3.1.4.
Toward Global Parliament
Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss
CHALLENGING THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT
One crucial
aspect of the rising disaffection with globalization
is the lack of citizen participation in the global
institutions that shape people's daily lives. This
public frustration is deeper and broader than the
recent street demonstrations in Seattle and Prague.
Social commentators and leaders of citizens' and intergovernmental
organizations are increasingly taking heed. Over
the past 18 months, President Clinton has joined with
the secretary-general of the United Nations, the director-general
of the World Trade Organization (WTÎ), the
managing director of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), and the president of the World Bank to call
for greater citizen participation in the international
order.
But to
date, these parties have not clearly articulated a
general vision of how best to integrate a public role
into international institutions. So in the absence
of a planned design, attempts to democratize the international
system have been ad hoc, as citizen organizations
and economic elites create their own mechanisms of
influence. In domestic politics, interest-group pluralism
flourishes within a parliamentary system of representation.
In global politics, interest-group pluralism is growing,
but no unifying parliament represents the public interest.
This state of affairs cannot last in a world where
the prevailing understanding of democracy does not
accept the fact that unelected interest groups can
speak for the citizenry as a whole. Any serious attempt
to challenge the democratic deficit must therefore
consider creating some type of popularly elected global
body. Before globalization, such an idea would have
been considered Utopian. Now, the clamor of citizens
to participate internationally can no longer be ignored.
The only question is what form this participation
will take.
DECISION-MAKING GOES
GLOBAL
Behind
this clamor lies a profound shift in power. Thanks
to trade, foreign direct investment, and capital flows,
globalization is dispersing political authority throughout
the international order. International governance
is no longer limited to such traditional fare as defining
international borders, protecting diplomats, and proscribing
the use of force. Many issues of global policy that
directly affect citizens are now being shaped by the
international system. Workers can lose their jobs
as a result of decisions made at the wto
or within regional trade regimes. Consumers must contend
with a market in which state-prescribed protections
such as the European ban on hormone-fed beef can be
overridden by wto
regulations. Patients who need medicines pay prices
influenced by WTO-enforced patent rules, which allow
pharmaceutical companies to monopolize drug pricing.
Most of the 23 million sub-Saharan Africans who have
tested positive for the aids virus cannot afford the
drugs most effective in treating their illness. They
will die much sooner as a consequence.
For the
half of the world's population that lives on less
than $2 a day, governmental social safety nets have
been weakened by imf decisions. The globalized economy
has not meaningfully reduced poverty despite a long
period of sustained growth. Economic inequality is
on the rise, as is the marginalization of regions
not perceived as attractive trading partners or “efficient”
recipients of investment. Furthermore, environmental
trends pose severe dangers that can be successfully
dealt with only through global action and treaties.
Against such a background, it is little wonder that
people who believe they possess a democratic entitlement
to participate in decisions that affect their lives
are now starting to demand their say in the international
system. And global civil society has thus far been
their voice as they attempt to have this say.
CIVIL SOCIETY'S GLOBAL PRESENCE
Civil
society, made up of nonprofit organizations and voluntary
associations dedicated to civic, cultural, humanitarian,
and social causes, has begun to act as an independent
international force. The largest and most prominent
of these organizations include Amnesty International,
Green peace, Oxfam, and the International Committee
of the Red Cross; in addition, the U.N. now lists
more than 3,000 civil society groups.
During
the 1990s, these transnational forces effectively
promoted treaties to limit global warming, establish
an international criminal court, and outlaw antipersonnel
land mines. These same actors also helped persuade
the International Court of Justice to render an advisory
opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons and defeat
a multilateral investment agreement. More recently,
civil groups mounted a drive to cancel the foreign
debts of the world's poorest countries. Although these
efforts remain works in progress, civil society to
date has been indispensable in furthering them.
During
the early 1990s, civil society's organizations began
visibly cooperating at large international conferences
of states. When conservative political pressures
forced an end to these conferences, civil society
began to coalesce to act cohesively and independently
in the international arena. For example, 8,000 individuals
representing civil society organizations met in May
1999 at the Hague Appeal for Peace to shape strategy
and agree on a common agenda. Among those attending
were such luminaries as Nobel Peace Prize winners
Desmond Tutu, Jose Ramos-Horta, and Jody Williams.
Similar smaller meetings in South Korea, Canada, Germany,
and elsewhere followed.
These
meetings were a prelude to the Millennium ngo
Forum held at the United Nations in May 2000, to which
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan invited 1,400 individuals
representing international civil society groups to
present views on global issues and citizen participation
in decision-making. The forum agreed to establish
a permanent assembly of civil society organizations,
mandated to meet at least every two to three years,
before the U.N. General Assembly annual session. Although
it is still to be realized, such a forum might earn
recognition over time as an important barometer of
world public opinion — and a preliminary step toward
creating a global parliament. Regardless of how this
specific forum develops, civil society will continue
to institutionalize itself into an independent and
cohesive force within the international system.
