The following collection of veterans’ experiences, ranges from World War II to Somalia, and is included as additional urban warfare background for all Marines. It is not meant to be all-inclusive, but is offered as a momentary glimpse through the history of urban warfare so that we may learn from others experiences.
26. The Soviets had up to 50% of their indirect fire dedicated to direct fire support during urban fighting based on their World War II experiences.
27. In examples of urban combat from 1945-1967, armor was considered a decisive factor in over half the examples examined. In examples from the post-1967 period, armor was rated critical in only one in thirteen examples. possibly due to the proliferation of portable Anti-tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) and the attacking commander's ignorance of tank-infantry tactics.
28. Key terrain must be identified and seized. Just as the church steeples of World War II were often eliminated due to the observation potential they offered the enemy, so tall buildings or those with significant Line of Sight (LOS) should be denied the enemy or secured for friendly use.
29. Helicopter use is feasible if used in the same way as supporting weapons systems, i.e. give them a hide, shoot, go back into a hide position. Any available weapons system can be used in urban combat. The leader "just needs to be a little imaginative." The whole approach to urban fighting requires a team, approach.
30. Urban operations are hard to rehearse. A cut-away model of the building(s) involved is very helpful.
31. Regarding operations in Somalia, bandits closely observed U.S. and coalition operations and force movements to discover patterns of patrolling and timing of maneuver operations. Avoiding predictable patterns of movement is an important Operations Security (OPSEC) measure.
32. Knowing the enemy is key to urban warfare just as in any fighting. In Vietnam, for example, Special Forces initially caused greater damage in urban areas than necessary as they destroyed entire buildings to deny the enemy an opportunity to engage. With experience, they learned that the enemy used upper floors for support weapons, and thus damage and ammunition consumption was better controlled as they knew where to engage (high windows and rooftops). Friendly casualties were also reduced.
33. Regarding operations in Somalia, "Human Intelligence (HUMINT) took on a more important role than did strategic or high-tech intelligence collection assets."
34. Reconnaissance by force becomes the most effective reconnaissance means. This method involves probing a defense with successively larger units until the enemy positions are disclosed and can be successfully attacked. If doubt exists as to whether a town or building is defended, that doubt should be settled by reconnaissance, not by fire. However, there may be an increased risk to friendly forces using this method.
35. Note the importance of cities in the North Vietnamese objectives during the Tet offensive in 1968 - this was possibly the most decisive campaign of the war.
36. The U.S. Army suffered over 50% casualties in three weeks at Hue. "Hue was the turning point of the war, it was Gettysburg."
37. During fighting in Panama, one company conducted a "mad minute" with all heavy weapons fired against a compound and then a broadcast of surrender demands. Most enemy surrendered and the damage was limited to two buildings that were engaged while friendly casualties were minimal.
38. Combined arms are key to urban combat success. The Israelis failed to capture Suez City in 1973 and lost 80-125 soldiers and 28 armored vehicles in a one day effort. The Iraqi attempt to capture Khorramshahl cost 7,000 casualties and over 100 tanks and other armored vehicles even after a week of air and artillery bombardment. The defenders were Islamic militants not organized into standard military units. The Russians attempted to capture the Chechnya Presidential Palace in Grozny and on the first day lost 105 of 120 tanks and Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) to Chechen rebels. In Lebanon, Tyre, and Sidron, "Combined arms appears to be as much a key to effectiveness on urban terrain as it is to effectiveness on other battlefields."
39. The battalion attack frontage for the Canadians during fighting in Oranto (Italy 1944) was less than 250 yards.
40. In Stalingrad, the 95th Rifle Division arrived in the city in late September 1942 with a strength of roughly 7000. By 8 October the strength was 3075; on 14 October the division was evacuated with approximately 500 men. Other divisions suffered similar casualties.
41. Civilian casualties in the Dominican Republic (1965) were primarily the result of inaccuracy, i.e. efforts to engage enemy forces would result in civilian losses in adjacent locations due to the inability of the round fired to land exactly where it was wanted. There was no real concern with minimizing collateral damage. If an enemy location was determined, firing large caliber weapons was not a concern despite the extensive damage to city structures.
42. The defense of Thu Duc (14 km north of Saigon) during Tet 1968 showed again how a smaller force can defend against a larger foe. The defenders numbering 220 fought against two NVA battalions. Using helicopters armed with machineguns and rockets (on station through an entire night) the defenders killed hundreds of NVA troops.
43. There is a need to target PSYOPs just as other weapon, otherwise it many have undesirable impacts with regard to both enemy and civilians. Cities can be difficult for PYSOP operators, the often heterogeneous nature of the population means that message directed at a given group may have negative/unwanted effects on other groups in the area or on the group being targeted. In short, the number of variables to be considered when conducting such an operation in a city is greater than in many other instances.
44. Using friendly snipers to cover friendly forces has the disadvantage that it shows how friendly forces will deploy. In an environment in which the population is unfriendly, it is very difficult to position a sniper without the population knowing.
45. The isolated nature of fighting in urban areas posses support problems. Soviet soldiers in Stalingrad went without food and water for extended periods (to the point where they would shoot holes in water pipes in hopes of obtaining a few drops). Ammunition resupply and medical evacuation pose significant challenges.
46. The NVA in Hue quickly learned that U.S. units used smoke to conceal their movements. As a result, the enemy fired into the areas they expected the friendly forces to move through and caused casualties. Thereafter, the friendly forces used the smoke and back blast from 106mm recoilless rifles to conceal movement.
47. Based on a review of 22 historical cases of urban combat, the correlation of forces is less an absolute than a function of surprise, firepower superiority, quality of intelligence, and the quality of the defense when the force ratio is between 2:1 and 4:1. However, overwhelming superiority reduces attacker losses.
48. In Hue, the enemy held very well-planned strong points, i.e. a three story building with spider holes and flank approaches covered. They would hold until pressure became to great and then fall back to another strong point. Squad leaders had to keep U.S. Marines from over-pursuing and then getting ambushed by the enemy in their new location. Additionally, preplanning mortar fires for 50 meters beyond the strong point forced the withdrawing enemy to move through U.S. mortar fire when abandoning a strong point.
49. Though commercial telephone service into and out of a city was cut, both sides used telephones extensively in the 1981 fighting in Zahle. Even after cutting the ground lines, Christian paramilitary forces used cell phones for effective propaganda communications, to include a call from the paramilitary commander to President George Bush.
50. Western powers need to have military forces better trained for urban combat. This form of training is perceived to require expensive3 (and therefore currently very limited) training facilities. Additionally, mot U.S. and other western, leaders have little experience or expertise in such combat and therefore may be hesitant to undertake such training/missions where they lack confidence in their abilities.
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