Excerpt From The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan

The Frunze Military Academy

Lessons Learned in Afghanistan

Edited By Lester W. Grau - FMSO and NDU

Vignette 20 from Chapter 3

Tactical Air Assaults in Nangarhar and Laghman Provinces

By Major S. A. Urban

Introduction

Major S. A. Urban served in the Republic of Afghanistan from December 1981 through April 1984 as a platoon leader and then a company commander in an air assault battalion. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Star”.

Tactical Air Assaults in Nangarhar and Laghman Provinces

In February 1983, the brigade intelligence section reported that approximately 150 enemy were operating as groups within in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AOR) of the 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade. They were shelling security outposts and civilian facilities with 81mm mortar fire and were mining roads.

The brigade commander decided to eradicate these groups in our AOR. He planned to attack the enemy in the village of Kama (located in Nangarhar Province about 12 kilometers from our base camp) and the village of Ghaziabad. The bronegruppa of the participating motorized rifle battalion and airborne company would move out from Jalalabad to Ghaziabad in support. The air landing would be preceded with a 10-minute artillery preparation. Captain Kostenko, the acting battalion commander would command the air landing. Major Ermolaev, the deputy commander for technical support, would command the bronegruppa. The first lift would consist of an air assault platoon, an engineer squad and a flame-thrower squad.

On 12 February, the air landing took place near Kama. The 2nd Air Assault Company swept through the green zone, but did not find any enemy. The bronegruppa moved toward the village of Ghaziabad.

On 13 February, we conducted an air landing with the 1st Air Assault Company, this time near Ghaziabad to seize the crest of the southern mountain and block the enemy withdrawal. However, before the bronegruppa reached Ghaziabad from the north, the enemy withdrew into the mountains. On the morning of 14 February, the battalion commander decided to pick up the two air-assault companies and air land them near the village of Charbagh (in Laghman Province). From there, they would advance across the mountains to Bailam Village. According to preliminary intelligence, the Mujahideen stored ammunition and had a hospital in Bailam. The advancing companies would work with the bronegruppa to seal off Bailam and destroy the enemy inside it. We had 24 hours to accomplish our mission.

The area around Bailam was well fortified and had reinforced security. The enemy observed our air landing and the battalion lost the element of surprise. We lacked the necessary combat power to take the village. Finally, toward the end of 17 February, our brigade commander gave us the necessary air and artillery support to take the village. The battalion lost 25-30 men.

Frunze Commentary

This action shows that the first requirement for a successful air landing is surprise. Without surprise, it is impossible to dislodge the enemy unless you have sufficient aviation and artillery support.

Editor’s Commentary

The 66th and 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigades were forces created for counterinsurgency operations. They were composed of two t three motorized rifle battalions, an air assault battalion, an artillery howitzer battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, a tank battalion and support troops. There are also some indications that a MRL battalion might have belonged to this organization. In this vignette, a MRL battalion is part of the Brigade Artillery Group (BRAG) of the 66th. Evidently is was not brought in just for this action.

Soviet military vocabulary is very precise when it differentiates between tactics and operations in the European Theater. Tactics are the business of platoons, companies, battalions, regiments, and divisions while operations are the business of armies and fronts. When the 40th Army conducts Operation Magistral (vignette 17) it is an operation. When divisions and regiments fight, it is tactics. However, whenever the 103rd Airborne Division, the 56th Air Assault Brigade, the 345th Separate Airborne Regiment, the 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, or the 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade fight, it is an operation. This is probably due to the unique combined arms mixes of the separate brigades and the level of impact of the airborne and air assault forces.

In this vignette, the actions of the bronegruppa spooked the enemy before the air assault element was in position to deal with them. Apparently, there were problems with the coordination and communications between the two elements.

It would also appear that intelligence for this operation was very poor. This may be a reflection of poor performance of the reconnaissance forces and a demonstration of an inability to identify enemy positions.

The MOUT Homepage Hot Links:

Visitor since 23 February 1998

This page hosted by Get your own Free Home Page