An Introduction to Chapter 2: The Offensive in Populated Areas And Mountains
The peculiarities of this theater of operations (TVD) called for advancing in populated areas and mountains. Success was often determined by the skill of the commander and staff in the creative fulfillment of the requirements of the regulations when dealing with these particular terrain conditions; with the troop control of TO&E, attached and supporting sub-units and their coordinated interaction; and with the correct determination of the enemy’s strong and weak-points.
Special attention was devoted to determining the place of fire support in the combat formation and its application in battle. Characteristically, the troop formation used in an advance was a function of the degree of preparation, which the Mujahideen had put into their defensive positions and whether the commander was employing assault detachments and assault groups. (Editor Note: An assault group is a platoon or company- size detachment temporarily created for blocking and destroying a single strong point or permanent structure(s) during an assault. An assault group typically consists of motorized rifle forces, engineers, and flame-thrower operators. An assault detachment is normally battalion-sized and also has armor or direct-fire artillery attached – endnote). As a rule, the offensives were launched from base camps or jumping-off areas and because of their distance from the combat zone, organizing movement became very important.
Introduction
Major V. M. Bogdashkin served in the Republic of Afghanistan from June 1983 through June 1985 as a platoon leader and company commander in a motorized rifle battalion. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Star”.
Assault on the Outskirts of Herat
The situation in Herat Province was very serious in the fall of 1984. Guerrilla forces, led b Captain Ismail, received trained reinforcements as well as new weapons from Iran. They launched raids on Soviet and Afghan convoys and struck the Kushka-Shindand pipeline. They constituted a threat to the Herat airfield and grain elevators.
The operational group of the regiment with field post number (FPN) 51883 was ordered to: block part of the southern edge of Herat City with the 2nd MRB (minus a company) and fragment the Mujahideen force. Further, in conjunction with the 2nd MRB of FPN 83260 regiment and the 3rd MRB of FPN 51931 regiment, destroy the enemy.
Editor’s Note: FPNs were postal numbers assigned to a division and higher headquarters, regiments and separate battalions and companies. A compilation of field post numbers was considered classified. The field post numbers referred to here are probably of the 12th, 101st, and 371st Motorized Rifle Regiments of the 5th Motorized Rifle Division – endnote.
Preparation for this action was conducted in base camp. All company commanders and above, plus all the attached company commanders conduced coordination on a terrain model. Enemy courses of action and the sequencing of his destruction were also worked out on the terrain model. Personnel who would be physically close with the Mujahideen conducted training in a deserted village where they became familiar with the specific make-up of an assault group and gained practical experience.
At the end of October, my company (the 7th MRC) was designated part of the operational group of regiment FPN 51883, which assembled outside Herat. At 0400 hours on 4 November, our sub-units were ordered into the city. By 0540 hours, the force blocked off the eastern section of the city. The east side was held by FPN 83260, the north and west sides were held by FPN 51931 and the south side by my regiment - FPN 51883.
At 0600 hours, FPN 51883 regiment committed its mountain motorized rifle battalion to battle and it managed to cut off and surround a group of Mujahideen. (Editor’s Note: The mountain motorized rifle battalions retained most of their regular MRB TO&E, but had special training, and additional equipment for mountain warfare – endnote). However, other Mujahideen pounded this battalion with small arms, rocket launchers, cannon and mortars. The battalion had stumbled into a Mujahideen fire sack. In the course of 40 minutes, the battalion lost nine killed or wounded and was forced to stop and go over to the defense.
Regiment ordered my 7th MRC to turn over our portion of the southern block to a bronegruppa and move to the command post of FPN 51883 regiment. My regimental commander was LTC A. M. Budeyev. He ordered my company commander, Senior Lieutenant S. N. Bogrov, to advance along a city street to fragment the defending Mujahideen force. My MRC had two BMP-2s and a tank as part of our assault group.
Editor’s Note: The BMP-2 is an upgrade of the BMP-1, which first appeared in 1967. Both BMPs are tracked infantry fighting vehicles that carry a three-man crew and a squad of eight soldiers. The BMP-1 mounted a 73mm cannon, a 7.62mm machine gun and an antitank missile. The BMP-2 substituted a 30mm automatic gun for the 73mm cannon as well as a different antitank missile and launcher. The BMP-2, introduced in 1981, has a greatly enhanced elevation and depression capability over the 73mm cannon version – endnote.
