Operation JUBILEE began as Operation RUTTER in April of 1942. Since becoming Prime Minister in 1940, Churchill had expounded on the possibilities of raiding the coast of occupied Europe with large armoured forces. He had promised such in each of his yearly forecasts, and had promised both the Americans and the Russians that raids of increasing frequency and size would take place in 1942. With the development of the war in the Pacific however, the British faced shortages of men, equipment, and shipping.

The British were in an impossible situation. The Americans were pressing for a second front landing in France, and, with the Russians were questioning the resolve of the British to fight. The surrender of Singapore, and then of Tobruk, to numerically inferior forces only heightened the suspicions of Britain's allies. A major raid was required, first to prove Britain's desire to fight, and second, to prove the techniques required for an invasion landing.

The British had three preliminary plans available to them, Operations, RANSACK, IMPERATOR, and RUTTER. Both RANSACK and IMPERATOR were corps sized operations requiring several days ashore. The British, however, had only enough landing craft to land a brigade. RANSACK was considered to be too large to be successful, and IMPERATOR, which included a penetration to Paris, as too risky. By default RUTTER was chosen.

Having approved the operation, command was given to South-East Command (SECO), GOC, General Montgomery. The original plan of flank landings over two tides was amended to a frontal assault during a single tide. Having decided on a general plan the time had come to choose the formations to take part in the assault. Canadian troops had arrived in Britain in 1940. They had been kept defending England from invasion since that time. Unlike the Australians, New Zealanders, or South Africans, Canadian soldiers had yet to see combat. Their general officers had been pressing for involvement in some operation if only to gain experience. This seemed to be the perfect opportunity for them. Based on results from recent exercises, the 2nd Canadian Division was chosen to provide the units for the assault.

The frontal assault had already been decided upon, as had the objectives of the raid. The Canadian staff only filled in the operational details. The original plan also called for an airborne assault on the batteries defending the Dieppe area, and a bombardment by heavy bombers to suppress fire from the beaches. In the later stages of planning the aerial bombardment was cancelled.

On the day the operation was to be launched the weather was unsuitable for parachute operations. The operation was first delayed, then cancelled as the weather did not improve. Disappointed by the cancellation and desperate for a raid, Montgomery's advice that the raid be cancelled for all time was ignored. There was insufficient time before the planned landings of Operation TORCH to train troops and launch a new operation. It was decided to relaunch RUTTER under the name of Operation JUBILEE. The same Canadian units that had trained for RUTTER would be used, but this time Commandos would be used instead of parachute troops.

The plan in its final form called for landings on eight beaches, Yellow I & II at Berneval by No.3 Commando, Blue Beach at Puys by the Royal Regiment of Canada. These were on the eastern flank and would precede the main landing at Dieppe. The Commandos would knockout a coastal battery, the Royal Regiment would capture the East Headland overlooking the town and beaches. On the western flank there were Orange I & II at Vasterival by No.4 Commando who were take out another coastal battery, and Green Beach at Pourville by the South Saskatchewan Regiment who would capture the town and west headland, these assaults were also to take place before the main landing. Also landing at Green Beach were the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada who were to move through the South Saskatchewans and assault a strongpoint inland and the divisional headquarters.

The landings at Dieppe were divided into Red and White Beaches. Red Beach was the east side of the town, here the Essex Scottish were to land, on the west was White Beach which was to be captured by the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry. Landing with these two infantry battalions were the tanks of the 14th Tank Regiment (Calgary Regiment). These were to assist in overcoming beach defences, then pushing through the town to link up with the Cameron Highlanders for the assault on the headquarters. Landing afterwards was to be Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal who would form the rearguard for the withdrawal. Also along was Royal Marine "A" Commando who were responsible for seizing German landing barges in the harbor.

The opposition was expected to be light. The Dieppe area was considered to be defended by about 2,000 German soldiers, with approximately 1,500 of these manning coastal and anti-aircraft batteries. Only 3 infantry companies were expected, one at Puys, one on the west headland, and one at Pourville. In fact there were nearly 6,500 troops defending the Dieppe area. Instead of outnumbering the enemy by 3 to 1, the assaulting force was in fact facing the enemy at 1 to 1.