THE CORPORATE MOVERS
Through
expanding trade and investment, business and banking
leaders have also exercised extraordinary influence
on global policy. Even in formerly exclusive arenas
of state action, these private-sector actors are making
a mark. For example, Secretary-General Kofi Anan has
made “partnering” with the business
community a major hallmark of his leadership. The
United Nations has now established a formal business
advisory council to formalize a permanent relationship
between the corporate community and the U.N.
As with
citizen groups, elite business participation in the
international system is becoming institutionalized.
The best example is the World Economic Forum in Davos,
Switzerland. In the 1980s, the wef transformed itself from an organization
devoted to humdrum management issues into a dynamic
political forum. Once a year, a thousand of the world's
most powerful business executives get together with
another thousand of the world's senior policymakers
to participate in a week of roundtables and presentations.
The wef
also provides ongoing arenas for discussion and recommendations
on shaping global policy. It is notable that Anan's
ideas about a U.N. partnership with the business community
have been put forward and endorsed during his frequent
appearances at Davos. In addition, the wef
also conducts and disseminates its own research, which
not surprisingly shows a consistently neoliberal outlook.
For example, it produces a well-publicized annual
index ranking the relative economic competitiveness
of all countries in the world. The Davos assembly
and overlapping networks of corporate elites, such
as the International Chamber of Commerce, have been
successful in shaping compatible global policies.
Their success has come in the expansion of international
trade regimes, the modest regulation of capital markets,
the dominance of neoliberal market philosophy, and
the supportive collaboration of most governments,
especially those of rich countries.
PONDERING A GLOBAL PARLIAMENT
Global
civil society still cannot match the resources and
power linkages of the corporate and banking communities.
But many civil society groups have carved out niches
within the international order from which to influence
decision-making by relying on imagination and information.
The evolution of these two networks—civil and business—has
been largely uncoordinated, and it remains unclear
how they could fit together in a functionally coherent
and representative form of global governance. Neither
can claim to represent citizenry as a whole. As global
civil society acquires a greater international presence,
its critics are already challenging its claims to
represent the public interest. The charge of illegitimacy
has even greater resonance when leveled at corporate
and banking elites, who do not speak for organizations.
Now that
the global system is increasingly held up to democratic
standards—and often comes up short—those people who
find their policy preferences rejected are unlikely
to accept the system's determination as legitimate,
and the democratic deficit will remain a problem.
Only when citizen and business interests work together
within an overarching representative body can they
achieve policy accommodations that will be seen as
legitimate. For the first time, a widely recognized
global democratic forum could consider environmental
and labor standards and deliberate on economic justice
from the perspectives of both North and South. Even
an initially weak assembly could offer some democratic
oversight of international organizations such as the
imf, the wto, and the World Bank.
Unlike
the United Nations, this assembly would not be constituted
by states. Because its authority would come directly
from the global citizenry, it could refute the claim
that states are bound only by laws to which they give
their consent. Henceforth, the ability to opt out
of collective efforts to protect the environment,
control or eliminate weapons, safeguard human rights,
or otherwise protect the global community could be
challenged.
In addition,
the assembly could encourage compliance with established
international norms and standards, especially in human
rights. The international system currently lacks reliable
mechanisms to Implement many of its laws. Organizations
such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,
and even the International Labor Organization attempt
to hold states accountable by exposing their failures
of compliance, relying on a process often referred
to as the “mobilization
of shame.” In exercising
such oversight, a popularly elected global assembly
would be more visible and credible than are existing
watchdogs who expose corporate and governmental wrongdoing.
The assembly's
very existence would also help promote the peaceful
resolution of international conflicts. Because elected
delegates would represent individuals and society
instead of states, they would not have to vote along
national lines. Coalitions would likely form on other
bases, such as world-view, political orientation,
and interests. Compromises among such competing but
nonmilitarized coalitions might eventually undermine
reliance on the current war system, in which international
decisions are still made by heavily armed nations
that are poised to destroy one another. In due course,
international relations might more closely resemble
policymaking within the most democratic societies
of the world.
ALL THOSE IN FAVOR
In spite
of its advantages, would the formation of such an
assembly threaten established state and business interests
so much that its creation would become politically
untenable? The European Union's experience suggests
otherwise. Established by states—and with little initial
authority—the transnationally elected European Parliament
has now become powerful enough to help close a regional
democratic deficit.
As with
the early European parliament, a relatively weak assembly
initially equipped with largely advisory powers could
begin to address concerns about the democratic deficit
while posing only a long-term threat to the realities
of state power. Systemic transformation of world order
that would largely affect successors would not significantly
threaten those political leaders who are inclined
to embrace democratic ideals. Indeed, it might even
appeal to them.
Despite
these humble origins, the assembly would have the
potential to become an extremely important fixture
of the global architecture.
