Excerpt From The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan

The Frunze Military Academy

Lessons Learned in Afghanistan

Edited By Lester W. Grau - FMSO and NDU

Vignette 18 from Chapter 2

Storming Spinakalacha Village

By LTC V. D. Vlasyan

Introduction

LTC V. D. Vlasyan served in the Republic of Afghanistan from October 1986 through June 1988 first as a deputy commander and then as the commander of a motorized rifle battalion (MRB). He was decorated with the “Order of the Red Banner” and the “Order of the Red Star”>

Storming Spinakalacha Village

From 21-26 December 1987, a strong enemy force overran a series of security outposts in the Daman region. This area was the responsibility of an Afghan Army Corps of the Army of the Republic of Afghanistan (the Afghan 2nd Army Corps headquartered in Kandahar). My battalion had to be in the Spinakalacha combat area by the morning of 31 December. I was to seal off the Spinakalacha village from the major supply bases and create conditions, which would allow the Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade to recapture lost positions. In the course of preparing for our road march and ensuing combat, I added extra ammunition, water, fuel and rations to what we usually carried and picked up some reinforcing sub-units. At 0400 hours on 29 December, my battalion moved out to accomplish its mission.

At 1600 hours, 30 December, we arrived in Kandahar. There, General-Major R. K. Pishchev, the deputy commander of the 40th Army, met me. He gave me specific orders. We were to enter the contested area at 100 hours, 31 December, and assault and capture Spinakalacha Village by 1500 hours. We were to then seal off the canyon and hold this area until 7 January 1988. During that time, an Afghan regiment would fortify the area and assume responsibility for the area defended by my 2nd MRB.

Editor’s Note: The Afghan Army had both a brigade and a regiment force structure. The Afghan regiment mentioned here was either from the Afghan 7th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) or 15th MRD stationed in Kandahar - endnote.

At 1100 hours, I put my battalion on the road flanked by security patrols. As we entered the area, we began battle and I post two killed and three wounded. By 1210 hours, I assembled the bulk of my battalion 1.5 kilometers south of Spinakalacha. From 1220 until 1240, I conducted a personal reconnaissance, finalized my plans for the assault groups and finalized air and artillery coordination. I reported my plan to the senior commander at 1240.

Ten minutes later, my reconnaissance platoon began to climb a mountain ridge from the west to destroy enemy security outposts on dominant terrain and on the canyon approaches and the approaches to Spinakalacha Village. During their advance, the reconnaissance patrol uncovered a launch-bomb cache with 150 launch bombs and two launchers. The patrol rigged the cache for detonation and proceeded up the hill where they could secure the left flank of the assault detachment. At 1320 hours, the patrol attacked and destroyed an enemy outpost and established solid communications with me.

At 1320 hours, I signaled the start of an artillery preparation. A 152mm self-propelled (SP) howitzer battalion, a separate 122mm SP howitzer battalion and a multiple rocket launcher (MRL) battalion participated in a 10-minute artillery preparation. This was immediately followed by a bombing and strafing attack by two squadrons of Su-25 FROGFOOT ground-attack aircraft.

At 1335 hours, my 5th Motorized Rifle Company (MRC) moved out to its jumping off point some 250 meters from the village. The 5th MRC was commanded by Captain B. M. Mikul’skiy. The 5th MRC was configured as Assault Group Number 1. It had 46 men, including a squad of sappers and eight BMP-2s. I added a tank with a mine plow and an Afghan infantry company of 40 men to this company. As the 5th MRC moved out, I covered its movement with the fires of a sniper squad, a flame-thrower platoon, an AGS-17 platoon and a mortar battery. At 1340 hours, I had the MRL battalion lay down a smoke screen to blind the enemy.

At 1340 hours, my sub-units attacked Spinakalacha. We met strong resistance on the right flank and the Afghan Army company withdrew to the jumping off area. I was not able to get them to come back and they did nothing further towards accomplishing our mission. The enemy began to shift his forces to his left flank in order to put flanking fire on the 5th MRC. For awhile, we were held back by the thick adobe walls of the village. Then, however, my troops were able to blow gaps in the adobe walls and my platoons burst through these gaps in three-man groups on the attack. My 5th MRC faced the enemy main force.

At 1355 hours, my 4th MRC (Assault Group Number 2) attacked on the battalion’s left flank. The 4th MRC - commanded by Captain Yu. A. Shalkin - broke the enemy defense and destroyed his covering forces guarding the entrance to the canyon. One of his platoons was able to hit the enemy in the rear, which helped the 5th MRC’s fight. Two more 4th MRC platoons grabbed the western edge of the village and established blocking positions. At 1500 hours, these platoons got into a fire fight with Mujahideen who were retreating into the mountains.

By 1600 hours, the 5th MRC completed the destruction of the enemy in the eastern part of the village and established blocking positions against the access points from the neighboring green zone. The surviving enemy had fled into the green zone. At 1800 hours, I organized the defense of Spinakalacha and provided fire support to an Afghan infantry regiment which attacked north to seize the southern slope of Grakalacha.

Frunze Commentary

Analysis of the organization and conduct of combat shows:

1. The totally successful march and concealed concentration of the battalion near Kandahar was possible due to the thorough and complete preparations for the march and follow-on combat.
2. Prior combat experience allowed the sub-unit leaders to correctly use initiative during combat in the village.
3. The battalion commander’s actions merit attention, particularly when you consider how he coordinated actions and rapidly conducted his personal reconnaissance and arranged the necessary fire support to destroy the enemy and then decisively used their results to conduct the advance of his sub-units.
4. The battalion commander’s interesting maneuver of his reconnaissance platoon’s supporting fire on the enemy from dominant terrain, his skillful use of snipers and portable flame-throwers, and the actions of his platoon’s three and five-men sections during the assault on the village are all worthy of study.

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