This article reviews the warfighting approach used by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) in their 1975 Spring Offensive with an eye to lessons learned applicable to littoral warfare. The final phase of the war in Vietnam required NVA forces to transition from operations centered in the mountains, jungles, and rice paddies to direct confrontation with South Vietnamese Army Forces (ARVN) defending cities and hamlets. This transition in warfighting environments provides insights for Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commanders operating in the ever-expanding Third World urban sprawl.

Background

General Van Tien Dung, in his book Our Great Spring Victory, addresses the strategic, operational, and tactical considerations for planning the final strike against South Vietnam. On a strategic level, the NVA General Staff made several key military assessments that in turn drove the planning process for the Spring Offensive.

The most important of these was a traditional Soviet school "correlation of forces" estimate. On looking at the defensive layout in the South, the country was divided into three areas. In the north was I Corps with five division equivalents. This force was centered around Hue and Da Nang. In the south lay six division equivalents. This was the combined strength of III Corps protecting Saigon and IV Corps covering the Mekong Delta. Finally, in the center was II Corps with only two division equivalents. Slitting his "weak" center became the focus of NVA operational planning.

Within Military Region II the key feature was it consistency of elevation, which, coupled with the road network, facilitated the use of "modern weapons" on this plateau. The ARVN in this area drew logistical strength and mobility from three cities; Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban Me Thuot. These ran from north to south along Highway 14. Any attack in the central region that planned to use mobile striking columns would have to transition from the mountains and forests of Cambodia into the urban fighting environment of one of these cities. The NVA elected to seize Ban Me Thuot, which control led movement on Highways 14 and 21, s the opening shot of their campaign.

Operations Against Cities

At the operational level of war the NVA viewed their main problem as maintaining the correct correlation of forces once the battle had begun. To accomplish this, the operational commander would have to rely on mobility and deception. Use of corps-level assets would ensure that combat units could be moved and supplied as planned. For veteran NVA soldiers, this was the first time that did not have to walk to the battlefield. This comment recurs throughout personal accounts of the battle as troops discuss the "joy" of going into combat fresh.

Deception was maintained at the operational level. While the main effort was centered at Ban Me Thuot, the final campaign was joined simultaneously across the full length of South Vietnam. In words more reminiscent of modern day "preparation of the battlefield" than revolutionary text, General Dung outlines measures taken to ensure correct correlation of forces at the point of main effort. He discusses how valuable Saigon and Da Nang were to the ARVN. By striking at these critical locations concurrently with the main effort, the ARVN would be unable to reinforce the defenders of Ban Me Thuot or counterattack in sufficient strength to disrupt the offensive.

Electronic warfare was used to assist current operations and assess the actions of the enemy. The timing during the execution of each operational phase contributed to the deception effort. While the NVA had the capability to cut Highway 14, isolating Ban Me Thuot from Pleiku, this was delayed until all preparations for the final attack were complete. This ensured the point of main effort was not given away in the early hours of the campaign. Finally, march discipline, dispersion, and not moving forward until the last minute all contributed to the surprise achieved in the early hours of the campaign.

On a tactical level, the NVA used a technique known as the "blooming lotus" to take the town. This methodology was developed in 1952 in an assault on Phat Diem. Its key characteristic was to avoid enemy positions on the perimeter of the town. The main striking columns moved directly against the center of the town seeking out command and control centers. Only then were forces directed outward to systematically destroy the now leaderless units around the town. This outward movement, like a flower in bloom, gives the tactic its name. A reserve was maintained to defeat any counterattack that is mounted to relieve the command center.

This approach contrasts sharply with Western doctrine, which traditionally isolates the town, gains a foothold, and systematically drives inward to clear the town. This sets up a series of attrition-based battles that historically make combat in built-up areas a costly undertaking.

Two problems inherent in this NVA tactical approach are determining where and how to strike into the built-up area. Determining suitable targets and objectives for an attack are traditional intelligence functions. The NVA used two approaches to obtain this information. First, the "revolutionary structure" within Ban Me Thuot provided key information on the actions and locations of the defending forces. It was determined that the key objectives in the town were the command and control center of the defending headquarters and the two large airfields. Securing the latter would preclude large-scale airborne reinforcement once the surface routes to Ban Me Thuot were cut. Second, reconnaissance teams were sent ahead of the strike force. They confirmed and updated information developed on the town and provided the final confirmation for the assault.

To get at these objectives, sufficient combat power to rapidly crush the resistance, the NVA organized mobile strike columns around infantry and armor units. These combined arms organizations were self-sufficient units with the speed, mobility, an striking power to deal blows strong enough to overcome resistance in the heart of the town and agile enough to step around the defensive perimeter to reach objectives. Sapper and infantry formations enhanced the mobility of these striking columns by infiltrating into Ban Me Thuot prior to the battle. They secured key bridge and road junctions needed for the onward movement of the mounted formations.

The tempo generated by these combined arms formations working in unison with the advanced sapper units provided unstoppable in the events that followed. In just 36 hours, resistance in Ban Me Thuot ended. The door to the final conquest of South Vietnam had been thrown open. Within a week Pleiku and Kontum were controlled by the NVA. By the first week of April, the defenders in I Corps' area were crushed and the NVA had taken Cam Ranh Bay. The NVA General Staff turned all eyes on Saigon. The same approach that had proved successful at Ban Thuot provided a backdrop for the conquest of Saigon.

Lessons Learned for Future Operations

The first lesson from this campaign is the linkage between the operational and tactical levels of war. Striking directly at the center of the city enabled the NVA to isolate Ban Me Thuot at the operational level with coordinated attacks on key enemy centers of gravity. Future Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commanders should consider using their strategic mobility, inherent in forces afloat, to threaten action away from the objective area and isolate the battlespace.

Developing the intelligence needed to select the proper objectives within a built-up area remains problematic. It is unlikely in most scenarios that a landing force can exploit a resident "revolutionary structure" to target enemy command and control centers as the NVA did during the Spring Offensive. This requires improved linkage between those conducting Information Warfare and our traditional reconnaissance units to locate the right mix of targets and objects. Only by blending the human side of the intelligence problem with improved technology and target acquisition equipment can the MAGTF commander hope to identify the right centers of gravity.

Lastly, getting to the objective will strain MAGTF mobility resources and the imagination of the MAGTF commander. The NVA combined sapper and infantry combined arms teams to deliver overwhelming combat power at the objective. While the MAGTF commander may use like forces, he can also use vertical envelopment and seaborne penetrations, options that were unavailable to the NVA. The future fielding of the MV-22 (tilt-rotor Osprey) and the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) will extend the reach of Marines as they look to engage on the littoral built-up areas of the next century.

Thus, the NVA 1975 Spring Offensive is instructive in that it provides nontraditional approaches to conduct operations in a built-up area. It can provide a hypothesis for our warfighting experiments such as Urban Warrior. Finally, understanding the dynamics of this campaign ads to our insights of warfare in general and the scope of operations in the complex urban environment of the future.

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