Excerpt From The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan

The Frunze Military Academy

Lessons Learned in Afghanistan

Edited By Lester W. Grau - FMSO and NDU

Vignette 2 from Chapter 1

Searching a Populated Area in the Charikar Valley

By LTC A. L. Makkoveev

Introduction

LTC A. L. Makkoveev commanded at motorized rifle company in the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA) from December 1979 to November 1981. He was decorated with the Military Order "For Service to the Fatherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" Third Class.

Searching a Populated Area in the Charikar Valley

Throughout the winter of 1980, Kabul and the surrounding provinces were quiet and there was no combat in this region. However, with the arrival of spring, organized guerrilla groups initiated an active campaign.

I commanded the 7th Motorized Rifle Company (evidently part of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division) which was mounted on BMPs. On the morning of 21 July, I was given the mission to conduct a road march from Kabul to Charikar and then reinforce one of the mountain rifle battalions which would conduct a deep raid and search.

Preparations for combat began in garrison. The company had a 100 percent fill in personnel, weapons and equipment. We carried three days worth of dry rations and the vehicles were topped-off with POL. Editor note: Dry rations are similar to the old C-ration. There were three types of dry rations. The first contained a can of meat, some crackers or toast, some jam and a tea bag. The second contained two cans of meat mixed with oatmeal. The third contained a can of meat and a van of vegetables - endnote. After a thorough inspection, I reported to my battalion commander that we were ready for combat.

We completed our road march to the area of operations (AO) of the 3rd Mountain Rifle Battalion. That evening, the battalion commander - Captain Yu. P. Leventas - explained the 3rd Battalion mission and instructed me to prepare my company to move in the main body of the battalion along a designated route and search all the nearby villages.

At 0500 hours on 22 July, the 3rd Mountain Rifle Battalion, reinforced by my 7th Motorized Rifle Company, moved out. Riding on our combat vehicles allowed us to overcome many natural obstacles. At one stage of our advance, I dismounted my company. While we were dismounted, I received the order to search a nearby village and, following the search, to take the road (which ran through the village) to rejoin the battalion main body. I dispatched a squad-sized patrol to establish a defensive position at the entrance to the village. I wanted the squad to cover the company as it deployed. On the outskirts of the village, I established firing positions for the machine gun-grenade launcher platoon. Editor note: The machine gun-grenade launcher platoon was the fourth platoon of a motorized rifle company and provided suppressive fire from PKS or Utes machine guns and AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers. This platoon disappeared during force reorganization in the mid-1980s - endnote. The company then descended from the heights, formed into a line and combed the village, searching the houses and basements. After two hours, we finished the search and the company assembled on the road to exit the village.

At that moment, the enemy suddenly opened up on us with heavy fire from hill number two. The company went to the defense and took up positions behind the adobe walls on the south and southwest edges of the village. I decided to send two squads from the first platoon to envelop hill number two and then destroy the enemy by an attack from the front and rear. I also decided to dispatch a patrol squad to the top of hill number one. However, just as the platoon started to move to carry out its tasks, the Mujahideen opened fire from hills one, two and three. My forces had to stay in place and return fire. After 30 minutes, I received orders to withdraw my company to the hill from which we started (number four). During the withdrawal from the village, my company was pinned down by fire from hill number three. After we destroyed the enemy on hills number two and three with small arms fire and helicopter gun-ship strikes, I moved my company to the designated area.

Frunze Commentary

The positive aspect of this skirmish was that the personnel displayed high morale and rapidly reacted to all orders even though this was their first time under fire. Further, the helicopter gun-ships displayed great skill as they made gun runs on the enemy. However, the skirmish also showed that the company had insufficient experience in conducting combat in mountainous regions and neither the officers, sergeants, nor soldiers knew the enemy’s tactics. If the enemy had held his fire until the entire company was moving on the path between hill number one and number two (where there was nothing but open wheat fields to the right and left), the company would have been in a very serious predicament. Instead, the enemy opened fire immediately when the company reached the southern outskirts of the village. The Soviet force did a weak job of reconnaissance. Their failure to seize the dominant terrain allowed the enemy to suppress practically the entire company area with fire. Another shortcoming was that the company had never rehearsed breaking contact and withdrawal during training.

Data from this skirmish further shows that it is necessary to devote greater attention to commander’s training, especially tactical training. This should be done separately from platoon, company, battalion and field training. This includes training junior commanders. Courage and bravery are excellent characteristics, however, the skillful handling of squads and, consequently, of platoons in battle is what is necessary and training did not achieve this.

Editor’s Commentary

The commander learned that he must control dominant terrain and position over-watch forces before beginning the sweep. Failure to properly employ reconnaissance forces and failure to control high ground are constant problems throughout this book.

This 1980 example gives a partial look at one of the innovations in force structure which the Soviet Army made in an attempt to deal with the guerrilla forces - the mountain rifle battalion. Apparently, most of these came from the mountain training center in the Turkestan Military District.

The MOUT Homepage Hot Links:

Visitor since 23 February 1998

This page hosted by Get your own Free Home Page