Implications of Urban Warfare
The actual conduct of urban operations is undeniably tactical in nature. The intent behind urban battles is aimed at operational and strategic objectives. The commander charges with making decisions needs to understand the operational and strategic implications of a tactical struggle in an urban area. Three battles bring out the importance of seeing beyond the tactical nature of the battle.
The battle for Stalingrad had major operational and strategic implications. The entanglement of German forces at Stalingrad bought time for the Soviets to mobilize and prevented a major combined effort of two German Army Groups in the south. Stalingrad resulted operationally in the destruction of the German Sixth Army, but the strategic results were even greater. Strategically, Stalingrad caused a complete and total change of German strategy in the east. Hitler made major changes in his General Staff, and from this point on in the war, he was a man estranged from his military leadership. The los of enough men and equipment to field one fourth of the German Army rocked the very foundations of the Third Reich.
The Battle for Hue, although only one of over one hundred different attacks of the Tet Offensive of 1968, had a negative impact on the will of both the American people and its political leadership which directed the war. Hue marked a revolution in the coverage of the war by modern mass media. It was the first time Americans could sit at home and watch an ongoing battle on the evening news, every evening for almost a month. Hue, as is typical for an urban battle, continued for a long period of time and was a television bonanza. When the North Vietnamese leadership directed that Hue be held for at least seven days, it was clearly not their intent to win a tactical battle, but to strike at the strategic center of gravity - in this case, the will of the American people. Although the battle for Hue was a tactical victory for the United States, the North Vietnamese had achieved their strategic goal of searing the American consciousness with the costs of urban combat.
During the battle of Beirut II, the Israeli Defense Force's (IDF) objective was to drive the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) from Lebanon. The irony of Beirut II was that the Israeli leadership focused its attention on the enemy force and achieved a victory but failed to assess the ultimate cost. In Israel's case, the costs in image, prestige, allies, and most importantly, its own national will were enormous. It eventually resulted in a change of political leadership at the highest levels of government. The ability of the PLO to manipulate the media was one of the most significant weapons in their arsenal.
With these examples as historical guides, the following conclusions can be reached:
a. A tactical battle may have far-reaching implications.
b. Military commanders must have a visionary outlook to see beyond the immediate tactical implications.
c. In the technological world in which we live, commanders at all levels must understand the impact media representation will have on the accomplishment of operational and strategic objectives.
Historical Lessons Learned
The examination of MOUT begins by reviewing historical lessons learned from urban operations dating back to the battle of Stalingrad during World War II and most recently operations in the Baltic region. A foundation of MOUT knowledge is built by reviewing past urban operations. Lessons learned provide examples of how specific operations were conducted and the high points that were brought out. Just as in any other type of mission, none of these are solutions for upcoming challenges. From our reference perspective, these examples can be used to provide a starting point in the planning process. The following text condenses MOUT conflicts into historical lesson learned. Part III will examine the first five of 12 lessons learned. Part IV will examine the remaining seven. These lessons will assist planners in understanding the complexities of MOUT.
Physical Limitations of MOUT
MOUT planners will encounter limited opportunities and some unique constraints. This is due in part to the vertical nature of man-made structures, subterranean infrastructure; and restrictions on clear lines of sight for communications, observation, and target engagement. Not only do planners have to deal with depth and width, they now must consider the additional factor of drastic elevation changes. Man-made urban obstacles will impact every weapons system from the M-16 to Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs)
Doctrinal Avoidance of Urban Areas
Traditional doctrine is to avoid urban terrain. Technological improvements in aviation and weapon systems have had their greatest impact in effectiveness in the urban environment. NATO and Non-Western doctrine both stress the avoidance of positional or restrictive warfare. Urban warfare is considered very positional and highly restrictive due to the mix of man-made and natural features. Man-made features and obstacles have a tremendous effect on mobility, communications, concealment, observation and fields of fire. Fighting in cities can be the most costly and time consuming of any form of modern warfare. Urban fighting could be considered the great equalizer between the militarily advanced and the technologically deficient. There are a variety of reasons why Marines may fight in a city: It may be a vital port with free access to critical lines of communication, it may be located between two natural obstacles denying maneuvering to bypass, it may be the only place where the enemy is actually located, there may be overwhelming political considerations that dominate the military decision, or in the case of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) the entire mission and focus may be centered in a city. In fact, it is quite possible that the majority of future combat will take place in and around urban areas.
Urban Areas Create a Force Multiplier for the Defender
History has shown repeatedly that a small force with proper training, equipment, and coordination can effectively defend against heavily armed forces for a significant period of time. The urban battles of Stalingrad, Hue, Beirut, Mogadishu, and Chechnya attest to the hypothesis that urban warfare can provide a force multiplier for the defender. During the Israeli "Peace for Galilee" campaign in 1982, the IDF intent was to capture the city of Beirut, defeat the PLO, and drive Syrian forces from the city. Their ultimate goal was to establish a Lebanese government that would be more in line with Israeli interests. A major concern; however, was that the IDF was unprepared to conduct urban warfare. Therefore, the IDF concentrated on developing armor- heavy forces and planned on fighting similar type engagements that were characteristic of earlier Arab-Israeli conflicts. The result of this strategy was that enormous amounts of ammunition were expended and offensive gains were measured literally by yards. The artillery and tank shelling combined with aircraft bombardments created massive amounts of rubble. This served to strengthen the well prepared PLO strongpoints. As a result, it took the IDF 45 days to gain an offensive edge. If opposing forces had fought on rural terrain, the IDF objectives may have been met in only a few days.
Urban Operations Require Decentralized Control
The very nature of urban warfare requires decentralized control of assets, due to degraded communications capabilities, limited fields of fire and observation, and reduced mobility. Decentralized control allows small unit leaders and individual Marines and aircrews to use their imagination, initiative, and training to seize a specific urban objective. This is not to imply that centralized integration of supporting arms is no longer critical. MOUT requires small unit decisions, but a very high degree of coordination is required by both adjacent units and the HQS controlling them. Integration of supporting arms remains paramount in an urban environment. Battle plans and orders should be sufficiently detailed so small unit leaders understand the commander's intent and objectives. At the same time, plans must be flexible so subordinate leaders can seize the initiative. As an example, General Chuikov, the Russian 62nd Army Commanding General, stated during the battle of Stalingrad: "Fighting in a city...is much more involved than fighting in the field. Here the "big chiefs" have practically no influence on the officers and squad leaders commanding units and subunits and into those of the soldiers themselves."
More often than not, decisions made at the lowest levels during urban combat have their greatest effect during tactical engagements. If such small unit level decisions are not made within the commanders intent, you facilitate the enemy's effort.
Mutually Supporting Fires
When defending urban areas, mutually supporting strongpoints along major axes are required. During the battle for Hue City, it took two Marine battalions three weeks of door to door fighting to clear a seven block area. The reason was that the NVA and VC used an arrangement of mutually supportive defensive positions patterned like a checkerboard. They were established on alternate blocks and had secondary positions to the rear and in the gaps between the forward positions. Forces were dug in and well camouflaged. Firing positions were established to take maximum advantage of building rubble. Some ruins created better positions for fighting than the original structures. Finally, almost every building had fortified fighting holes and bomb shelters. The NVA and VC maximized the use of these shelters during Marine artillery and infantry attacks.
Although the initial advantage may go to the defender, a potential counter-move would be to thin the offensive front line and widen the attack frontage which may result in reducing casualties and finding the weakest point in the enemy's checkerboard defense.
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