Excerpt From The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan

The Frunze Military Academy

Lessons Learned in Afghanistan

Edited By Lester W. Grau - FMSO and NDU

Vignette 13 from Chapter 1

Blocking the Enemy in an Area of Villages and then Destroying them During the Sweep

By Major S. S. Gazaryan

Introduction

Major S. S. Gazaryan served in the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA) from August 1984 to September 1986 as the Chief of Staff of a Motorized Rifle Battalion (MRB).

Blocking the Enemy in an Area of Villages and then Destroying them During the Sweep

In February 1985, an intelligence agent brought us information that a guerrilla force of 100-120 men, armed with small arms, was located in the village of Karamagul.

Our regimental commander decided to destroy this force by sealing off the area and then sweeping it to find and destroy the enemy. My battalion, the 2nd MRB, was given this mission and reinforced with the regiment’s reconnaissance company and two artillery batteries. Six helicopter gun-ships from army aviation would be in support.

All the forces would be used for the initial action blocking action. On the night of 11-12 February, two Motorized Rifle Companies (MRCs), moving out on foot, by morning had to occupy the dominant terrain (hills 1864.4 and 1973.0) along the southern and eastern combat sectors. At 0600 hours on 12 February, our 4th MRC and the reconnaissance company had to land and secure the dominant terrain to the north and west of Karamagul’ Village by tactical air assaults. The 5th MRC was to establish a platoon-sized ambush to cover any attempted Mujahideen withdrawal from Karamagul’ to Batash.

Our plan was to begin the sweep at dawn only after we had seized and occupied the dominant terrain and had surrounded the enemy.

Following a 10-minute artillery and helicopter gun-ship preparation, the reconnaissance company moved forward and began sweeping the area. The enemy tried to break out of the encirclement through various gullies and ravines. A group of Mujahideen attempted to break out to the southwest. Then another group tried to break out of the encirclement. But the entire enemy attempt was futile. Only a small part of the enemy’s force was able to break out through a ravine in the direction of the village of Batash.

In the course of the combat, the enemy lost up to 60 killed or wounded and we captured 12. We also captured 25 weapons. The battalion’s losses were negligible.

Editor’s Commentary

Soviet block and seep tactics in Afghanistan differed from their own tactical encirclement methodology that they developed for war in the northern European plain. Their normal methodology called for an inner encirclement force to hold the trapped force in place while an outer encirclement force pushed out from the encircled area to put distance between the trapped forces and an enemy rescuing force. Only after the two forces were in place, would the Soviets fragment and meticulously destroy the trapped force. Evidently, Soviets in Afghanistan lacked the forces necessary for establishing an outer encirclement and the Mujahideen seldom launched attacks from outside the encirclement to rescue their trapped comrades. Further, the Soviet normal methodology was designed to work against encircled mechanized forces. They really did not care about small groups of dismounted soldiers escaping from the encirclement. In Afghanistan, the enemy was normally dismounted and could usually slip through the Soviet encirclement.

The Soviets apparently showed little concern for the civilian population and started each sweep with an artillery bombardment. This did not win many hearts and minds for the Soviet forces. Often the Soviet effort seemed deliberately aimed at killing civilians or forcing them out of the rural area.

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