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 Quarterback Psychology 101I have titled this commentary "Quarterback Psychology" for two reasons. One is that this essay will focus on whether or not the quarterback-coach relationship is fundamentally different than the coach relationship to players at other positions mentally; the other reason is that I have absolutely no experience playing quarterback or coaching quarterbacks (I'm lucky if I can throw a football 25 yards), but I do have a PhD in Psychology so maybe I'm qualified to write this commentary after all. Here's the issue: up until 1997 or so it was conventional wisdom that you had to have one main guy at quarterback and stick with him. You could sub your defensive players freely, you could spell your main running back every third or fourth drive to keep him fresh, you could go from two tight end formations to 4 wide-receiver sets depending on the down. Sure, you want one kicker, but you could have a kicker for short field goals, a different guy for long ones and kickoffs, and a separate punter. But the quarterback, well, you wanted one of them, and you wanted to stick with him through thick and thin. Ever heard of an "outside linebacker controversy"? Okay, maybe the Washington Redskins have one as they are itching to use first round draft choice LaVar Arrington as a starter instead of a second teamer, but watch Brad Johnson throw a couple of picks and its the "quarterback controversy" that interests every Redskin fan and commentator in the DC area. Why that word: controversy? Why is it that the starting quarterback is such an important decision, but the other positions less important? And what happened in 1997 to change conventional wisdom? I honestly think something happened on the college football landscape when Florida beat Florida State, 32-29. In that game, Steve Spurrier chose to rotate quarterbacks Noah Brindise and Doug Johnson on virtually every play. The scheme had several advantages: one, the defense would have to adjust to two different quarterbacking styles. Two, the pressure in a big-pressure game was not all on one guy's shoulders, important with a green sophomore in Johnson and a walk on senior in Brindise suddenly thrust into the high-profile position at Air Florida. Three, Spurrier could send the play in directly with the subbing quarterback each play, eliminating the possibility that signals could be stolen or misunderstood. Four, and not to be overestimated, was the surprise factor. The rotation system, when tried later, was far less successful than it was in that first game against Florida State. The scheme may have been tried by others at other times, but for some reason, this game appears to have made swapping quarterbacks much more acceptable. One reason is that Spurrier, a quarterback himself, is widely considered to be an offensive mastermind. If a mastermind and former quarterback thinks it's okay to interfere with delicate quarterback psychology, then maybe it is okay. A second reason is that Florida-Florida State is a high profile game, so the scheme had a baptism by fire and proved successful despite it. And so there seems to be a rash of quarterback shuffling since 1997. It has rarely been used in the way that Spurrier has used it, with substitutions on every play; others have tried every series or every quarter or whenever it was necessary to stimulate the offense. Coaches are more willing to bring out the hook. Some examples: for two years, Alabama has been undecided if Tyler Watts or Andrew Zow should be their starting quarterback, and Coach Mike DuBose frequently uses both in close games. At Arzona, Keith Smith and Ortege Jenkins shared quarterbacking duties from 1998-1999, with Dick Tomey quickly yanking one when the offense stalled. Early last season, Michigan used both Drew Henson and Tom Brady before wisely sticking with Brady. Georgia Tech was able to give Florida State a lot of different looks in the 2000 game by bringing in Jermaine Crenshaw at key moments to take over from George Godsey. Syracuse never seems to be able to settle on Troy Nunes or Madei Williams. Even Florida State readily shuffles its quarterbacks for situational reasons; in 1999 using Marcus Outzen and Dan Kendra in short-yardage situations, Peter Warrick for his big-play potential, and Chris Weinke on most downs for his passing efficiency. Obviously coaches have always switched quarterbacks for reasons of incompetence (DiNardo at LSU used three quarterbacks in 1999 not because he wanted to, but because he had to). But before 1997, there was a reluctance to bring in a new guy to jump-start an offense, to use a situational advantage, or as part of a game plan. The quarterback must be the on-the-field general, and subbing for the general might lead to disharmony in the ranks. Also, like a starting pitcher or a goaltender, the quarterback is involved at all times, and must work himself into the flow of the game and adjust his play as necessary. He may learn as the game goes on how best to exploit the defense, to read their movements, to anticipate blitzes and the predilictions of the defensive backs. Subbing could interrupt this learning process. But coaches have lately been more willing to ignore these negatives for the positives of switching horses in the middle of the race, to borrow a campaign slogan from the Robert Redford movie, "The Candidate". Is it the right thing to do? Spurrier, who I fault or credit with the rash of quarterback shuffling, has been criticised over the past two years for his handling of the Doug Johnson-Jesse Palmer and now Jesse Palmer-Rex Grossman situations. The criticism of the 2000 controversy may be a bit premature. To be sure, Palmer was yanked in the second quarter of a 21-0 game, but Florida always uses 2-3 quarterbacks in the first two games of the season, and Spurrier had intended to give Grossman a lot of playing time against Middle Tennessee State anyway because Palmer went longer than expected in the first game against Ball State. On the other hand, the proximal reason for the yank was that Palmer didn't see a receiver running wide open; Spurrier told Grossman next to him to go in and hit that play. Two plays later, Grossman did, and Spurrier simply left him in there for most of the rest of the game as part of his long-range strategy to give the back up playing time. Still, Florida fans are worried. How will this affect the delicate psychology of the quarterbacks? Will Palmer press too hard, as Johnson seemed to in 1999, for fear that the offense bogging down will mean the yank? Probably the answer to the bigger question is this: you need depth and competition at the quarterback position just like any other position on the field. You need to put your best player out there, and leave him in if at all possible. Quarterback swapping does seem to work best when it is part of a global strategy (Florida vs. Florida State, 1997), when it capitalizes on the different abilities of your quarterbacks (Florida State vs. Florida, 1999; Georgia Tech vs. Florida State, 2000), or when the team responds well to the swap as a jump start (Arizona, 1998). But when the quarterback swapping reflects a lack of confidence in any quarterback by the coach or team, then trouble may loom. Then again, my degree was really in psychobiology. |
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