The 20th Century urban warfare experience has caused us to reevaluate old factors and consider new developments that affect the way we fight in this environment. The following discussion on historical analysis of the result of these select urban battles illustrates the importance of our maneuver warfare and combined arms philosophies. Part I discussed military intelligence, surprise and weapons. Other factors that have impacted on the way urban warfare has been conducted are:
Forces:
Force Size: Whether attacking or defending, the size of the force relative to the enemy can be critical to success. When provided with adequate forces the attacker can use them to isolate and encircle the defender and to prevent a break-out or link-up. The defender can use them to create a mobile defense or create strong reserves for counterattacks.
The degree of surprise and firepower (aviation, armor, artillery, mortars) the attacker can achieve is pitted against the degree of sophistication with which the defender pas prepared the city. Also important is whether the defender is supported by the local population, is wholly or partially cut off from external support, and has effective communications systems.
It must be noted that historically the defender was “normally” outnumbered by the attacker, quality of forces available were inferior, and defeat of the forces defending the city was usually certain. Nevertheless, no matter what the size or quality of defensive forces, the defender can extract enormous costs to the attacker in time, resources, and casualties. As was seen at Khorramshahr, the defender, irregular Iranian forces outnumbered 4:1, still held the city for approximately 26 days. Although the Iranian defender’s lost the city, its defense allowed remaining Iranian forces time to organize and redeploy. Furthermore, the winter rains that followed on the heels of the battle turned much of the region into a sea of mud and largely further Iraqi efforts. As a result, the Iraqi army’s offensive thrusts into Iran to achieve a quick victory were stopped at Khorramshahr.
Force Ratio: Successful attackers most often had superior manpower and firepower. In cases where the attacker won, but was inferior in manpower and firepower, the defender violated one or more principles of war. Nevertheless, the average attacker-to-defender ratio in the 22 battles reviewed was 4:1. Another consideration for both attacker and defender is the relationship between force ratio and combat duration. Historically, the stronger the attacker, the shorter the duration of the fight.
Combined Arms: In these battle studies, from 1942 to the present, “shock units” or “special assault teams” have been used by attackers (and often by defenders) with great success. These organizations were characterized by integration of combined arms at battalion level and below. Control was decentralized to lower echelons down to, in some cases, squad level. Typically, assault teams contained infantry with variable combinations of armor, artillery, and engineers. Thus, combat in built-up areas has historically involved and affected all combat arms, combat support, and combat service support units. The study of the urban battles reviewed here reaffirms the necessity for all combat arms to plan, train, and develop common tactics, techniques, and procedures. Prior to the battle of Aachen, U.S. ground forces conducted intensive urban training with antitank teams and artillery pieces down to the squad and fire team level. In contrast, the defender in most cases had to fight with only locally available forces and no opportunity to conduct combined arms training.
Time:
In most cases the time required for successful conclusion of an urban battle exceeded the initial estimates by a factor of two to three. Consequently, the expenditure of time, logistics and personnel has, in many cases, adverse effects on the overall campaign. Thus advances in other sectors had to be delayed until the urban threat was eliminated.
Three battles where time played a critical role in the attacker’s strategic timetable (and this role was not anticipated) were Aachen, Khorramshashr, and Stalingrad. In these battles, and others, defenders delayed the attacker longer than was estimated, resulting in the modification of operational or strategic plans. Furthermore, analysis indicated that most city battles, if decided within 30 days, are won by the attacker.
Additionally, it should be noted that a well-planned urban defense, even if the defender is isolated, or lacking in aviation, armor, or artillery weapons, can consume inordinate amounts of the attacker’s time trying to overcome it. This time can permit the defender to reorganize, redeploy, or otherwise more effectively marshal resources in other areas.
Isolation
The attacker won all the battles where the defender was totally isolated. Even partial cut-off of the defenders resulted in attackers enjoying a success rate of 80 percent. Conversely, attackers won only 50 percent of the battles in which defenders were not significantly cut off, and that victory came at great cost.
In most battles, some form of isolation of the urban area occurred as a result of the attacker’s actions. In most battle environments it appears unrealistic to envision complete isolation of a city until enemy forces to the rear of the city are pushed far beyond its outermost boundaries. However, total isolation does not appear necessary, since partial isolation was gained in 80 percent of battles where the attacker won. The key is in stemming the unimpeded flow of manpower, supplies and weapons to replace defender’s losses.
Cost:
The cost of conducting urban warfare is relative to the percentage of total resources, the time expended, and the results achieved. The cost to the attacker was considered high in the majority of urban battles. A high cost does not necessarily imply that the results were not worth the price. What is important is that the attacker or defender thoroughly evaluate the overall cost prior to committing to the battle.