Following a five-minute artillery strike, the 7th MRC went into battle at 0730 hours. It advanced 150-200 meters when heavy small arms fire as well as the fire from two recoilless rifles, a grenade launcher and a mortar stopped it. The small arms fire came from was close range from a grape arbor and through embrasures cut in the adobe walls. One of our soldiers was wounded. The company commander was ordered to break contact and withdraw. After his professional, organized withdrawal (there were no more casualties), the company deployed along the edges of a village.
Afghan intelligence reported that there were some 800 men in the guerrilla force that operated in this immediate territory (25 square kilometers) but we had no idea how many we were facing now. We called in ground attack aircraft (Su-25s) and artillery fire on the encircled Mujahideen. Three artillery battalions from division artillery fired in our support.
The company commander asked for two 152mm self-propelled (SP) howitzers and another tank. He received these plus a sapper squad with 75 kilograms of explosives. The 1st and 2nd platoon leaders (Captain P. P. Rozhkov and Lieutenant V. I. Nikitenko) were ordered to advance from the company flanks through the grape arbor and blow up the adobe walls.
LTC A. M. Budeyev, the regimental commander, requested two BM-21 122mm multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) to conduct direct fire as needed by the company commander. Following an air strike, the BM-21s opened fire. Supporting artillery simultaneously began a 10-minute artillery preparation. The company moved forward to the attack under this protective fire.
The BM-21 direct-fire salvos did not inflict heavy casualties on the enemy, but did have a tremendous effect on their morale. The company advanced 300 meters before the first Mujahideen fired, and this fire was very weak. On signals from the company and platoon commanders, the two SP 152mm howitzers, two tanks and four BMPs opened direct suppressive fire on the enemy. The flanking platoons were able to move at the same tempo as the center and signaled their progress with signal rockets. The assault group hit a mine filed at a street intersection. They defused seven mines as well as a 250-kilogram bomb rigged as a mine. The assault detachment advanced 1.5 kilometers when it was stopped by strong fire from a village. The fire came from dugouts cut in earth dikes of irrigation canals. Tank and BMP-2 fire suppressed the enemy fire. The company had two more men wounded during this advance.
In all, the company accomplished its mission in an hour and a half at the cost of three wounded. They killed seven Mujahideen in close combat. By 1130 hours, the opposing guerrilla force was shattered. However, at 1400 our attempts to destroy another guerrilla force failed. We made a second unsuccessful attempt at dusk. With nightfall, the Mujahideen managed to slip out of the blockade.
Frunze Commentary
In this example, a very large group of enemy was encircled, but the combat power was insufficient to destroy it. This was a result of poor intelligence which furnished insufficient information about the enemy and led to an insufficient force in the blocking forces.
Nevertheless, good points included the rapid re-concentration of sub-units from one direction to another, the powerful influence of fire-power on the enemy, the proper reinforcement of the company and the skillful application of BM-21 fire to strengthen the morale of flanking platoons which also strengthened the fighting spirit of the soldiers and officers.
Editor’s Commentary
The Soviets used MRLs in the direct fire role during World War II. The war in Afghanistan showed that it is still an effective way to shake up your opponent. Rapid-fire antiaircraft guns are also very effective ground support weapons as are SP howitzers when used in direct fire. However, firepower is not an absolute substitute for maneuver and close combat. During the war in Afghanistan, like the U.S. in Vietnam, the Soviets chose to expend massive firepower in order to save Soviet lives and to compensate for their lack of infantry. It was an expensive, indiscriminate, and probably ineffective practice.
Unlike World War II, the Soviet Army in Afghanistan did not push on despite heavy casualties. They transitioned to the defense after moderate casualties and then called for fire support.
The Soviets assigned commands not so much by rank as by ability (or connections). Vignettes throughout this book show captains, majors and lieutenant colonels commanding battalions, senior lieutenants and captains commanding companies and captains and lieutenants commanding platoons. In this vignette, a senior lieutenant commands a company, which has a captain as one of its platoon leaders. This captain could have been a platoon commander as punishment for some misdeed, or he could have been doing his normal job since wartime regulations allowed the army to carry a man in a position one grade higher than that authorized. Further, he might have just been promoted. In the peacetime Soviet Army, it was not unusual for higher-ranking officers to work for a lower-ranking officer. The position, to the Soviets, was more important than the rank. The Soviet military pay scales reflects this when it adds command or responsibility pay to an officer’s pay based on rank.
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