The soldiers were not informed of the remounting of the operation. Told they were going on exercise, they did not discover their true destination until they were aboard the landing ships. This led to some harmful repercussions. Having extensive experience with exercises the Canadians had become experts at shedding unnecessary weight. Sub-machine gun ammunition was left behind leading to a desperate scramble aboard the landing ships to borrow whatever the navy could spare. Because of the shortage of automatic weapons, sub-machine guns were kept in central depots and only issued to units as they were needed. The British used the Sten gun, a weapon that was unreliable until its users had been able to file down all the rough edges. During their training for RUTTER the Canadians had been able to work their Stens into useful weapons. For JUBILEE, however, they were issued with brand new guns, guns which they had only the time it took to voyage to France to work in, and a scarcity of ammunition to work with.

The assault force sailed without serious incident until shortly before the assault was to commence. On the eastern flank the craft carrying No.3 Commando ran into a German convoy. In the ensuing fight the landing craft were scattered, the German units on the eastern beaches alerted, and the fog of war began to descend on the operation. Only six landing craft reached their assigned beaches, five were met by the alerted defenders, and the commandos from those craft pinned on the beach until forced to surrender. One boat managed to land its commandos unopposed, these commandos managed to disturb their intended target, a heavy battery, so much that they were unable to interfere with the main landing at Dieppe.

Of a more serious nature, the Officer Commanding the Commandos, unable to make radio contact with the headquarters ship, took a Motor Gun Boat to that ship. In doing so, the crew crossed in front of the assault force that was to land at Blue Beach (Puys). The landing craft from that force followed his MGB rather than the guiding one. The resulting confusion meant that instead of landing in darkness they landed in daylight. In order to make up for lost time, the MGB commander increased speed, with the result that the first wave of landing craft split into two, one fast, one slow, this meant that there insufficient troops at any time to overwhelm the defences. In recovering the straying landing craft, the defences at Dieppe were also alerted. On the eastern flank of the attack, two of the three beaches were manned prior to touchdown. In the center, the two beaches were also manned prior to touchdown. Only on the western flank was surprise achieved.

Blue Beach, assigned to the Royal Regiment, became a killing ground. When the second half of the first wave landed they were unaware that any previous landing had been made as there was no movement on the beach. It is believed that only 10 per cent of the first wave of 150 men actually survived to the sea wall. As the second wave crossed the beach they realised their mistake. The sea wall that faced them was twelve feet high and topped with barbed wire. Immediately above the wall was a pillbox with a clear field of fire along the entire wall. A single path passing by it led from the beach to the top of the cliffs. At the top of this path stood another pillbox and two fortified houses. Altogether there twelve heavy machine guns sighted on the beach. Only a small party managed to cross the wall and they were quickly cut off from the beach. Two hundred and sixty one of the Royal Regiments men became prisoners of war, 227 died, only 65 returned to England.

No.4 Commando made an unopposed landing and was successful in destroying their assigned battery. The South Saskatchewan Regiment made an almost unopposed landing as the Germans had left only a platoon to garrison Pourville. The majority of their defences lay between Pourville and Dieppe, on the west headland. While Pourville was quickly captured, the battalion had been landed entirely on the western side of the River Scie, instead of astride it as planned. There was only a single bridge across that river, and it was in plain view of the Germans on the headlands. Lt.Col. Merritt, the regimental commander, won a Victoria Cross for leading his men across this bridge. But only two companies of the South Saskatchewans had been detailed to assault the headland, and they were faced by two larger German companies, dug in, and well supported with heavy machine guns, mortars and artillery. By day's end they had suffered 339 casualties, the lowest of any of the Canadian infantry battalions. The Cameron Highlanders were landed almost on time and attempted to push on to their objectives. They were unsuccessful in breaking through the enemy troops ringing the town. The Highlanders suffered 346 casualties out of their 503 men.

By this time the defenders of Dieppe were fully alerted. Cannon-firing Hurricanes swept over the town. This brief air support surprised and disheartened the regiments approaching the beach as they were unaware of the late change of the air support, they had been expecting bombers. They suffered heavy casualties approaching the beach, and even heavier casualties once they landed. The tanks were landed late, and it was discovered that instead of the 1 in 30 rise they had been briefed, the rocky beach was in fact a 1 in 4 rise, that is, 1 foot of rise in 4 feet. The shingle did not stop the tanks, but it did slow them down making them easy targets for the defenders. While the Germans had no anti-tank guns capable of knocking out the Canadians Churchill tanks, they were quite capable of immobilizing them. Only half of the 29 tanks landed actually managed to get off the beach. Once off the beach they were hampered by the fact that they were armed only with solid armor piercing shot, and not high explosive. While the crews rendered what fire support they could, it was of limited effect against the German defenders.