From the point of view of the offense, several factors can be associated with cost. First, and most importantly, isolating the urban area is critical to the attacker’s success. Second, overwhelming superiority is critical if all costs are to be minimized. Third, the operation should be carefully planned. Fourth, photomaps and dependable intelligence are invaluable. It is critical to know where and how the city has been prepared for defense. Fifth, attacking forces should understand the unique nature of urban combat. Clear doctrine concerning urban combat is critical. Every aspect ranging from taking a building to using destructive technology and coordinating combined arms must be understood. There are many tactical issues that determine the course of combat, but these five considerations appear to be key to minimizing the cost of urban warfare to the attacker.
From the standpoint of the defender, the critical variable is clear: defensive preparation of the city. The capture of a prepared city can be made extremely costly. Preparations can include creating kill zones, clearing fields of fire and constructing channelizing obstacles, organizing multiple movement routes above ground, between rooftops, and below ground in subways and sewers. Maintaining substantial supply lines and receiving artillery support are also valuable, but physical preparation of the city is clearly most important.
Cost considerations can also be associated with other factors: for example, how we judge cost may limit our military action or the nature of the military operation may constrain our use of weapons and force employment. If the attacker is prepared to accept the cost of high casualties and the consumption of time and has no restraints on firepower, manpower, and resources, he is in a stronger position than the defenders. Under such conditions, it is not whether the attacker will win, but how long it will take to win. However, is minimal cost is a salient factor, the attacker is in a substantially more difficult situation. Constraints and restrictions may result in the attacker not being able to defeat the defender. Therefor, in situations involving restrictive rules of engagement, one must seriously question the wisdom of assaulting built-up areas.
Unless the attacker has a relatively free hand, he should not consider attacking a built-up area. If the attacker is constrained, the defender must be considered to have an equal chance to win or at least to raise the attacker’s cost of victory, regardless of force ratios. The majority of urban battles since 1967 (such as Beirut II, Hue, Jerusalem) have one or more of the following constraints imposed on the attacking force:
(1) Limiting friendly casualties.
(2) Minimizing civilian casualties and/or collateral destruction. Either the attacker or defender has been obliged to - -
(a) Avoid alienation of the local population.
(b) Reduce the risk of adverse world or domestic opinion.
(c) Preserve facilities for future use.
(d) Preserve cultural facilities and grounds.
(3) Restricting the use of ground or air weapons.
Logistics
Supporting forces and resources are critical to the success of any operation. Supporting forces engaged in urban warfare require special considerations.
Logistical Support: The logistical support system must be responsive to the increase in Class IV (construction materials), Class V (ammunition), and Class VIII (medical material) support. Items such as rope, grappling hooks, ladders, sandbags, wire, building/reinforcing materials, etc., are required during offensive and defensive urban operations to conduct the building-to-building fight. Intense close-quarter combat requires a constant flow of ammunition to sustain forces. This type of warfare results in a dramatic increase in need for small arms, heavy machine gun, tank, antitank, mortar, and artillery ammunition and for mines, grenades, and demolitions explosives. Medical supplies must be readily available to handle the anticipated increase in casualties. To accomplish this, the attacker/defender must pre-stock as many supplies as possible prior to the urban conflict. Once the battle has begun, forces must receive supply support continuously.
A method of providing continuous support is to establish a “logistics push system” which pushes supplies and ammunition to fighting units in preset amounts, or packages. This is done without request from units. This type of support prevents delays of a “pull system” which requires units to request supplies and ammunition, then await their arrival.
Health Support System: Responsive medical treatment and evacuation plans should be established in order to handle the increase in casualties. Both health care and evacuation are critical in maintaining the morale and confidence of forces during urban warfare. To meet casualty and evacuation needs, place mobile aid stations with surgical teams as far forward as the tactical situation allows and have vehicles dedicated for medical evacuation purposes.
In addition to casualties resulting from physical injury on the battlefield, there were considerable psychological casualties in the 20th century urban battles. This was attributed to the intense, sustained and close-quarter combat associated with city fighting. Also, in many battles, attacking troops were not properly trained for urban warfare and felt inadequate in their ability to fight on equal terms with the defender. Additionally, a moral or ethical dilemma may be associated with battle destruction and casualties. And finally, the constant threat of being killed from any quarter coupled with the extreme fatigue of fighting are all contributing factors to psychological casualties. Leaders at all levels must be attuned to the symptoms associated with psychological casualties in order to get prompt treatment and return of individuals to units.
Part III will address the implications of urban warfare and historical lessons learned.
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