached the green zone near the village of Maliykhel’. As the vehicles crossed the river bridge, the enemy activated a radio-controlled, command-detonated mine which damaged the towing vehicle. The passage was blocked. At that instant, the enemy opened fire on the convoy from positions on the dominant heights. (MOUT Homepage Note: Though this vignette takes place outside a populated area, the military aspects of the terrain can be easily compared to that of urban areas – restricted avenues and dominant heights are two examples).

Attempts to push the trucks off the bridge failed. The company commander decided to have his 2nd MRP flank the bridge site through a gully. However, the enemy had mined the exit from the gully. The 2nd platoon’s lead BTR hit a mine. Attempts to extricate this BTR failed, and while they were trying, another BTR hit another mine. Taking stock of his increasingly untenable situation, the company commander ordered the 3rd MRP to dismount and take hill 1760. This was my platoon. I manuevered my first squad into a position where they could pin down the enemy with fire from the front. Then, I took my 2nd and 3rd squads to flank the enemy and hit him from the flank and rear. By 1145, we had successfully accomplished our mission and hill 1760 was ours.

During this time, our force continued attempts to retake the road and move the convoy to a safe place. However, due to the intense fire from “Nameless” mountain, we were unsuccessful. The approaches to the mountain were wide-open and a flanking attack did not appear possible. Despite our heavy small arms and BTR fire plus the repeated gun runs by helicopter gunships on the height, we were not able to take it.

Finally, our company commander’s radio requests resulted in an additional flight of helicopter gunships. The commander decided to attack the enemy with the 1st platoon, which had originally acted as the reconnaissance platoon. At 1240 hours, the 1st platoon attacked. It was supported by fire from the machine gun/grenade launcher platoon and a flight of helicopter gunships. It took the hill. The convoy could now resume its march.

Frunze Commentary

This vignette shows that is always necessary to “wargame” several variants for your sub-units in the event of an enemy attack. Further, sapper sub-units should always be a part of a convoy escort along with the motorized rifle force. And, again we see how good combat training of the troops leades to success in battle, regardless of how difficult the situation is.

Editor’s Commentary

The companies in this vignette and the first vignette in the chapter (number 35) are from the same battalion. There is a year’s difference between the two incidents. It would seem reasonable to check for improvements made during this time. The force now moves with a reconnaissance force forward and with more responsive air cover. But, the commander still rides in the lead vehicle, bridges not checked for mines, and dismounted forces do not probe likely ambush sites. Broken-down convoy vehicles are still towed at the front of the column right behind the command vehicle. There is no apparent attempt to control dominant terrain or check it prior to the convoy’s advance. There is no discussion of using air assault forces to leapfrog from dominant height to the next to cover the convoy’s movement. Apparently, not all lessons on convoy escort have been learned.

This chapter started out by saying that the Mujahideen attacked convoys with mines during the early stage of the war, and as the war progressed, they began to conduct full-scale attacks on convoys. All these examples are from 1981 or 1982 – the early stages of the war and, yet, the Mujahideen seem well advanced in convoy attack by this point. In these vignettes, however, the Soviets are not taking steps that are standard in western armies. There seems to be no road-opening force on these routes. Evidently, there are no “bait-and-hunt” decoy convoys. Rapid reaction forces supporting the convoy escorts are not apparent. There is no evidence of any planning to use airmobile forces on likely guerrilla escape routes. Artillery fire support planning also seems to be absent. These examples fail to show map and terrain work to identify choke points, and likely kill zones and ambushes sites in advance. Reconnaissance forces seem road-bound. The effort appears passive and reactive.

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