Introduction
Major S. G. Davydenko served with the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA) from September 1984 to September 1986 as the adviser to an Afghan battalion commander.
Sweeping Villages With Afghani and Soviet Sub-units
Throughout the time that Soviet forces operated in Afghanistan, the Panjsher Valley was the site of the sharpest ideological and military struggles between the government of Afghanistan and the armed opposition led by Ahmed Shah Massoud. Editor’s note: Ahmed Shah Massoud is one of the best-known guerrilla leaders in the West. He is a minority Tadjik who assembled the largest single guerrilla army in Afghanistan. This army, put at 11,000 regulars by the Soviets, may have numbered 50,000 when part-time partisans are added. Massoud was born around 1950, studied engineering in Kabul and is fluent in French. His control of the 70- mile-long Panjsher Valley was frequently challenged by the Soviets, yet in the end Massoud dominated the valley. Massoud became the West’s favorite Afghan when Ken Follett based his best seller, Lie Down With Lions on this tough guerrilla commander - endnote. Operations, which had been conducted in this valley earlier, had resulted I heavy casualties. The mountain massif (located high above sea level) and the severe climate limited the capabilities of machines and men.
I was an adviser to a battalion of the Afghan Army’s "Commando" Brigade (the 212th Separate Assault Brigade) garrisoned in the Barak fortress. We received an order to sweep the villages of Tal’khana, Dashtak, Kalatak and Chislak to capture or destroy Mujahideen operating in the area. In addition, we were to find and destroy prepared firing positions and supply caches of ammunition, equipment and food.
Preparations for the operation began upon receipt of the mission. However, due to the massive disaffection and desertions of Afghan brigade officers and men to the Mujahideen, the enemy almost immediately knew the Afghan concept of the operation. On the morning of 28 October 1984, I received the order to start the mission. The concept for the battalion was as follows: Move out of the fortress and proceed on foot to conduct a sweep of the designated villages. In the event that the enemy offered any resistance, call in artillery fire from the artillery battalion that belongs to the “Commando” Brigade. Plan to operate with the Soviet motorized rifle regiment that is located in the Rukha fortress (probably the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division).
Due to the security leaks during the course of preparation for the operation, some combat missions had to be amplified and changed. The new concept required that the 2nd Afghan Battalion would exit the fortress and occupy the heights around Post 21. From there if necessary, they could support the Soviet motorized rifle company which would independently sweep the villages of Tal’khana and Dashtak. Following this, the two units would switch roles while the Afghan battalion swept Turkha.
At the designated time, the 150-man Afghan battalion exited the fortress. It reached Post 21 in an hour and a half. The Soviet company swept the villages of Tal’khana and Dashtak. No Mujahideen were discovered during the sweep, but a hidden Mujahideen rest station with a small supply of food and anti-Soviet leaflets was discovered.
The battalion reached the village of Turkha on the evening of 29 October. Observers at Post 20 had seen Mujahideen moving through Turkha the day before. On the morning of 30 October, the battalion searched the village. There, they found a few flintlock muskets and an AK-74. That evening, the battalion returned to the Bazarak fortress where they rested.
On the morning of 31 October, following joint planning between the Afghan battalion commander and Soviet motorized rifle regimental commander, the forces set out to reach the villages of Sata, Kalatak, and Kishlak. The plan was that the Afghan battalion would enter the canyon and search the villages sequentially. The canyon was controlled by two ridges, which rimmed the canyon. It was necessary to put a Soviet battalion onto each of these ridges. Once they reached the crest of the ridge, the Soviet battalions would dominate the high ground and could support the Afghan battalion. The artillery was ready to open fire from protected positions within the fortresses.
At noon, the Afghan battalion began to sweep the canyon as the Soviet battalions began to mount the ridges. Combat engineers moved in front of the sweeping Afghan forces. As the Afghan battalion attempted to enter Kishlak to search it, they were met with strong small arms, mortar and heavy machine gun fire. Simultaneously, both the Soviet battalions became trapped in minefields. The enemy opened fire on the Soviet battalions from ambush and inflicted heavy casualties on them. Neither battalion was able to get into a position to support the Afghan battalion. The Afghan battalion also took heavy casualties and by nightfall was forced to withdrawal to Bazarak village.
Frunze Commentary
This combat example shows that a good plan is only as good as its skillful implementation. This operation was thoroughly planned - however - it was not able to overcome its inherent problems. It began with the security leaks. Moreover, our intelligence picture of the Mujahideen strength and their lines of communication were poorly developed. The enemy knew the scheme of maneuver for our Afghan and Soviet forces well in advance and was able to adjust the situation by maneuvering his forces into threatened sectors or away from planned strikes.
When conducting a sweep over such an extensive area, a commander cannot relax, even for a minute. The enemy lured our forces from vigilance to complacency by secretly withdrawing from the first villages prior to our sweep. Then, they initiated combat at the time and place of their own choosing. Communications was a problem throughout the operation. This led to a loss of control and a loss of current information on the status and situation of the sub-units. Coordination between the Afghan battalion and the supporting artillery was unsatisfactorily organized.
Editor’s Commentary
The main lesson in this vignette is do not move a ground force where you cannot cover it by air or artillery fire. Radio communications are very difficult in the mountains, but uninterrupted radio communications with supporting artillery or aviation is essential for survival. (MOUT Homepage - the urban environment is a prime example of an area of operations that will experience difficult communications problems - at best). Radio transmission points on mountaintops or aircraft are a solution (MOUT Homepage - building tops or other terrain features that offer line-of-sight or other communication advantages in urban areas). The ground forces were moving without adequate flank, forward and rear security. Consequently, both Soviet battalions bogged down in minefields and left the Afghan battalion stranded. The Afghan battalion moved its main body into restrictive terrain without first clearing it and assuring the Soviet battalions were securing its flanks and providing over-watch. The further lack of available air-power to over-watch the Afghan battalion sealed their fate.
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