Upon the assembly's inception,
civil society organizations would almost certainly
lobby it to issue supportive resolutions. Groups who
opposed such resolutions could shun the process, but
that is not likely: they would concede the support
of the world's only elected democratic body. Over
time, as the assembly became the practical place for
clashing interests to resolve differences, formal
powers would likely follow.
Some
business leaders would certainly oppose a global parliament
because it would broaden popular decision-making and
likely press for transnational regulations. But others
are coming to believe that the democratic deficit
must be closed by some sort of stakeholder accommodation.
After all, many members of the managerial class who
were initially hostile to such reform came to realize
that the New Deal—or its social-democratic equivalent
in Europe—was necessary to save capitalism. Many business
leaders today similarly agree that democratization
is necessary to make globalization politically acceptable
throughout the world.
As the
recent large street protests suggested, globalization
has yet to achieve grassroots acceptance and legitimacy.
To date, its main claim to popular support is not
political but economic: it has either delivered or
convincingly promised to deliver the economic goods
to enough people to keep the antiglobalization forces
from mounting an effective challenge. But economic
legitimacy alone can rarely stabilize a political
system for long. Market-based economic systems have
historically undergone ups and downs, particularly
when first forming. The financial crisis that almost
triggered a world financial meltdown a few years ago
will not be the last crisis to emerge out of globalization.
Future economic failures are certain to generate
political responses.
Standing
in the wings in the United States and elsewhere are
politicians, ultranationalists, and an array of opportunists
on both the left and the right who, if given an opening,
would seek to dismantle the global system. A global
parliament is therefore likely to serve as an attractive
alternative to those people who, out of enlightened
self-interest or even public-spiritedness, wish to
see the international system become more open and
democratic.
MAKING IT HAPPEN
Although the raw political potential for a global assembly may exist,
it is not enough. Some viable way needs to be found
for this potential to be realized, and it can most
likely be found in the new diplomacy. Unlike traditional
diplomacy, which has been solely an affair among states,
new diplomacy makes room for flexible and innovative
coalitions between civil society and receptive states.
The major success stories of global civil society
in the 1990s—the Kyoto global warming treaty, the
convention banning land mines, and the International
Criminal Court—were produced in this manner.
Civil society, aided by receptive states, could create the assembly
without resorting to a formal treaty process. Under
this approach, the assembly would not be formally
sanctioned by states, so governments would probably
contest its legitimacy at the outset. But this opposition
could be neutralized to some extent by widespread
grassroots and media endorsement. Citizens in favor
could make their voices heard through popular, fair,
and serious elections.
Another approach would rely on a treaty, using what is often called
the “single
negotiating text method.” After
consultations with sympathetic parties from civil
society, business, and nation-states, an organizing
committee could generate the text of a proposed treaty
establishing an assembly. This text could serve as
the basis for negotiations. Civil society could then
organize a public relations campaign and persuade
states (through compromise if necessary) to sign the
treaty. As in the process that ultimately led to the
land mines convention, a small core group of supportive
states could lead the way. But unlike that treaty,
which required 40 countries to ratify it before taking
effect, a relatively small number of countries (say,
20) could provide the founding basis for such an assembly.
This number is only a fraction of what would be needed
for the assembly to have some claim to global democratic
legitimacy. But once the assembly became operational,
the task of gaining additional state members would
likely become easier. A concrete organization would
then exist that citizens could urge their governments
to join. As more states joined, pressure would grow
on nonmember states to participate. The assembly would
be incorporated into the evolving international constitutional
order. If it gained members and influence over time,
as expected, its formal powers would have to be redefined.
It would also have to work out its relationship with
the U.N. One possibility would be to associate with
the General Assembly to form a bicameral world legislature.
The pressures to democratize the international system are part of an
evolutionary social process that will persist and
intensify. The two dominant themes of the post-Cold
War years are globalization and democratization. It
is often said that the world is rapidly creating
an integrated global political economy, and that national
governments that are not freely elected lack political
legitimacy. It is paradoxical, then, that a global
debate has not emerged on resolving the contradiction
between a commitment to democracy and an undemocratic
global order.
This tension may be the result of political inertia or a residual belief
that ambitious world-governance proposals are Utopian.
But whatever the explanation, this contradiction is
spurring citizen groups and business and financial
elites to take direct actions to realize their aspirations.
Their initiatives have created an autonomous dynamic
of ad hoc democratization. As this process continues
to move along with globalization, pressures for a
coherent democratic system of global governance will
intensify. Political leaders will find it more difficult
to win citizen acquiescence to unaccountable policies
that extend globalization's reach into peoples' lives.
To all those concerned about social justice and the
creation of a humane global order, a democratic alternative
to an ossified, state-centered system is becoming
ever more compelling.
(New York, “Foreign Affairs”, January/February
2001, volume 80, number 1, pp. 212-220)