Another surprise waiting for the Canadians was the German barbed wire. As the tanks advanced over the wire the infantry expected to follow them. But the wire bounced back to regain its coiled shape once the tanks passed, preventing the infantry from advancing and leaving the tanks unsupported.

One of the greatest obstacles to the infantry was the featureless promenade between the town and the beach. This promenade was 150 yds wide, and the houses fronting it were fortified. The Essex Scottish made 3 attempts to charge across this area all in the first hour after landing. After their third attempt, they huddled beneath the sea wall waiting for evacuation. The Essex suffered 530 casualties of their 553 men.

To their right, on the west side of the beach, the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry was not having much better success. Three of their four company commanders were killed crossing the beach. Fortunately there was a casino linking the beach with the town. Fighting from room to room, the Hamiltons cleared the casino and began to infiltrate the town. Unfortunately there were not enough of them left to make a serious attempt against the Dieppe's defenders. The Hamilton's counted 480 of their 582 men as casualties.

As the tanks realised they were unsupported they returned to the beach to assist the infantry. While the tank crews suffered the lowest number of killed or injured, only three of those who landed were evacuated. The Calgary Tanks suffered 174 casualties.

Due to the faulty communications that existed throughout the day, General Roberts, the divisional commander had no clear idea of what was happening on the beaches. From the confused messages that were received it was deduced that the Essex Scottish had successfully entered the town, when in fact only a small party had temporarily entered. The commanders believed that the Hamilton's had captured the casino and were entering the town, again, only a small party managed this. No news had been heard from either Blue of Green Beach. It was therefore decided to reinforce success, the Fusiliers Mont-Royal and the Royal Marine Commando were ordered in. The Royal Marine CO quickly realized that his troops were sailing into an inferno and ordered them back, he died in his act. The Fusiliers not only sailed into the inferno, but were landed directly under the west headland. These soldiers suffered heavy casualties and were quickly made prisoners. The regiment's CO was injured several times crossing the beach and was evacuated. The Fusiliers suffered 513 casualties at Dieppe.

The losses suffered that day were horrendous. Of the 4,963 Canadian soldiers embarked in England, 907 were killed, nearly the same amount as the Canadians lost on D-Day. Another 2,460 were wounded, 1,874 were taken prisoner, 2,210 returned to England of which 1,974 were wounded. The majority of those unharmed were from the half of the Calgary Tanks that were not landed, nearly 200 men. Lovat's Commando landed 252 men and suffered 46 casualties. Among the 3,875 naval personnel who also manned the landing craft and provided the beach parties, there were 550 casualties. The Commandos, who provided a total of 1,075 soldiers suffered an additional 201 casualties to those of Lord Lovat. The U.S. Rangers who were engaging in their first action against Germany provided 50 men for the raid, they suffered 13 casualties. The RAF, for whom Dieppe was meant to trap the Luftwaffe into combat, sent 1,179 aircrew into battle, they lost 98 aircraft at a cost of 153 casualties.

The planners of Combined Operations at Richmond Terrace had estimated that the forces landing at Dieppe would suffer some 10 per cent casualties, with the tank crews closer to 20 per cent. Total force casualties amounted to 60 per cent with nearly 100 per cent of tank crews landed (all of the tanks were expected to be lost as they could not be reembarked).

The losses break down as follows:

SERVICE	ENGAGED	CASUALTIES	%
RAF	1,179	153	13
ROYAL NAVY	3,875	550	14.5
COMMANDOS	1,075	247	22.9
US RANGERS	50	13	26
CANDIANS	4,963	3,367	68

Dieppe had proved a great disaster. Hereafter all landings, with the exception of Operation TORCH, had the beaches reconnoitred by Combined Operations Pilotage Parties, to confirm actual beach conditions. Major air support and naval bombardment was provided for all subsequent landings. A permanent force of landing craft navigators and crewmen was formed, it was called Force "J", for Jubilee. And the allies would never again attempt an assault against a fortified port.

The 2nd Canadian Division was rebuilt and took part in the Battle of Normandy two years later. Assigned to capture Dieppe, the German garrison abandoned the town without a fight, and the 2nd Division entered Dieppe in a triumphal parade.

The 14th Tank Regiment, as part of the 1st Tank Brigade, saw action in Sicily, Italy, and North-West Europe. It is now known as the King's Own Calgary Regiment.