Excerpt From The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan

The Frunze Military Academy

Lessons Learned in Afghanistan

Edited By Lester W. Grau - FMSO and NDU

Vignette 12 from Chapter 1

Blocking and Sweeping an Inhabited Region

By LTC V. V. Shubin

Introduction

LTC V. V. Shubin served in the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA) from 1986 to 1988. He was decorated with the “Medal for Merit in Combat”, the “Medal for Personal Bravery”< and the “Order of Glory”.

Blocking and Sweeping an Inhabited Region

Divisions (formations) and regiments (units) of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) conducted operations in the province of Kandahar (Qandahar) from March to the first days of September 1986. They inflicted such appreciable casualties on the guerrilla forces that the majority of them left for the safe haven of Pakistan.

By the beginning of September, active combat had ceased. The Afghan command decided to allow its forces the time to conduct training and to rest in their base camps. Consequently, on 6 September, the regiments of the 9th Infantry Division began moving out in march column to their camps in the Ghazni Province.

The march took the division through Zabol Province, where five of six guerilla forces with a total of approximately 500 men were located. The local guerrilla leader Pahlawan commanded these Mujahideen. They were well armed with recoilless rifles, mortars, rocket launchers and antiaircraft guided missile systems. They knew the local terrain very well and could quickly and secretly maneuver their forces and equipment throughout the area.

The terrain in this area is mountainous and semi-desert in places. The guerillas used the extensive Karez underground irrigation system for ambushes. (MOUT Homepage Note: The subterranean aspects of an area of operations when conducting MOUT cannot be overlooked nor overemphasized – unfortunately this is one of the urban areas that we lack training in and may lack detailed information on when deployed). The enemy knew about the movement of the 9th Infantry Division. Since the road network in this area was poorly developed, the enemy knew at what time which forces would pass through the narrow sections on the Kandahar-Ghazni route.

At 0500 hours on 7 September, two explosions ripped apart the roadbed close to the village of Shingali-Kalay. Simultaneously, a Mujahideen ambush opened fire with every weapon at its disposal. Within the first few minutes, they destroyed four tanks, three BTRs, and seven trucks. (Editor’s Note: The BTR is an eight- wheeled armored personnel carrier that can carry up to an 11-man squad. It mounts 14.4mm and 7.62mm machine guns and can carry antitank weapons as well. The BTR and BMP were the most common infantry carriers of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan).

A part of the division column, including the division commander, was able to force its way through the blocked passage and escape to the province center of Kalat. It arrived at 0520 hours. The division commander requested assistance from the commander of the provincial “Sarandoy”. (Editor’s Note: The Sarandoy were Ministry of Interior armed forces – a heavily armed police force. They were organized into six brigades or regiments and numbered about 6,000 men. They were based in Kandahar, Badakhstan, Baglan, and Parvan Provinces plus two in Kabul. The Sarandoy had an additional 6,000 men in operational and mountain battalions). The province authority agreed to dispatch the 35th Operational Battalion reinforced with a company from the KHAD (DRA secret police) to aid the trapped sub-units.

The province’s plan was to draw the guerrilla main force into the battle, hit them with aviation and artillery fire, and then simultaneously attack them from the flank and rear to destroy them. The battalion commander formed his force into two columns. The first column consisted of the 1st and 3rd Companies of the 35th Battalion plus the KHAD Company. The second column was the 2nd Battalion of the 35th Battalion. The columns moved out at 0600 hours.

Artillery strikes and helicopter gun-ships fired preparatory fires from 0610 to 0625 hours. At 0630 hours, the flanking detachment (2nd Company) radioed in that it was in its designated position. A battalion sub-unit then gave the signal and the battalion hit the enemy in the flank and rear. The enemy abandoned their casualties, weapons and ammunition and withdrew. Enemy losses were 27 KIA and 36 WIA. The Afghan government forces captured two recoilless rifles, six mortars, two DShK 12.7mm heavy machine guns, three RPG antitank grenade launchers, two crates of grenades, and six AKM assault rifles. Losses of the 35th Operational Battalion were two killed and six wounded.

Frunze Commentary

The successful blocking and destruction of enemy ambushes was made possible by a variety of factors. These included – the rapid assembly of personnel and readiness of weapons and equipment for combat – the resourcefulness and military cunning of the battalion commander – the thorough knowledge of the local terrain and – the correct determination of the probable enemy course of action.

At the same time, the flanking detachment did not completely fulfill its mission to cut of the enemy withdrawal. There were several contributing factors. Reconnaissance devoted scant attention to determining the location of enemy combat outposts and early warning posts. There were isolated instances of command and control failures during the battle since the command post was located away from the battle. Finally, there was insufficient fire suppression on the withdrawing enemy.

Further combat analysis shows that the enemy studied the terrain and the convoy structure carefully and selected his ambush sites with the goal of limiting, to the maximum extent possible, the combat potential of the division march columns and especially its fire support. Combat experience clearly shows that all march columns must have air cover regardless of their ground power.

Editor’s Commentary

Ambush sites are best assaulted from the flank or rear. Conversely, when your force is caught in a killing zone, the best immediate action is to assault into the teeth of the ambush rather than passively remaining and dying in the killing zone. Part of the Afghan division apparently tried defending in the kill zone. The total division casualties are not given, but they were probably significant.

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