Excerpt From The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan

The Frunze Military Academy

Lessons Learned in Afghanistan

Edited By Lester W. Grau - FMSO and NDU

Vignette 4 from Chapter 1

Combing the City of Bamian and its Outlying Towns During the Course of a Raid

By Major A. P. Pivovarenko

Introduction

Major A. P. Pivovarenko served as a reconnaissance platoon leader in the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA) from January 1980 to December 1980.

Combing the City of Bamian and its Outlying Towns During the Course of a Raid

During the winter of 1980, the situation along the roads between Termez and Kabul worsened. Enemy activity was particularly heavy in the area of the Salang pass leading to the critical Salang tunnel. Guerrilla forces struck convoys of military vehicles and trucks. Our motorized rifle regiment, composed of three reinforced motorized rifle battalions, was tasked to secure this sector from February until May of 1980. By May, the situation along this section of road had become even more acute. Consequently, one of our battalions was structured as a raiding detachment. The battalion was reinforced with a tank company, a self-propelled artillery battery from division artillery, the regiment’s reconnaissance company, a platoon of ZSU-23-4s, and a squad of sappers. Editor’s note: The ZSU-23-4 is a self-propelled air defense weapon, which fires four 23mm machine guns simultaneously. The weapon proved extremely effective in counter-ambushes and in the destruction of ground targets - endnote.

The reconnaissance company carried out its first raid in the area of Ghorband during the pre-dawn hours of 20- 21 May and arrived at the village at daybreak. The detachment quickly broke into Ghorband and killed up to 10 Mujahideen. After this, we began a thorough search of all the houses in the village. During the search, we only found some Mujahideen small arms, for the bulk of the guerrilla force had secretly withdrawn to the north. On the following day, the entire raiding detachment finally began to move onto the city of Bamian. The detachment moved by road and fell into a Mujahideen ambush, losing one BMP and one ZSU-23-4. The detachment seized the city. Our companies assaulted and searched the city’s blocks. Our search showed that the Mujahideen had abandoned the city. Our detachment stayed in the city for several days. During that time we searched the nearby villages but found no Mujahideen. The enemy had temporarily abandoned the populated areas. My reconnaissance company received information from our Afghan agent network, which was located in that city and, from that information, we were able to seize 63 weapons. The rest of the battalion was only able to capture two weapons - both of them antiques.

The detachment conducted further raids, which combed outlying villages and canyons. But again, the Mujahideen had successfully withdrawn and the battalion swept empty blocks and areas.

Frunze Commentary

Military Experience shows that three basic tasks must be fulfilled to conduct a successful block and sweep. First, preliminary reconnaissance must disclose the location of the guerrilla forces as well as their composition and probable course of action. Second, maneuverability of the guerrilla force must be constrained - tactical air assault landings and raiding groups must deny all paths and routes of withdrawal to the enemy and prevent his disengagement from the strike of the blocking groups. Third, the enemy must be destroyed by the main sweeping force or by a frontal attack. The unsuccessful accomplishment of any one of these tasks resulted in a failed mission. Combat experience demonstrated that it is necessary to establish close contact with the enemy, pin him down by battle while simultaneously maneuvering blocking forces into position, and then surrounding and destroying his guerrilla force. It is absolutely essential to search for the enemy, and this requires the effective utilization of reconnaissance forces. In order to successfully accomplish their combat mission, sub- units need to be expeditiously divided into search, support, and fire support groups and the main body.

Editor’s Commentary

The commander fought the Mujahideen rear guard and made no efforts to pin down the main body of the guerrilla force in place, cut off its escape route and aggressively out maneuver it. The commander did not use his reconnaissance, fought his way through in a by-the-numbers manner, and did nothing to accomplish the mission rapidly. Sweeping an area without first posting blocking forces is, at best, a waste of time and good way to get one’s nose repeatedly bloodied. The commander showed little initiative and less field sense. Originally, this was the leadoff example to the book, but it was so weak that I moved it. I left it in as a prime example of the problems of the Soviet Army in 1980 in Afghanistan. Their army was trained for the European battlefield and was unable initially to cope with this new environment. Tactical commanders lacked initiative and the Mujahideen took advantage of this.

Soviet commanders used their reconnaissance for combat and did not restrict them to reconnaissance missions. Reconnaissance forces were better-trained and motivated than motorized rifle forces, but their casualty rate must have been much higher. The misuse of reconnaissance forces may have also been dictated by the fact that there were not enough Soviet forces in-country to do the job. Soviet field units were often chronically under strength.

Finally, the Bamian in this example is not the province capital of Bamian Province, which was controlled by government forces throughout the war and which is not on the road to Termez, but approximately 150 kilometers to the east.

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