The following collection of veterans’ experiences, ranges from World War II to Somalia, and is included as additional urban warfare background for all Marines. It is not meant to be all-inclusive, but is offered as a momentary glimpse through the history of urban warfare so that we may learn from others experiences.
1. Currently units may train extensively in the use of Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) tactics but not for the execution of MOUT operations. They DO NOT have facilities, which replicate the size or scope of problems at battalion or higher levels, so they are not prepared to deal with problems above the lowest levels. This could be countered in part through the use of wargaming and computer simulations. Examples include:
a. Cities have large numbers of approaches, so it is difficult for the commander to defend, as his force may be too small to cover all of these areas. In small unit exercises, using a reserve to counterattack is likely more effective than using all forces in defensive positions. Even so, once an attacker has gained a foothold, it is difficult to dislodge him.
b. Cities offer the defender many ways to defend and infiltrate back into “cleared” areas after the defense is penetrated. Rapid attrition of attacking forces occurs due to the need to occupy those buildings already cleared.
2. Urban areas are perhaps the most heterogeneous terrain upon which a force has to fight.
3. British soldiers would go into “NI mode” when confronted with an urban area (very deliberate, hesitant to engage). This must be a consideration if forces from between operations short of war to the less constrained Fighting in Built Up Areas (FIBUA).
4. Surprise often gets a force into an urban area and to its objective, but extracting the force can be difficult, as surprise is lost. A heavier force may be needed to act as a reaction/extraction force.
5. Refugee problems must be planned in advance. If possible, make them a problem for the enemy rather than friendly forces.
6. Speed of operations is important in political as well as in a military sense as minimal losses (combatant or non- combatant) over time causes an attrition of public support (Somalia, for example). The more strict the Rules of Engagement (ROE), the greater the Marine/Soldier exposure and the higher the casualties.
7. Friendly casualties and attrition of strength during urban fighting are due more to injuries from falling rubble and dealing with the physical environment than enemy fire.
8. The following characteristics are typical of urban combat:
Short engagement ranges.
Reduced target exposure.
Widely varying fields of fire.
Dead space in three dimensions.
Projected difficulty of logistical operations.
Possible requirement for increased exposure while firing.
9. The French found in Beirut that they needed to know how to selectively activate or deactivate services such as water, electricity and communications. Likewise, they realized that enemy tactics would include acts intended to wear down popular support in France and create dramatic shocks through activities which caused large numbers of casualties. Intelligence regarding key buildings had to be initially developed and then constantly updated. Examples include the location of tall buildings and underground parking lots, energy supply networks, cross sections of buildings and visibility from access routes, and locations of public works systems.
10. Quote from an Israeli reserve officer with experience in five wars: “Every Israeli officer’s worst nightmare is to have to control an inhabited Arab city.”
11. Is the mission of winning in urban warfare while constrained to minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage feasible? It depends on the enemy and how he decides to defend. If the enemy is defending in strength, is proficient, and the friendly mission is to regain the city, there will be civilian casualties and collateral damage. “When the enemy determines he will make a stand in a city, you will take severe casualties.” If friendly forces are constrained, either while defending or attacking, while the enemy fights without regard for casualties or collateral damage, the constrained mission is infeasible.
12. The single greatest shortcoming in Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) operations is communications. "Communications are always our downfall." Batteries in particular create problems during extended operations.
13. The Israeli’s used precision bombing with LGBs and CBUs effectively in Beirut in 1982 primarily through the use of detailed aerial photography. Collateral damage was minimal. However, civilian casualties subsequent to the use of CBUs especially among children has significant negative effects.
14. Dual-purpose anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) was used very effectively in Beirut. Currently the U.S. has too few of these systems and they are not designed for ground support use as a secondary task. Use of AAA in urban combat was effective when other systems (tanks) fell short of needs. Note that AAA was used with similar success in Hue (1968) and was used by rebel forces in Mogadishu against U.S. helicopters (1993). It may be that gun systems are better suited for both an AAA and ground support role in urban environments than are missile systems.
15. An effective way of clearing buildings/areas may be to use Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) in a manner similar to Gulf War operations. Warn occupants that they must evacuate or that they will die in the building when it is destroyed. Then destroy it. The next time, state that the situation is as in the first case and that survival again depends on evacuation.
16. Use local support and civil affairs personnel if they are available. They know terrain (alleys, buildings, etc.) and can often tell friendly from enemy when U.S. forces cannot.
17. Overwatch is critical to all urban operations.
18. In 1982, the Israeli’s in Beirut, found that the ability to strike lethally on initial contact with a target was critical. Otherwise the enemy dug in or found cover very quickly. By the time other (precision) means of engaging the enemy were applied, they were generally ineffective due to these covering survivability actions.
19. Control of rooftops is key if the enemy has sophisticated AAA and friendly forces want to employ helicopters. Artillery may engage rooftops and upper stories of buildings to deny enemy platforms for observation and snipers.
20. Buildings with large double doors offer hides for equipment such as self-propelled artillery and tanks. Reconnaissance may want to identify such structures for wither targeting or friendly use.
2`. Observations from units in Somalia include:
a. Attack helicopters are superb, critical for survival.: However, use of the same by leaders below company level was not well understood and such capability should exist to the squad leader level. The aircraft must be able to destroy targets in doorways across the street from friendly forces.
b. A downed helicopter is a baited trap for the enemy to use. Expect to have to fight to get to the aircraft, to recover personnel and equipment and to return.
c. Wheeled vehicles must move in such a manner that they are mutually supporting while remaining spread out.
d. Use of graduated response is the norm for building entry. Ask the occupants to surrender, attempt to talk them out, continue to escalate as required.
e. A building is a company team operation. Two platoons isolate the building, one assaults. PSYOPS and CS are used as needed. Blowing a hole to enter generally causes civilian casualties as armed males hide behind women and children.
f. Obstacle breaching in cities is done by driving through or using the Mk-19, never by hand. “It wouldn’t work.”
g. “We as an Army must do more live fires in a MOUT environment that more closely resembles the third world structures found in the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East.”
h. “Close combat in MOUT needs more focus.”
i. The Somalis used civilians to carry ammunition and sometimes used them as shields against U.S. fire. They took advantage of U.S. ROE not permitting firing at unarmed personnel.
j. Problems during 3 October 1993 in Mogadishu included “brown outs” caused by dust thrown up by helicopters in a dusty city.
22. "The world is quickly becoming a megalopolis." You have to train to that. We cut our urban training down to an hour (prior to Vietnam). USMC training for urban warfare must be “extensive” as commanders must understand that they will likely have to fight in such an environment to seize a port or airfield or perform other MOUT missions.
23. U.S. forces in World War II and in the Philippines used WP for indirect fire from artillery and mortars versus tanks as the round would sometimes set the tank on fire even with a near miss.
24. "Smoke was the best way to reduce (friendly) casualties in Vietnam."
25. The best defensive position in an area may not be in a building. The building will tend to attract attention, as will the windows, doorways or holes in the walls. More effective for a defender may be the use of rubble, walls, yards, or other areas near a building.
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