Excerpt From The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan

The Frunze Military Academy

Lessons Learned in Afghanistan

Edited By Lester W. Grau - FMSO and NDU

The Frunze Conclusion

Soviet Tactical Operations in Afghanistan

Introduction

The Frunze Military Academy is a ground forces command and staff college located in Moscow on Proyezd Devich’yevo Polya near the Novodevichiy Monastery. It trains select captains and majors over a three-year course of instruction. It has chairs of operational-tactical disciplines, history of war and military art, foreign languages and scientific research section. It primarily trains ground forces officers in combined arms warfare, but has representatives from all branches and services. World-famous military historians are included in its faculty. In this conclusion, the Frunze Academy refers to the Basmachi movement. The Basmachi were resistance fighters in Central Asia who resisted the imposition of Red rule from 1918 to 1933. The Bolsheviks attempt to extend their revolutionary order into Muslim Asia was resisted by hit-and-run raids and ambushes. A good English-language account of the Basmachi resistance is in Dr. Robert F. Bauman’s Russian-Soviet Unconventional Warfare in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan, Leavenworth Paper Number 20, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1993.

The Frunze Conclusion

Combat experience in the Republic of Afghanistan confirms the correctness of the basic tenets of our directive documents. However, in addition, it confirms the need to reassess some of them which touch on forces and means in special circumstances.

Several combat principles lay at the heart of the Majahideen’s tactics. First, they avoided direct contact with the superior might of regular forces - it would have wiped them out. Second, the Mujahideen practically never conducted positional warfare and, when threatened with encirclement, would abandon their positions. Third, in all forms of combat, the Mujahideen always strove to achieve surprise. Fourth, the Mujahideen used examples from the Basmachi movement and employed terror and ideological conditioning on a peaceful populace as well as on local government representatives.

The Mujahideen knew the terrain intimately, were natural scouts, and were capable of rapidly transmitting the necessary information about secret Soviet unit and sub-unit movements over great distances using rudimentary communications gear and signaling devices. Among the guerrilla forces’ tactical strong suits were all types of night actions, the ability to rapidly and clandestinely move in the mountains, and fielding of a very broad agent reconnaissance network.

The constant changes in the military-political situation in Afghanistan, the outfitting of the guerrilla forces with new weaponry, and the Mujahideen use of various techniques and procedures of military action worked to keep pressure on the tactics of Soviet forces. This demanded a constant, creative search for fundamentally new approaches for successful completion of the military mission. The TO&E (Table of Organization and Equipment) structure of sub-units and units were perfected. This was done in accordance with the techniques and procedures of combat, which would be most effective in the given TVD. This placed increased demands on the production of improved uniforms, load-bearing equipment and gear for the soldiers.

Experience shows that the basic conditions for achieving success in battle are making a well-informed decision in accordance with the specific combat situation. This includes thorough and complete preparation for mission accomplishment; securing tactical surprise and insuring tight coordination between sub-units and units of various branches and aviation performing common missions; hard but flexible and uninterupted control of sub- units; and daring, brave and enterprising actions by the commander and his troops as well as comprehensive support for the combat actions.

Military cunning was given great importance. As a rule, when sub-units went into battle, they were thoroughly prepared. Several hours or several days were set aside for this. Special attention needs to be paid to practical training of the soldier, sergeant, and officer. Training was frequently conducted on terrain similar to that on which they would fight. This allowed sub-units to work out several scenarios for the conduct of battle.

It must be remembered, however, that the experience of Soviet forces in the Republic of Afghanistan is specific to that locality. The practical application of this experience will require creativity and will have to take into account the specific natures and types of enemy actions.

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